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PREFACE 
With this fourth volume of Readings in European Security, the number of 
seminars held by the European Security Forum has reached 25, which may 
be viewed as an anniversary and an occasion for stocktaking. The first 
meeting was held in April 2001. The project was initiated by CEPS and the 
IISS in response to an awareness that the European Union’s role in strategic 
foreign policy and security seemed destined to develop, yet at that time 
debate and analysis of the potential issues were extremely limited even in 
Brussels. In the major capital cities of Europe, there were well-established 
policy research institutes devoted to such questions, but they were 
invariably looking from national rather than European perspectives.  
From the start, it was decided to follow a standard format of inviting 
one scholar each from the EU, Russia and the United States to address the 
same issue. With few exceptions, different authors were invited for each of 
the 25 seminars, with the result that there is now a virtual ESF alumni 
association of almost 75 past contributors. Therefore, for this volume we 
have listed this impressive collection of individuals at the end. Taken 
together one can say that the six years and 25 seminars of the European 
Security Forum have involved a considerable share of the leading scholars 
of international relations and strategic studies in the EU, Russia and the US. 
We hope that this effort has resulted in focusing the attention of the 
European policy-research community on Europe’s actual or desirable role 
in matters of strategic security, as well as also helping their American and 
Russian counterparts to think of Europe as an emerging strategic actor.  
Looking ahead, we hope to broaden the topics and participation with 
greater weight given to global rather than just European issues. The last 
meeting covered in this volume, on Afghanistan, with contributors also 
from that region, was a step in that direction.  
Finally, we would like to thank those who have supported the 
European Security Forum, namely NATO, the US Mission to the EU, the 
Compagnia di San Paolo and the Open Society Institute. We are also very 
happy that the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
has joined CEPS and the IISS as a co-sponsor. 
Michael Emerson 
CEPS Senior Research Fellow 
Co-Director, European Security Forum  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this fourth volume of Readings in European Security, a striking 
disconnection occurs between the external challenges facing the European 
Union and its members, and the great, indeed growing, internal difficulties 
within Europe, which impair the ability of the EU to act as a coherent 
player on the international scene. 
Fittingly, in this regard, the first discussion in this fourth volume 
flows from the consequences of the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes against the 
Constitutional Treaty in May–June 2005. The dual rejection has left the EU 
at an institutional impasse and the Union has had to fall back on the Nice 
Treaty as the default option. Thus, we are left with the shortcomings of that 
treaty, not the least of which is an impossibly complex system of voting 
rights within the European Council, which the Constitutional Treaty had 
set out to correct.  
The situation has also deprived the EU of measures that would have 
significantly improved its ability to weigh positively on the international 
scene, such as an EU foreign minister (combining the Commission’s 
considerable foreign-assistance spending with the Council secretariat’s 
diplomatic assets) and a foreign service, the solidarity clause or the 
abolition of the six-month rotating presidency. Possibly most significantly, 
however, the Nice Treaty in its current state does not provide for the EU to 
enlarge beyond the current 27 member states: neither seats in the European 
Parliament nor voting rights in the Council are available for any additional 
new members. This restriction does not mean that there is no way to break 
the deadlock – in the short term, for instance, it may just be possible to 
modify the Nice Treaty in the margins to create space for Croatia when it is 
ready to join, possibly by 2009 – hopefully without raising calls for a new 
referendum. Yet such an expedient will not eliminate the broader logjam. 
Some two years after the ‘no’ votes and as the French are going to the 
presidential election polls, it may now be feasible to attempt to agree on 
measures that could allow the Union to move beyond the Nice Treaty. Not 
only is this necessary if the EU is to exercise international responsibilities 
commensurate with its economic and political weight, it would also make 
sense, since apparently the bulk of the external and security policy 
provisions of the Constitutional Treaty had been uncontroversial in the 
French and Dutch referenda campaigns. It can be argued that bringing such 
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provisions into a post-Nice Treaty regime would not be a denial of the will 
expressed by the ‘no’ voters in France and the Netherlands. 
The following meeting on the topic of burning banlieues was about a 
very different sort of crisis, since it involved rioting and violence, rather 
than voting and institutions. Nevertheless, there is a strong epistemological 
link between the French ‘no’ vote and the November 2005 crisis in France: 
in both cases, the politics of identity were of the essence. The saving grace 
(if such a form of words can be suggested) of these events in France was 
that the rioters were not promoting an alternative identity, let alone waging 
jihad. Far from being a European intifada, as the Russian or American 
mainstream media were prone to suggest, the riots were about the 
downtrodden seeking entrée into the system. This reaction was against 
housing and job discrimination rather than a quest for reverse 
discrimination in the form of communautarisme: the ‘Eurabia’ of some of the 
more sensationalist American literary visions of contemporary Europe is 
not lying in wait around the corners of the French cités, whatever else may 
be (and is) wrong with the situation in the suburbs. The vast array of 
policies and attitudes in Europe vis-à-vis citizens and non-citizens hailing – 
or whose ancestors hail – from the greater Middle East provides analysts 
and hopefully politicians with a rich fund of practices, good and bad, from 
which to attempt to draw lessons for the future. Between the integrationist, 
assimilationist policies put forward by France and the communautariste 
spatial segregation of the ethnic and religious ghettos of Belgium and the 
UK, the contrasts of principle but also of implementation are as diverse as 
the consequences, be it in terms of daily law and order (or its absence), the 
spawning (or stifling) of terrorism and the violent or peaceful interaction 
with the rest of the population. Getting both principles and implementation 
right in terms of the functioning of the European melting pot is crucial for 
the future of the EU countries as open and vibrant societies. 
A Europe in an institutional funk and plunged into identitaire 
introspection is not well poised to deal with the issues of energy security at 
a time when relatively high energy prices and lastingly high levels of fossil-
fuel dependency converge with a newly assertive Russia as a supplier of oil 
and gas and the rapidly rising demand of Asia. The same applies to the 
growing constraint of global warming caused by the emissions of 
greenhouse gases from hydrocarbon fuels of all sorts.  
The meeting on European energy security took place after Russia had 
put Europe on notice in January 2006 that gas deliveries could no longer be 
taken for granted, given Russia’s political and economic objectives. Our 
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discussion highlighted the very real difficulties in understanding what 
Russia has actually been attempting to achieve through its energy policy, 
beyond satisfying Gazprom’s desire to secure higher earnings from the sale 
of Russian gas to those countries of Russia’s near abroad that still benefit 
from prices that are less than those of the world market. In geopolitical 
terms, Moscow has managed to alienate relations with and reduce its 
influence in a broad range of countries, notably Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, not to mention Georgia (but in the last particular case, the 
damage had already been done). These countries have gravitated away 
from rather than closer to Moscow as a consequence. And in geo-economic 
terms, Russia appears to be achieving great success in discouraging the 
investment flows that would be necessary to sustain, let alone expand, 
levels of gas and oil production, which have not improved from where they 
stood in the days of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Exports 
have doubled since then because of the demise of the energy-profligate 
industry of the Soviet era, but that sort of low-hanging fruit has already 
been plucked. 
The race is now on between the energy appetite of a rapidly growing 
Russian economy on the one hand, and stagnating oil and gas production 
levels on the other, against the prospective backdrop of socially (and 
politically) painful domestic gas-price increases. If Russia’s purpose in the 
field of energy remains confusing, it is quite clear that for Russia, it is not 
simply market-driven: energy is viewed and handled as a strategic asset. 
Under those conditions, the EU’s attempts to devise an energy strategy 
essentially based on free market principles seems to some experts to run 
the risk of falling out of synch. The corresponding contradictions grew 
plain in the presentations and debates in our session on energy security. 
Between energy security and Ukraine, there are but a few steps to 
take. From our discussions on Ukraine, two points can be highlighted. The 
first is Ukraine’s clear will to see itself as having a European future. There 
may be deep divisions concerning NATO membership, but not about that 
of the EU. In other words, it is important that the EU does not close off the 
long-term prospect of Ukrainian membership. The door may not be open, 
but it should be pointed out that no decision has been made to lock it. 
Despite Ukraine’s deep and enduring difficulties, especially in terms of the 
links between crime and politics, the country’s existence and independence 
are now well established, however imperfect its political life. There is a 
strong and diverse civil society – indeed, the formula used in our 
discussion was that ‘the people are better than their leaders’. The second 
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point is about energy. Ultimately, Ukraine stands to gain (as did the Baltics 
some years ago) from moving towards world market prices, since this 
would avoid compromising the full and free exercise of sovereignty vis-à-
vis Russia – sweetheart deals have a high political price. Thus, rather than 
pressing Russia to moderate its pricing policies, both Ukraine and the EU 
should seek to promote greater transparency on gas prices and 
transactions, while putting in place policies that would limit the economic 
consequences of energy price increases.  
Finally, our session devoted to Afghanistan cast an occasionally cruel 
light on both NATO’s divisions and shortcomings, and the West’s 
imprudence and illusions in assigning itself enormously ambitious social, 
economic and political goals, without the geopolitical and regional 
framework, the on-site institutional tools or the in-depth local presence that 
our lofty objectives would normally call for. Although the mission may not 
(yet) be impossible, the sense of the meeting was hardly cheerful about the 
prospects of success, unless very substantial changes of attitude and 
organisation take place. Undertakings between allies need to be honoured, 
while the scale of the challenges in Afghanistan require a much more direct 
involvement of the regional players – not least Iran – as part of an 
integrated international venture, rather than to continue as an essentially 
Western effort. The crisis of Europe’s commitments in Afghanistan is a 
facet of the West’s broader and growing inability to set the global strategic 
agenda in the post-cold war era. 
François Heisbourg 
Chairman 
European Security Forum 
 
  
 
 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU CRISIS 
 
WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY 
JEFFREY GEDMIN 
CHARLES GRANT 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty have opened 
up a period of deep and protracted difficulties for the European Union. The 
strategic implications of the new situation are compounded by the fact that 
foreign and security policy was one of the areas in which significant 
innovations have been provided for by the treaty. 
In presenting his paper on the American perspective, Jeffrey Gedmin 
(Director of the Aspen Institute Berlin) disputed the notion of a ‘crisis’ in 
the literal sense of the word, preferring the word ‘malaise’. He underscored 
the limited extent of schadenfreude in Washington. According to him, there 
was now a good chance to move away, on both sides of the Atlantic, from 
moralising attitudes towards having a more dynamic debate on the future 
of Europe. He noted that the strategic glue between the US and Europe was 
not as readily provided as before by common values (although not ‘clone’ 
values) or common interests (we all have ‘sharper elbows’ and our interests 
do not always coincide). But when addressing the question of transatlantic 
cooperation, his view was that it was necessary to think through the 
alternatives to sticking together. 
Timofei Bordachev (from the Institute of Europe) put forward the 
proposition in his presentation that the EU crisis means the end of a 
‘normative empire’. While emphasising the absence of mutual trust in the 
EU–Russian relationship, he considered that the future of the European 
integration project could not be dealt with in isolation from cooperation 
with Russia, in effect with a view towards an EU–Russian future. In 
response to the chairman’s question about the nature of the glue binding 
Russia and the EU, he added that the aim was to extend “peace in Eurasia” 
in the same way that the EU’s goal had hitherto been “peace in Europe”.  
Charles Grant (Director of the Centre for European Reform) 
underlined the importance of interests in providing the glue between the 
                                                     
* François Heisbourg is Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in 
Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
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US and the EU as between Russia and the EU. Pressed by the chairman on 
the issue of the ultimate limits of the EU, he defended the virtues of 
ambiguity within the context of existing treaty language (which mentions 
‘Europe’ without defining it in geographical terms). Like Jeffrey Gedmin, 
he was wary of using the word ‘crisis’, which conveys the impression that 
European integration is essentially treaty-driven whereas recent examples 
(the Services Directive and the European Arrest Warrant) show otherwise. 
He considered that in the case of the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP), political will is more important than institutions. In presenting the 
proposals made in his paper concerning variable geometry, he recalled the 
need to define those areas that would need to be common and not variable 
(e.g. trade, competition, the single market, fisheries and regional policy, 
elements of the common agricultural policy, border control and the 
environment). He added that his suggestion of “associate membership of 
the CFSP” could include Russia. 
In setting the stage for the first round of discussions, Robert Cooper 
made several points. In his view, too much hubris had accompanied the 
Constitutional Treaty project, moving away from the methodology of Jean 
Monnet or, to use a British precedent, of Walter Bagehot: we forgot to do 
things that are effective rather than those that are just dignified or 
decorative. He noted that while there had indeed been little schadenfreude in 
the US, there had been rather more in Russia, because of opposing views on 
enlargement (i.e. for Moscow, the less enlargement the better, while for 
Washington the more the better). On the ultimate limits of the EU, he asked 
the rhetorical question of whether the Mediterranean or the Sahara was the 
limit of the EU to the south. On the issue of associate membership of the 
CFSP, he stressed not only the limited appeal of such halfway-house 
solutions (countries want a seat at the table) but also the limited ability of a 
still weak CFSP to cope with such an approach (hence the ‘no’ to Norway’s 
ideas on this score).  
In the first round of discussions, one participant noted that variable 
geometry would have occurred even with the Constitutional Treaty. And 
even those who want variable geometry need to explain who would define 
the areas that would not be subject to variable geometry. On a different 
note, the same person observed that “output legitimacy” had reached its 
limits. He made the point that the European Arrest Warrant had been 
struck down by the German constitutional court in part for reasons related 
to national sovereignty.  
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A member of the Commission staff stressed inter alia (as had Jeffrey 
Gedmin) that the smaller states had to be “brought along” in the European 
integration process. He also emphasised that the CFSP had not been a 
contentious item in the French and Dutch referenda. His view was that 
there will be a need for a new treaty down the road if the EU wants to have 
an EU foreign minister. This point was underscored by a Dutch speaker, 
who asked how the EU could deal with Asia if the ‘malaise’ is unresolved. 
Another participant raised the risk of “protectionist groupings” arising in 
the case of variable geometry while a member of CEPS noted that 
enlargement would slow down without a treaty. 
In response, Charles Grant raised the issue of the eventual extension 
of the EU’s “enlargement leverage” as far afield as North Africa or Russia 
or Kazakhstan. He agreed that the Constitutional Treaty should be 
considered dead. He suggested that the existing treaties could provide the 
basis for deciding what would not be eligible for variable geometry. 
Robert Cooper agreed that one would indeed need a Constitutional 
Treaty to have an EU foreign minister. He noted that while it is possible in 
theory to create the service d’action extérieur (SAE) without a treaty, one 
would still have to decide to whom the SAE would report, which brings 
one back to the foreign minister. The Croatian Accession Treaty could 
possibly be used to incorporate elements of CFSP-related language. 
He reminded participants of the recent speech given by the Belgian 
foreign minister in Florence, observing that not every EU country would be 
interested in every CFSP issue. On the issue of the EU’s limits, he 
considered that this was a divisive debate whose time had not yet come. 
Timofei Bordachev took the view that the EU crisis had really started 
in 1997, when variable geometry was introduced and that variable 
geometry kills solidarity.  
In the second round of discussions, Russian participants pointed out 
that the EU–Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would expire 
in 2007. A member of CEPS took exception to the idea that the EU had 
ceased to be a ‘normative empire’, noting that Russia lay outside the EU’s 
system of norms and values. 
On the issue of the EU’s limits, one participant observed that the 
French départments in Algeria had been covered by the original treaties in 
the 1950s, while Cyprus had been included in the Council of Europe at the 
same time, thus reminding us of the many meanings that could be given to 
the word ‘Europe’… 
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A Finnish participant noted that the EU had made substantial 
progress in the field of defence, citing the creation of battle groups and the 
European Defence Agency. He wondered where this would lead us in the 
next 20 years. A Japanese speaker suggested that the real crises were 
budgetary or political (e.g. the leadership conflict between Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac) rather than constitutional. 
Cherry-picking could deal with the latter. 
A Canadian participant also took the view that the incremental 
progress on the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and justice, 
liberty and security, combined with the inevitable leadership changes in 
Paris and London, could move the EU beyond the current malaise. He 
added that with the accession of Croatia, the Nice Treaty would become 
obsolete in terms of its voting weight provisions. This situation could 
present an opportunity for broader change in the form of a new treaty. 
In response, Timofei Bordachev considered that the EU had not been 
a serious player with Russia, either before or after the rejections of the 
Constitutional Treaty. The treaty had not changed things much from that 
standpoint. Russia was not using as much leverage as it could in its 
relations with the EU from its position in the field of energy, where its 
policy has essentially been one of a mere seller of oil and gas. 
Charles Grant did not concur with the view that “variable geometry 
kills solidarity”. In his view, the ‘EU-3’ on Iran, the policy towards Ukraine 
and the euro were all positive examples of solidarity. He agreed with the 
role of defence in helping the EU to move forward. As to where defence 
convergence would be in 20 years, he foresaw common procurement, the 
enhanced pooling of assets and the development of the EU’s military 
intervention capability. 
In conclusion, he observed that Russia’s values and attitudes were 
different from those of the EU, but noted that whereas Russia’s values 
could change, the sheer size of Russia would not, thus bringing us back to 
the question of the EU’s limits.  
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American and European malaise? 
An American Perspective 
Jeffrey Gedmin* 
This author perhaps first really grasped what schadenfreude means by living 
in Germany these past four years. Countless examples come to mind, of 
course, but most recent and poignant, perhaps, was the column in the 
newspaper Tageszeitung (taz). The writer of the article actually took the 
view that it was a good thing that hurricane Katrina had hit the United 
States (he felt “joy” in his heart). He added for good measure that it had 
been a pity Katrina had not been able to target supporters of the American 
president and members of the US military (Philipp Mausshardt, 2 
September 2005). 
This view may be an example of anti-Americanism, but it also is in 
keeping with the moral competition some European elites insist on 
promoting with the US. Recall, for example, the overheated, sanctimonious 
rhetoric one heard for a time from European capitals about the Kyoto 
Protocol. It seemed a touch unreasonable. The UN’s Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change suggests says that, without ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the average global temperature will rise by about 1 degree 
Celsius by 2050. The same group forecasts that with the implementation of 
Kyoto, the temperature will still rise by 0.94 degrees. As Italian defence 
minister Antonio Martino (himself an economist) has pointed out, that is a 
whopping difference of 0.06 degrees in a half century. Incidentally, a dozen 
European countries that signed Kyoto are slipping rapidly behind their 
treaty obligations today, a fact that does not seem to cause much huffing 
and puffing on opinion and editorial pages and talk shows in Europe. 
Rather it is the eco-reactionary President George W. Bush, as maintained 
for example by the Independent newspaper, who is the real “threat to the 
world”. 
                                                     
* Jeffrey Gedmin is Director of the Aspen Institute Berlin. 
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What is the difference between American and European approaches 
to the Greater Middle East? One can find a candid and rather astonishing 
answer on the website of the German foreign ministry, says Dr Gunter 
Muhlack, Commissioner for the Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamic 
World:  
We do not want to impose our view of the world and our philosophy 
on our partners. Here I have the feeling there is a big difference 
between the American and European approach. Europe is no longer 
interested in power games. The world we want to see is a world of 
lasting peace based on justice and the rule of law.1 
This moral competition with America is nothing new, of course, and 
like anti-Americanism itself it has a long history and tradition. Barry Rubin 
notes that in the 1780s, a French lawyer named Simon Linguet, surely 
speaking for more than a few at the time, argued that America was being 
built by the dregs of Europe and would in due course become a dreadful 
society bent on the domination of the continent and the destruction of 
civilisation. Nor is the attempt of European elites to caricature American 
presidents and US positions anything new. The current affairs magazine 
Der Spiegel insisted that we Americans want to have everything our own 
way in our own “McWorld” in an editorial written during the glory days of 
that great and beloved multilateralist President Bill Clinton. As for current 
American attitudes towards the greater Middle East by the way, President 
Bush’s view, in his own words, is that “when the soul of a nation finally 
speaks, the institutions that emerge may reflect customs and traditions very 
different from our own. America will not impose our form of government 
on others.”2 
One wonders whether a touch of humility on both sides of the 
Atlantic will provide space for much overdue reflection and introspection. 
This author thinks we have an opportunity. The administration in 
Washington had been starting to realise well before the president’s re-
election to a second term that the way in which the US had dealt with key 
                                                     
1 See also the article by J. Gedmin in Welt Online, 21 October 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article172325/Araber-Versteher.html). 
2 See the second inaugural address of President George W. Bush, “President 
Sworn-in to Second Term”, Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, the White 
House, Washington, D.C., 20 January 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html). 
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allies in recent years had been counter-productive, to put it mildly. This 
was one of the conclusions in a recent book by Yale historian John Lewis 
Gaddis entitled Surprise, Security, and the American Experience,3 a slender 
volume the president, his national security adviser and top National 
Security Council members were reading in summer 2004. The president 
had even invited Professor Gaddis to the White House for a discussion.  
Indeed, if the European reaction over Kyoto tended towards hysteria, 
Washington’s own management of the issue was defined by arrogance and 
incompetence. Likewise, American public diplomacy failed badly to 
explain American reservations about the International Criminal Court and, 
for that matter, pressing US concerns over Saddam Hussein’s quest to 
escape sanctions and continue his armament programmes. American 
hubris may fade, at least momentarily, and for this there are certainly other 
reasons as well.  
The mismanagement of hurricane Katrina was a disaster for the Bush 
administration. Social security reform, which was to be a centrepiece of the 
president’s second term, has floundered. Iraq continues to present 
enormous challenges. The president’s popularity has plummeted. The 
indictment of Vice President Dick Cheney’s aide Scooter Libbey and the 
ongoing investigation of potential wrongdoing in the CIA-leak case of the 
president’s top adviser Karl Rove have also badly damaged the 
administration. The ill-fated choice of Harriet Meiers for a seat on the 
Supreme Court was another recent blow to the president’s standing and 
prestige. 
At the same time, from an American perspective Europe hardly looks 
to be in the best of shape. One would be hard pressed to find much 
evidence of schadenfreude in Washington. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s power has begun to wane. In France, the nationwide riots of recent 
weeks have begun to provoke a serious national debate, which will 
understandably devour enormous amounts of time and political capital in 
the months ahead. The American-led intervention in Iraq has damaged 
America’s standing in France. Yet one wonders if our French friends fully 
appreciate how, in the US, the image of France has taken a beating as well. 
In October, a French magistrate brought former UN Ambassador Jean-
                                                     
3 See J. Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
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Bernard Merimee in for questioning on an allegation that he took a bribe 
from Saddam Hussein for 11 million barrels of oil. Others accused of 
wrongdoing in the UN’s oil-for-food scandal thus far include Charles 
Pasqua, a Senator and former interior minister; Serge Boidevaix, the former 
Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry; and Patrick Maugein, Chairman 
of the oil company SOCO, who is also close to President Jacques Chirac. 
Germany has its own problems of course. At the time of writing, we 
are still waiting for a new government. The grand coalition that is being 
formed will try to focus on economic reform, a process that is now certain 
to move forward at a snail’s pace. With low growth, 11% unemployment 
(19% in Berlin), meagre defence spending, an ageing population and 
declining birth rates, does anyone really expect Germany – Europe’s largest 
economy – to be a force for action and a leader in Europe in the years to 
come? 
This is the backdrop to the collapse of the EU’s constitutional process. 
One does not have to be a Euro-pessimist to see that Europe is likely to be 
stalled for the next couple of years. Further enlargement appears 
increasingly unlikely, deeper integration at the moment unthinkable. 
Charles Grant is right when he wrote recently that the EU is “neither dead 
nor dying”. There is reason to believe, though, that both the US and EU 
may tend now towards self-involvement, a regrettable and potentially 
dangerous scenario for the next couple of years. 
In the short term, Iran continues to pose a formidable challenge to the 
transatlantic community. Europeans whisper that military force will not 
halt the mullahs’ drive for a nuclear weapon. The Americans make no 
secret of the fact that they believe diplomacy is doomed to fail. Both may be 
right. Meanwhile, Syria shows signs of meltdown. The future of Iraq still 
hangs in the balance. In East Asia, we must cope with proliferation and 
prepare for the coming unification of Korea. And of course, how we help 
manage the rise of a peaceful China over the years ahead is probably one of 
the most serious tasks the transatlantic community has to ponder. 
There has been a fair amount of commentary in Europe about Euro-
scepticism and anti-Europeanism in the US. This view is part of a larger 
and largely phoney debate. There is broad consensus in the US in favour of 
a strong Europe. Even the dreaded neo-conservatives have called for years 
for greater defence spending and reform of European economies, measures 
that would make Europe stronger. A stronger Europe would be less 
envious and resentful of American power. Once the current imbalance of 
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power is addressed, it may become easier to forge common strategies on a 
variety of security issues.  
How Europeans choose to organise themselves remains chiefly a 
European matter, even if we ‘talking heads’ like to hector from time to time 
from the bleachers. In this respect Americans have had concern about one 
thing, a concern shared on both sides of the political aisle in Washington: 
that the new Europe, whatever its organisational arrangements, is Atlantic 
in its orientation, inclusive towards the young democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and open to helping the US solve the global, strategic 
problems of the day. This seems like a reasonable proposition if there ever 
was one.  
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The Strategic Implications 
of the EU Malaise 
Enlargement, Variable Geometry and 
a Stronger Neighbourhood Policy 
A European Perspective 
Charles Grant* 
The European Union’s malaise in 2005 is the result of at least four 
problems: economic failure, institutional blockage, diminishing legitimacy 
and lack of leadership. The poor performance of the core eurozone 
economies has made many people fearful of change, whether it comes in 
the form of new EU treaties or fresh rounds of enlargement. The failure of 
the Constitutional Treaty has left a cloud of uncertainty over the EU’s 
institutions. Partly as a consequence of those economic and institutional 
problems, the legitimacy of the EU has deteriorated among many sections 
of European public opinion. And finally, throughout its history the EU has 
never experienced such a striking lack of leadership. The Commission is 
weak, while most of the larger member states have leaders who appear to 
care little about the fate of the EU.  
This essay examines the strategic consequences of the EU’s malaise 
and, in particular, the threat to further EU enlargement. It suggests that an 
extension of the principle of variable geometry could help to revive 
prospects for enlargement. And it proposes a form of associate membership 
for countries that have no hope of joining the EU. 
Ever since the 1970s, there has been a close link between ‘deepening’, 
the movement towards a more integrated Union, and ‘widening’, the 
enlargement of the Union. Political elites in core countries such as France 
have always been reluctant to widen the EU, understanding that a larger 
Union would find it difficult to integrate. They feared that the British 
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wanted enlargement in order to fulfil the Thatcherite dream of an EU that 
was little more than a glorified free trade area, with weaker institutions and 
less solidarity. A wider Europe, of course, would also reduce the influence 
of France, Germany and the Benelux countries. 
Despite these reservations, the EU has continued to enlarge – in 1981, 
1986, 1995 and 2004. The French and others sceptical of enlargement, such 
as federalists, swallowed their reservations. They did so because they 
extracted a price. This price amounted to a series of treaties that created a 
more integrated Europe – those negotiated in 1985, 1991, 1997, 2000 and 
finally the Constitutional Treaty, signed in 2004 but unlikely to ever enter 
into force. The British, Nordics and some other enthusiasts for enlargement 
were never particularly keen on treaty-based integration, but put up with it 
in return for enlargement. (The Germans sat in the middle of this debate, 
pro-deepening, because of their generally federalist approach to the EU, 
but also pro-widening, so that their neighbours could join the club.) 
This implicit bargain between deepeners and wideners has driven the 
EU forward for the past 20 years. The demise of the Constitutional Treaty 
has therefore done much more than bring an end to treaty-based 
integration for the foreseeable future. It has also created major obstacles to 
further enlargement of the EU.  
Appetite for enlargement was deteriorating even before the French 
and Dutch referenda. France had changed its Constitution in March 2005 
such that any country wishing to join after Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
could not do so without a positive referendum in France. Indeed one 
reason why French people voted ‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty was to 
protest against the 2004 enlargement, which had been unpopular in France. 
In both France and the Netherlands, some of those voting ‘no’ did so 
because they opposed Turkish membership (although the treaty had 
nothing to do with Turkey).  
Evidently, there are many reasons why people oppose further 
enlargement, in addition to an apparent wish to end deepening. Some 
voters fear that people from accession countries will steal their jobs while 
others do not want Muslim countries in the EU. But there is no doubt that 
the French and Dutch referenda have darkened the prospect of a much 
wider Europe. Since the referenda, most of the serious contenders for the 
French presidency – including Nicolas Sarkozy, Dominique de Villepin and 
Laurent Fabius – have spoken out strongly against Turkish accession. So 
have Angela Merkel, Edmund Stoiber and other senior German Christian 
Democrats. Austrian leaders have been especially hostile to Turkey, almost 
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vetoing the opening of accession talks in October 2005. In many EU 
countries, senior officials, politicians and pundits are arguing that the EU 
should not expand into the Balkans, Turkey or elsewhere until and unless it 
can strengthen its institutions. 
That argument is not unreasonable. Proponents of enlargement need 
to show that the EU’s policies and institutions could function effectively in 
a wider Union. Nevertheless, it would be a tragedy for the EU to postpone 
further enlargement indefinitely. The Union’s greatest success has been its 
ability to spread democracy, prosperity, security and stability across most 
of the continent. Of course, there has to be a geographical limit at some 
point – North African countries are not in Europe and so cannot join. Still, 
for the EU to define precisely its future borders for all time would have a 
disastrous impact on would-be members beyond those borders. 
If the EU ended talks with Turkey, the extreme nationalist and 
Islamist elements within Turkish politics and society would be 
strengthened. The impact of the EU shutting the door on the Western 
Balkans would be worse still. Would fragile constructions such as Bosnia 
and Macedonia hold together? Would Serbia ever be able to swallow the 
bitter pill of independence for Kosovo without the prospect of EU 
membership for itself? And if the EU said ‘never’ to countries further 
afield, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, how could it hope 
to influence their development? 
Can variable geometry save enlargement? 
Despite enlargement’s gloomy prospects, Europe’s leaders could, if 
determined, resuscitate the process. First, they should boost Europe’s 
economic growth. As long as millions of Europeans are unemployed or fear 
for their jobs, they will naturally be reluctant to welcome new EU member 
states and their workers. Second, EU leaders should lead, explaining to 
electorates that extending the single market and good governance across 
the continent enhances their prosperity and security. 
Third, politicians should work to revive the EU’s legitimacy in two 
ways. They should ensure that the EU focuses on policies and actions that 
appear relevant to citizens’ lives, such as encouraging educational 
exchanges, making it easier for people to live and work outside their home 
country or helping to retrain those who lose from globalisation. And they 
should improve the way the institutions work, for example by giving 
national parliaments a bigger role in decision-making and by allowing the 
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media into the Council of Ministers. Much can be done without changing 
the current treaties.  
This essay concerns itself not with these three points, but rather a 
fourth way of promoting the cause of enlargement. EU leaders should 
make better use of variable geometry, the idea that not every member state 
needs to take part in every EU policy area. Already, of course, some EU 
countries opt out of the euro, the Schengen agreement or EU defence 
policy. The current treaties allow groups of member states to move ahead 
in certain policy areas, under the as yet unused enhanced cooperation 
procedure. An avant-garde group could also emerge independently of the 
EU institutions. Schengen started as an inter-governmental accord before 
being folded into the EU treaties. 
More variable geometry could help enlargement in three ways. 
• If the countries that aspire to a ‘political union’ were able to build 
avant-gardes in certain policy areas, and thus revive a sense of 
forward motion, they would be less likely to oppose further widening 
of the Union. 
• EU governments should also try to persuade EU applicants to accept 
long or possibly indefinite transition periods that would postpone 
their full participation in some EU policies. Again, that would make 
enlargement more palatable for some doubters. 
• For neighbours of the EU that are unlikely to join in the foreseeable 
future, the EU should offer a tighter form of association than its 
current neighbourhood policy. The EU should hold out the 
possibility of neighbours being able to join the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) as ‘security partners’. Such a scheme, if 
successful, could reduce the number of countries seeking full 
membership. 
Greater use of avant-garde groups 
The current trend towards variable geometry is unmistakeable. For 
example, seven member states signed the Treaty of Prüm in May 2005, a 
kind of ‘super-Schengen’ agreement that among other things enables the 
signatories to share information on fingerprints and DNA, and to cooperate 
on aircraft security. More informally, the interior ministers of the UK, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the so-called ‘G-5’, work together on 
counter-terrorism. And then there are issue-based subgroups of members, 
such as that of the UK, France and Germany, the ‘EU-3’, which leads EU 
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policy on Iran. All these groupings promote European interests or 
integration. In a wider, more diverse EU, it is inevitable that some countries 
will not take part in every policy area. This trend should be welcomed and 
not resisted. Any forum that has 25 or 27 governments represented around 
a table is seldom likely to be useful or effective. 
The variable geometry envisaged here is different to the idea of a 
‘hard core’ or ‘concentric circles’ that is periodically floated by senior 
French politicians, including Jacques Chirac, Valérie Giscard d’Estaing and 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Their idea is that France and Germany should 
lead a group of integrationist members into a new organisation that would 
establish closer cooperation across a broad range of policy areas, rather 
than one particular area. Those left in the outer circle would be in the EU 
but not the new core. This scenario has never been very plausible because 
of the institutional, political and judicial difficulties that would ensue, and 
because few German leaders are amenable to the idea. It has become even 
less plausible in recent years because Franco-German leadership has gained 
a poor reputation among many other member states and because of the 
weakness of the governments in Paris and Berlin.  
This essay suggests an alternative scenario, based on the current 
situation, in which several avant-garde groups, each with a different 
membership, would overlap. 
Evidently, variable geometry – whether in the form of treaty-based 
enhanced cooperation clubs established outside the treaties or informal 
groups focused on particular policies – entails risks. Nevertheless, most of 
the potential pitfalls can be dealt with. 
• There is a danger of exclusion. The British government has traditionally 
opposed variable geometry, fearing that if it stayed out of a group it 
would lose influence in the EU and that if it later tried to join it might 
find the door bolted. Any avant-garde group is entitled to establish 
entry criteria for those who wish to join. These criteria need to be 
interpreted in an objective manner, however, to ensure a member 
state is not excluded for the wrong reasons. The Nice Treaty’s rules 
on enhanced cooperation give the Commission just such a policing 
role. The countries that signed the Treaty of Prüm have said explicitly 
that, if their venture is a success, they will invite other member states 
to sign in 2008. The problem of exclusion is more pronounced for 
informal groupings. When the EU-3 began their Iranian diplomacy, 
other member states resented being left out. But the subsequent 
involvement of High Representative for the EU’s CFSP Javier Solana, 
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who reports back to the other governments, has reassured most of 
them. 
• Avant-garde groups could weaken EU institutions. Groups established 
outside the framework of the treaties, whether formal or informal, 
risk undermining the role of the Commission, Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice, to the extent that inter-governmental 
arrangements do not involve EU institutions. That being stated, 
precautions can be taken to ensure that such groups mesh smoothly 
with the institutions. For example, when the Schengen agreement 
was established – initially, outside the EU treaties – the Commission 
was invited along as an observer. The signatories of the Treaty of 
Prüm have taken care to ensure that it is compatible with EU law. 
• Variable geometry is ‘undemocratic’. That is true, to the extent that 
neither the European nor national parliaments have oversight of 
inter-governmental organisations. Yet avant-garde groups are only as 
undemocratic as governments choose to make them. If a group of 
member states embarked upon an enhanced cooperation initiative, 
the European Parliament would play a role (for normal Community 
business, the Parliament’s consent would be required, on foreign 
policy the Parliament would merely be informed and on justice and 
home affairs it would be asked for an opinion). Other sorts of avant-
garde groupings need not be unaccountable. Thus the President of 
the European Central Bank appears before the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The Western 
European Union, a defence subgroup that has largely merged with 
the EU, still has its own parliamentary assembly, consisting of 
representatives from national parliaments. Other inter-governmental 
groupings could create their own systems of parliamentary oversight. 
• Variable geometry could lead to the unravelling of the acquis 
communautaire with increased opting-out. The more some countries are 
allowed to pick and choose, the greater the risk that others will 
demand the right to opt out of existing policies they dislike. British 
Conservatives, for example, talk of using variable geometry to pull 
the UK out of the common farm, fisheries and foreign policies. The 
EU therefore needs to define the set of policies in which that every 
member state must take part. These policies should include trade, 
competition, the single market and its four freedoms (of goods, 
services, capital and people), fisheries and regional policy, overseas 
aid, some common rules on agriculture, some environmental rules, 
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some cooperation on borders and policing, and a common foreign 
policy. That leaves subjects such as the euro, the coordination of 
budgetary and tax policy, border controls, and the harmonisation of 
criminal justice and defence policy as suitable for variable geometry.  
The countries in the euro area may well see virtue in coordinating 
their economic policies more closely. They are already talking of 
harmonising corporate tax bases (though not rates). They may wish to 
create a stronger external representation for the eurozone. Jean Pisani-
Ferry, of the Bruegel think tank, has suggested that there is a much stronger 
case for eurozone members to coordinate their structural reforms than 
there is for the wider EU membership to do so. At some point, the eurozone 
countries may even wish to simplify and strengthen the currently ragged 
rules of the stability and growth pact. 
The other area where more variable geometry is likely is in the 
domain of justice and home affairs. The Schengen agreement was a 
successful piece of variable geometry, conceived outside the treaties but 
later shifted into them. The recent Treaty of Prüm suggests that more 
variable geometry is on the way, as do the ‘G-5’ meetings of interior 
ministers. 
Transitional arrangements 
When a country joins the EU, it is normally subject to transitional 
arrangements that exclude it from full participation in certain policies for a 
number of years. Sometimes these work to the benefit of the new member 
state. Eastern Europeans countries that joined the EU in 2004 will not have 
to apply all the (very costly) environmental rules for up to seven years. 
Sometimes the transitional arrangements work, supposedly, in the interests 
of the old member states. Thus, many of the old member states have 
insisted on limiting the right to work of citizens from the new member 
states for seven years. 
Most applicants naturally resist that kind of measure, resenting the 
implication of a status that is ‘membership minus’. Moreover, some 
applicants and future applicants should think very seriously about 
tolerating some long or even indefinite transitional periods. The biggest 
reason why many people fear Turkish membership is that they fear its 
workers will take their jobs. Free movement of labour would be good for 
Turkey and in most respects good for the existing member states. But given 
Turkey’s current poverty – with per capita GDP at around 30% of the EU 
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average – fears of Turkish immigration are understandable. Turkey should 
be prepared to envisage a provision that would, for example, allow a 
member state to limit inflows of Turkish labour indefinitely, but only for as 
long as Turkey’s per capita GDP was below 50% of the EU average.  
Once Turkey had been in the Union for a few years, many member 
states would probably not wish to apply such restrictions. After all, the 
Turkey that joins the EU, if it does, will be very different from and much 
richer than the Turkey of today. Some Turks would see membership with 
limits on free movement of labour as an insult. Yet as a last resort, Turkish 
negotiators should be prepared to accept such limits. Turkey would be 
much better off inside the EU, with restrictions, than outside. This 
approach would be a kind of variable geometry, in the sense that not every 
member state would be taking part in every policy. Like the other kinds of 
variable geometry, it should make enlargement less threatening to those 
who fear it. 
Associate membership of the CFSP 
Turkey and Croatia have started accession negotiations. Macedonia, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Albania are likely to start negotiations at some point. If 
Montenegro and Kosovo become independent, they too will probably 
become candidates. Such countries are currently far from being ready for 
membership. If these Balkan states make good progress, however, and if 
they can convince the French electorate that their people share European 
values, they may be able to join the EU in the long run. 
But there are other countries, further afield, that have very little 
prospect of joining. Ukraine, a large country with a lot of farmers, has 
enhanced its democratic credentials over the past year. Nonetheless, apart 
from Poland and Lithuania, very few member states are keen to see it join 
the Union. Belarus and Moldova are unquestionably in Europe, but are 
very far from meeting the basic conditions for membership. Georgia 
believes itself in Europe, as do its neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
though many Europeans would disagree. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
Georgia has undergone a quasi-democratic revolution and it is keen to 
move closer to the EU. 
Over the past two years, the EU has started to implement a new 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims at enhancing ties with 
the countries that have no prospect of joining in the foreseeable future. The 
point of the policy is to turn the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, 
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the South Caucasus and the EU’s eastern hinterland into a ‘ring of friends’. 
The EU has already negotiated country-specific or tailored action plans 
with Ukraine, Moldova, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco. 
Others, such as the three Caucasus countries plus Egypt and Libya are now 
starting to negotiate action plans. Each plan sets out the reforms the 
neighbour intends to undertake to align its economic and political system 
with EU norms. It also sets out what the EU can offer in terms of trade, aid, 
political contacts and participation in its programmes. 
The neighbourhood policy is a sensible initiative and it is too soon to 
judge its effectiveness. Yet the EU seems to be having difficulty in fleshing 
out the promises it has made in the action plans. Several Commission 
directorates-general have moved too slowly to deliver on commitments 
made under the ENP (DG External Relations being an exception). And 
many of the member states appear unenthusiastic. Some of those most 
hostile to enlargement are in no hurry to deepen ties with countries just 
beyond the EU’s borders. For their part, the neighbours have moved very 
slowly to fulfil their promises.  
In time, hopefully, both the EU and its neighbours will make a real 
effort to implement the action plans. But even if they do, a more 
fundamental problem will remain. Most of the neighbours believe that the 
neighbourhood policy does not go far enough in offering to integrate them 
into the EU. Nothing in the policy or the action plans mentions the 
possibility of the neighbours ultimately joining the EU. This omission limits 
the EU’s ability to influence its neighbours. The EU probably needs to offer 
juicier carrots in order to wield meaningful influence. It should therefore 
beef up the ENP by rewarding the best-performing neighbours with 
‘security partnerships’ – in effect, much closer ties to the CFSP. 
This author owes this idea to a conversation with Salome 
Zurabashvili, the former Georgian foreign minister. She considered that 
while Georgia was not yet ready for the rigours of the single market, it 
would benefit hugely from being part of the EU’s foreign policy. As far as 
she was concerned, Georgia’s greater involvement in the EU’s CFSP would 
bring with it an implicit security guarantee. 
She is right that the neighbours should not try to adopt most of the 
acquis communautaire. Their economies are too backward to thrive in the 
single market and their administrative systems are not capable of enforcing 
the EU’s 80,000-page rulebook. The neighbours could adopt the foreign 
policy acquis, however, which is mostly declarations rather than legislation, 
without much difficulty. Adopting policies is much easier than enacting 
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laws – both technically and politically. Candidate countries often find the 
implementation of EU law very politically painful. But the alignment of a 
country’s foreign policy with that of the EU is seldom so sensitive. 
The European Economic Area (EEA) could offer a kind of analogy for 
neighbours becoming security partners of the EU. In the EEA, Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein are consulted on the shaping of single market 
rules but cannot take part in the formal decision-making. When the EU 
takes a decision, the EEA countries have to accept it. Although the EEA is 
about economics, and has no bearing on foreign policy, the proposed 
security partnerships would work similarly. These partners would engage 
in the CSFP but not in the single market. 
Suppose that Georgia and Ukraine make good progress with reform, 
and the EU asks them to become security partners. How might this work? 
The EU governments and those of Georgia and Ukraine would agree that 
they had common interests on certain subjects. The security partners would 
then join in discussions on those issues. While they would help to shape EU 
policy, they would not take part in decision-making. When the EU decided 
on a common policy, the associates would have the right to sign up to it 
(opting in) or not. Each partner would have a small team of diplomats in 
the Council of Ministers’ Justus Lipsius building, sending representatives 
to the relevant committees and working groups. The partners would also 
send a senior diplomat to attend and speak at the Political and Security 
Committee when the subjects covered by the security partnership were 
discussed.  
Under such arrangements, the security partners would be more 
intimately involved in the CFSP’s institutions than are current candidate 
countries such as Croatia and Turkey (Bulgaria and Romania, having 
signed accession treaties, are allowed to take part in EU meetings). 
Candidates have the right to associate themselves with EU foreign policy, 
but they do not have diplomats in the CFSP machinery. Therefore, the 
concept of security partnerships could not work unless candidates for full 
membership were included in discussions on foreign policy (that in itself 
could positively affect the EU’s accession talks with these countries). 
Security partnerships should not be just about procedures and 
institutions. The point should be for the EU and its partners to help each 
other to deal with real problems. The flow of benefits should not be just one 
way, from the EU to the partners, but in both directions. For example, some 
neighbours could help the EU to stabilise some of the very problematic 
regions that adjoin them. 
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Suitable areas for cooperation between the EU and its security 
partners could be, for example, the Caucasus, the Balkans, counter-
terrorism, non-proliferation and the Middle East peace process. The 
partnership should also extend to the European security and defence policy 
(ESDP). Already, some countries in the ENP send troops on EU military 
missions, but their involvement should be extended. Security partners 
should be encouraged not only to send troops and other essential personnel 
on ESDP operations, but also to take part in their management. 
This kind of link to the EU would probably have a beneficial impact 
on the neighbours concerned. Their diplomats would learn how the EU 
makes policy. Their governments would be acclimatised to EU ways of 
working. The model proposed is very different to the NATO–Russia 
Council, which treats the NATO countries and Russia as two distinct 
entities. In contrast, this idea would aim at integrating neighbours into EU 
foreign policy as a way of bringing them closer to the EU more generally. 
There is a risk that the arrival of security partners in the Council of 
Ministers would make the EU’s diplomatic machinery more complicated 
and slow it down. Therefore, it would be wise for the EU and its partners to 
start off by working together on only a limited range of issues. And if the 
EU did find the involvement of partners overly burdensome, it would have 
the right to press ahead and decide its own policies. Conversely, if the 
partners found that their views were disregarded and that their presence 
was merely symbolic, they could pull out of discussions on a particular 
subject. Or they could resign from their security partner status. 
One obvious criticism of this concept is that it would fail to deter 
neighbours from applying for membership. After all, Jacques Delors 
designed the EEA to prevent countries in the European Free Trade 
Association from seeking EU membership, but most of them did so 
anyway. Nevertheless, faced with a choice between no membership or 
CFSP membership, some neighbours might prefer the latter. If for example 
a large group of member states suddenly started campaigning for full 
Ukrainian membership, the government in Kyiv would of course have no 
incentive to pursue membership of the CFSP alone. Still, in the current 
climate that seems unlikely. 
In any case, the point of the proposed security partnerships is not to 
dissuade neighbours from applying to join the EU, but rather to encourage 
mutually beneficial cooperation. As with the action plans that exist under 
the ENP, the security partnerships should contain implicit conditionality. 
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The partners that were most helpful to the EU could expect more economic 
and political dividends in their broader relationship with the EU. 
In the long run, if Russia becomes a truer democracy and a better 
respecter of civil liberties than it is today, the EU should consider offering it 
this kind of scheme. Some analysts will argue that member states such as 
Poland and Latvia would never agree to embrace Russia in such a way. But 
if at the same time the EU extended the same offer to countries such as 
Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan – assuming that political and economic 
freedom were firmly entrenched in those countries and in Russia – would 
Poles and Latvians really be so hostile? 
Other analysts would say that Russia is too proud ever to agree to be 
treated in the same way as Ukraine and Georgia. Today that is the case, but 
one may imagine that, at some point in the future, Russia might see that 
participation in a broader CFSP zone could help it to build friendly 
relations with its neighbours. In any case, the prize of involvement in EU 
policy-making would be attractive to many liberal Russians, who may one 
day be more influential than they are today. If the EU could extend its 
CFSP across the entire continent, its member states, Russia and the 
countries between them would probably all get along better. 
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The Strategic Implications 
 of the EU’s ‘Crisis’ 
A Russian Perspective 
Timofei V. Bordachev* 
Russia is becoming more and more of an insider in European Union 
political and economic life, although there are no signs of its 
‘Europeanisation’, at least in the sense now generally accepted at the 
official level in the EU. Russia and the EU are linked by centuries of shared 
history, culture, tradition and economic interdependence. This 
interdependence cannot be destroyed even by today’s preoccupation (in 
Moscow and some European capitals) with oil and gas pipelines.  
The 70 years of the Communist experiment made an additional 
contribution to Russia’s Europeanisation by instilling in Russians a deep 
devotion to the idea of social solidarity and support for weak individuals 
by the state and society. In other words, contemporary Russian lifestyle is 
much closer to (old) French Orleans than to New Orleans. 
Irrespective of the real intentions of the official authorities and 
contrary to the tactical interests of some among the Russian business 
community, EU standards and rules for regulating economic activities are 
becoming increasingly customary in this country. The well-being and 
stability of more and more Russian businesses are becoming dependent on 
decisions made by the Council of the European Union rather than by the 
Russian government. The ‘road maps’, approved by Russia and the EU at 
their May 2005 summit, will also contribute to this process.1 Even though 
their overarching goal – the establishment of an open and integrated 
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1 See the Russian–EU road maps (Russian version) on the Kremlin’s website 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2005/05/10/1940_type72067_87994.shtml). 
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market – will not be reached for some time, the fact that the guidelines exist 
will steer Russia, however slowly, towards the EU’s social and economic 
model. In terms of security policy, despite the fact that its internal situation 
can be considered a challenge in itself, Russia shares with the EU the sense 
of facing a threat from transnational crime, unstable regions in the southern 
periphery of Eurasia and the potentially explosive (or aggressive) 
consequences of the transition of some countries in the Far East.  
All these factors point to a Russia that has ceased to be only an 
external partner of the EU but a Russia that has already evolved into an 
‘odd insider’ of EU politics. It shares not only the same soil with the EU, 
but also most of the same fears and threats. This conclusion leads us to the 
following four observations to help us analyse the consequences of the 
current crisis in the EU both for the future of Europe as a whole and for 
Russia’s approach to EU integration: 
1) Russia is a European country that is now outside the European 
integration process. 
2) The progress of the European integration project and its final shape 
will be key in determining Russia’s place in the European space. 
3) The transformation and viability of the European integration project 
cannot be dealt with in isolation from EU–Russian cooperation. 
4) The complexity of the situation and the recognition of the EU’s crisis 
at the highest political level mean that it is possible to move away 
from a literal interpretation of the political documents adopted in 
recent years by the European Commission and the Russian 
government. In any case, these documents have become part and 
parcel of the crisis in the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with 
Russia. Nothing in them is worthy of praise but it is too late to 
criticise them.  
Based on this analytical framework, it can be assumed that further 
enlargement and Russia’s inclusion in it in some form within 10 to 15 years 
will be among the major consequences of the EU’s crisis (which reached its 
peak in 2005). It can be assumed that, by the year 2020, Russia and other 
European countries, including current EU member states, will be able to 
coordinate closely on the management of a considerable amount of their 
political and economic resources.   
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The end of the ‘normative empire’? 
Some may say that statements like this are debateable and sound over-
optimistic, at least today. Yet even several months ago, no one could have 
predicted that in the autumn of 2005 the EU would be absorbed in heated 
debates about its own future, while its main supranational body, the 
European Commission, would be paralysed and unable to exercise its 
authority or to perform the functions of a suprastate actor in full.  
The machinery of European integration has quickly turned into an 
international community of political and economic actors torn between 
calls to integrate further (Brussels) and proposals to divide according to 
interests (London). The institutional crisis in the EU, which began in 1997 
and which has now reached close to its peak, is most likely to run for 
another 10 years. So now is precisely the time to think about the 
foundations for a Europe that will be built, in the foreseeable future, from 
the Atlantic to Vladivostok. 
Looking back, 2005 will be seen as the end of the EU’s ‘widening and 
deepening’ phase and as the beginning of a slow recovery, a return to the 
fundamentals of EU integration. Enlargement, a mechanical expansion of 
the EU’s normative empire based on introducing more and more new 
exceptions and in the process increasing the EU’s de facto divisions, has 
come to an end. It has culminated in the new neighbourhood programmes 
and the joint EU–Russian road maps.2 
In this sense, deepening – the development of a purely regulatory 
function for Brussels, which has replaced the transfer of competences (and 
which is again based on countless hidden exceptions) – cannot work in its 
former guise any longer either. This approach has resulted in attempts by 
the incumbent European Commission to overcome the divisions of the 
member states into groups and to initiate macroeconomic changes. 
Therefore, overall, the year 2005 is not a time for decisions. It is rather a 
time for reflection. 
 
                                                     
2 See M. Emerson, Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 71, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, May 2005 (retrieved 
from http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1224). 
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Three challenges 
An unbiased analysis of the events of the last decade shows that the EU has 
been heading towards crisis since 1997 and that the enlargement and the 
drafting of a Constitutional Treaty were attempts to prevent the crisis from 
becoming worse. Both attempts failed to achieve the desired effect. Let us 
now consider in more detail the main elements of the European crisis, 
which are characteristic of both the situation inside the EU and of its 
relations with other European countries. 
First, there is a problem of trust on the part of a substantial share of 
the population and elites in EU countries and beyond towards the 
European integration process. The double failure of the ratification of the 
EU Constitution has changed public moods. The percentage of the 
Constitution’s opponents has increased even in countries that were once 
ardent supporters of it. The leaders of those countries had initially declared 
that they would hold referenda on the Constitution. 
The mutual confidence between member countries and their citizens 
has fallen sharply. Internal solidarity within the EU has been undermined. 
Some of the ‘engines’ behind European integration do not hesitate to 
conclude unilateral deals on the side, which trigger indignation, legally 
quite unfounded, among the states of ‘new’ Europe. The most recent 
accession of 10 new member states from Central, Eastern and southern 
Europe to the EU has been an important factor in this respect as it has 
introduced a much greater degree of diversity to what had been a more or 
less uniform EU in terms of social, political and economic development as 
well as mentality. Although the candidate countries were required to 
adhere unconditionally to all ‘common policies’, their internal make-up 
(attitudes towards sovereignty, the quality of their political processes, the 
absence of a culture of compromise and hawkish foreign policies) meant 
that they were a far cry from the principles, rules and norms that had been 
developed in Western Europe over decades. 
It has to be admitted that the majority of the new member states are 
not yet ready to conduct political dialogue in the language of Western 
Europe. In this sense the ‘enlargement’, as an extrapolation of norms and 
rules that have been developed in ‘old’ Europe, has proven to be much less 
successful than expected. The enlargement has considerably increased the 
number of small states within the EU but has not strengthened the 
supranational bodies, as these countries might have wanted. The legacy of 
the Communist period is still marked in some of the new EU member states 
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and this has influenced the general level of political culture in the Union. 
The EU has become less able, as a political body, to set and implement 
large-scale strategic tasks. Moreover, the conduct of some of the new 
member states, often unintentional and devoid of evil intent, has led to the 
revival of conservative rhetoric and aroused ‘demons of the past’ 
(nationalism) in some of the EU founder countries.3 
Similar changes have taken place in relations between EU citizens 
and Brussels, i.e. the Commission. Brussels, which has never enjoyed much 
popularity, has found itself in an even more difficult and ambiguous 
position. The democratic shortfall with respect to the processes of European 
integration and the alienation of the supranational bureaucracy, centred in 
and personified by the European Commission, in relation to ordinary EU 
citizens, have become problems that are even more glaring. The 
Commission’s ‘re-nationalisation’ and the adoption of the ‘one country, one 
commissioner’ principle have fuelled national egoisms. The integration 
process has proceeded smoothly only when major decisions are made in 
Brussels and the political elites of the member states obediently endorse 
them. But when decision-making has been entrusted to the citizens, the 
process has stalled. 
Second, there is a crisis of the EU institutions and the governability of 
the processes taking place in the EU’s political and economic space. The 
authority of the European Commission and its ability to perform political 
and technical functions have been called into question and seriously 
compromised in the last few years. The clear establishment of the 
Commission’s powers, as proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, was an 
attempt to overcome this consequence of the EU’s enlargement. At the 
same time, things must have gone too far and the attempt by Brussels to 
safeguard its powers through the Constitution has provoked the opposite 
result. 
There have been no formal changes in the division of powers. 
Nevertheless, after the admission that the EU is “not in a crisis, but in a 
                                                     
3 Less than two weeks before the referendum in the Netherlands, public opinion 
polls showed a sharp increase in the number of the Constitution’s opponents. The 
increase took place after a Eurovision song contest in which Eastern European 
countries allegedly voted for each other, thus preventing singers from ‘old’ Europe 
from winning the contest. 
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deep crisis”,4 the process of giving the Commission additional powers has 
slowed down markedly, even in areas where these powers are required to 
accomplish the tasks set by the EU member states. At the same time, there 
has been a certain redistribution of forces inside the EU, between 
individual countries and supranational institutions, and between the 
Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission, headed by 
President José Manuel Barroso, was a lame duck from the very beginning, 
having experienced several setbacks at the time commissioner nominees 
were being approved by the European Parliament. The political defeat 
suffered by President Barroso in the European Parliament in October 2004 
undermined the Commission’s reputation. 
The crisis in the summer of 2005 eroded the Commission’s authority 
still further and at the same time strengthened the European Parliament, 
the only supranational body in the EU to be directly elected. But the fact 
that the European Parliament does not have any real opportunities or the 
legal grounds to take charge of the situation may create a dangerous 
vacuum until it can act as a pan-European source of political legitimacy. 
A recent meeting of the Council of the European Union, which 
discussed transport, telecommunications and energy issues, is a good 
example of this. It considered a proposal to grant the Commission a 
‘vertical’ mandate for negotiations with Russia and China in the field of air 
transport. The Commission had submitted the request in March 2005 when 
the office of Jacques Barrot, Vice President of the European Commission in 
charge of transport, had made public an ambitious plan to create a common 
air space with these two partners.5 The ministers of the 25 member states 
turned down the Commission’s proposal and said that relations with non-
EU countries in the field of civil aviation would continue to be based on 
bilateral agreements. Moreover, the Council reinforced the rights of EU 
member states to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements with non-
EU countries on their own. In addition, the Council demanded that the 
                                                     
4 See the statement of Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker on 18 June 
(retrieved from http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiques/2005/06/ 
17jcl-pf/index.html). 
5 See European Commission, A Framework for Developing Relations with the 
Russian Federation in the Field of Air Transport, COM(2005) 77 final, European 
Commission, Brussels, March 2005 (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm 
/transport/air/international/doc/com_2005_0077_en.pdf). 
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Commission seek a complete and unconditional abolition by Russia of 
trans-Siberian overflight payments imposed on EU airlines. It emphasised 
that an unconditional fulfilment by Russia of this requirement was a 
“prerequisite for making further progress with the Russian Federation”.6 
The Commission was thus put in an exceptionally difficult position, with 
the only way out of it involving cooperation with the Russian government. 
The EU’s crisis of governability has largely resulted from the practice 
of making exceptions so that the enlargement process would go ahead 
despite the inability of a majority of the new member countries to meet all 
the membership requirements. The history of European integration has 
many examples of specially introduced exceptions, such as the Schengen 
system and the European economic and monetary union. Now, however, 
there are so many exceptions that they are starting to define the very nature 
of the EU: 
• The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 legally set in stone the practice of 
exceptions (Art. 11 – 11a). 
• Never before have proposals to build a ‘Europe of exceptions’ been 
discussed as a possible scenario to preserve the viability of the 
entire EU project. 
The latter refers to the theory of a ‘Europe of variable geometry’, 
which proposes formalising the possibility of member states being able to 
establish closer associations according to their capabilities and wishes in 
order to keep the policy of widening and deepening afloat. 
The issue of how viable this strategy could be for pan-European 
institutions and solidarity is hardly worth a serious discussion. But if the 
logic of establishing ‘clubs of interests’ were to be continued, the freest 
possible association would be for the EU flag to be hoisted in front of 
official buildings, as is now done in Georgia. 
In general, the range of national priorities (in economic terms 
whether aimed at market liberalisation or emphasising high standards in 
social provision, and in foreign policy terms in setting priorities and 
assessing threats) has grown much broader since the 2004 enlargement 
                                                     
6 See European Council, Press Release, 2671st Council Meeting, Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy, held in Luxembourg on 27–28 June 2005, 
10285/05 (Press 156) (retrieved from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/newsWord/ 
en/trans/85602.doc). 
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than was expected. In terms of security, the lack of a shared vision and a 
major threat has prompted some EU countries to present their national 
agendas as pan-European ones. The EU interest is, however, more than a 
simple sum of the national interests of EU member states. As a result, the 
benefits generated by the EU’s collective strength and capabilities have 
proven insufficient to compensate for the formal reduction of individual 
countries’ roles and delegation of sovereignties to the supranational level. 
The EU’s inability to formulate a shared set of interests for the 25 
member states has led to growing national egoisms and the formation of 
groups of countries with shared interests in domestic and foreign policies. 
This result also applies to relations with Russia, where we can see at least 
three groups with different interests and ideas about a rational approach – 
the alliance of France, Germany and Italy; the group of new member states 
and Brussels. The Commission’s report of February 2005 provides an 
example of an artificial formulation of the EU interest. The approach it 
proposed was both softer and tougher towards Moscow and its leaders. 
Subsequent analytical studies that followed up the Commission’s 
initiatives, by that time already approved by the European Council, 
suggested working on the basis of almost open competition in relations 
with Russia, including on human rights and other humanitarian issues, 
however paradoxical this may sound.7 
Another vivid example is a proposal to demonstrate ‘tough love’(!) 
towards Russia, which can mean very different things to different people.8 
It seems that the ‘love’ was to emanate from Berlin and Paris, while the 
‘toughness’ was to be displayed by Riga and Warsaw. The result is well 
known. Such proof of the EU’s inability to work out a shared strategy with 
regard to a major European nation outside the EU is telltale evidence of the 
loss of governability within the entire EU. 
Third, there is an obvious crisis in the strategic goals of the European 
integration project. If we set aside destructive proposals on reform of the 
                                                     
7 See K. Barysch, The EU and Russia – Strategic partners or squabbling neighbours, 
Centre for European Reform, London, May 2004 (retrieved from 
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8 See H. Grabbe and H. Tewes, “Tough Love for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours”, 
CER Bulletin, Issue No. 31, Centre for European Reform, London, 2003; for further 
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EU, which can either turn it into a ‘gentleman’s club of interests’ or 
completely destroy the suprastate supporting structure of the EU, the 
choice of proposed strategic goals are limited as never before. The EU’s 
development into the most competitive economy in the world by 2010 is 
quite an ambitious task undertaking, which would go well beyond the 
work of preserving the social model that distinguishes Europe and the 
European way of life from the United States and Third World countries. 
The protection of ‘socially responsible’ Europe from Anglo-Saxon 
encroachments would also be a huge and hardly attractive task.  
The protection of human rights – from the threat of their being 
eroded under the banner of the struggle against the terrorist threat – would 
also be unlikely to lay a good foundation for the political unity of the 
governments and citizens of the EU. Not all EU citizens are equally 
threatened by international terrorism and not all have the same vision of 
where the limits lie for the state’s interference in people’s private lives. A 
still worse foundation for European unity would be technical or economic 
projects stemming from the EU’s increased ambitions on the international 
stage and its attempts to play the role of a global power. Initially, the main 
integrating factor was peaceful intentions based on benefits for each party. 
Substituting this policy with belligerence towards the outside world would 
bring about a complete failure of political efforts. 
Reflected in Russia 
All three crises are fully reflected in the EU’s relations with its largest 
European partner – Russia. The crisis of confidence, or rather the complete 
absence of confidence, is almost openly admitted by politicians and officials 
on both sides.9 There is evidence of a crisis of governability in the 
‘impressive’ rates of implementation of agreements and in the ‘enthusiasm’ 
of administrative bodies of Russia and the EU in this field. Many 
individuals can confirm the example of a project for the establishment of a 
                                                     
9 See the representative survey of Russian academics, businesspersons and officials 
taken during the brainstorming session in January 2006. Results of the 
brainstorming have been published as “Russia’s European Strategy: A New Start”, 
Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, July-September 2005. See also S. Karaganov, T. 
Bordachev, V. Guseinov, F. Lukyanov and D. Suslov, Russia–EU Relations: The 
Present Situation and Prospects, CEPS Working Document No. 225, CEPS, Brussels, 
July 2005 (retrieved from http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1246&). 
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European college at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. 
The project was given the green light at the EU–Russia summit in the 
autumn of 2004 yet has never made it further than the blueprint stage. The 
crisis in strategic goals is pretty self-evident as it is fully reflected in the 
unintelligible wording of the documents on the ‘four common spaces’. All 
the three difficulties in Russian–EU relations are interconnected. There 
needs to be a comprehensive approach towards solving them in a long-
term manner. Otherwise, a failure to meet any of the three challenges 
would bring a halt to progress in other fields, as has happened repeatedly 
over the last 15 years. 
The problems facing Russian–EU relations have been discussed in a 
large number of analytical works, so there is no need to focus on them all 
here. Moreover, this paper is not intended solely as an analysis of problems 
within the EU and its relations with other European countries. At the same 
time, these problems can offer subjects for political and expert discourse 
both inside and around the EU in the next few years. Of special importance 
is the problem of the two sides’ lack of a common strategic goal. 
This problem is best illustrated by the strategic documents on 
bilateral relations, adopted by Russia and the EU in 1999.10 In these 
documents, the parties set out their goals for cooperation and 
rapprochement, which differed in both the substance and the ways to 
achieve these goals. The EU, following the paradigm of enlargement in 
different forms, gave top priority to Russia’s transformation. Moscow 
assigned more importance to establishing an equitable dialogue between 
two independent actors of international relations and did not link its 
cooperation with the EU to changes in the Russian economy or society. The 
lack of a shared strategy of Russian–EU relations was the focus of 
numerous seminars and conferences held in subsequent years outside the 
framework of official top-level dialogue. Following the changes that have 
taken place in Russia’s domestic policy since 2000, the two sides have 
                                                     
10 With regard to the EU’s common strategy on Russia (European Commission 
document 1999/414/CFSP, 4 June 1999), see the europa website (retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114137.pdf). 
Concerning the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between 
the Russian Federation and the EU (2000–2010), see the website of the Finnish 
presidency of the EU (retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/ 
News/showarticle1610.html). 
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preferred to avoid this subject completely. They have never formulated a 
common goal for their cooperation and, quite possibly, the crisis in the EU 
will promote a more in-depth discussion of this issue. 
High politics 
What changes of a conceptual nature may occur in EU foreign policy, 
particularly vis-à-vis Russia, as the EU recovers from the current crisis? 
There are but a few options, given the EU’s internal constraints, decades of 
experience of integration and external factors.  
By all appearances, European integration will see a slowdown in the 
EU’s foreign policy as it emerges from its crisis. There will need to be some 
kind of inward-looking analysis to bring the EU member states closer 
together and improve the quality of transnational European democracy and 
the authority of the EU institutions. In the meantime, it cannot be ruled out 
that a less self-assured EU will require a sufficiently reliable partner who 
will, at least, neither compete with the EU nor bring economic pressure to 
bear on it. This may be the basis for building more trust. 
As regards relations with the largest European nation outside the EU, 
an attempt at a neo-functionalist approach – exploring the integration 
phenomenon in terms of deriving new political benefits from closer 
cooperation in purely technological spheres – may turn out to be an 
exciting intellectual exercise. Yet for all its seeming advantages (a rather 
successful record in the 1950s, relative equality of the participants and the 
easing of normative requirements imposed on them), such a vision of the 
future is unlikely ever to materialise. In the short term, functional 
cooperation may indeed be useful to some extent at the very basic level but 
this cooperation will be too meagre for this approach to be considered 
promising when it comes to the strategy of developing relations. 
The EU’s own record of the past few years goes to show that even in-
depth economic integration is insufficient for the purposes of diminishing 
the impact of nationally-specific political behaviour and motivation in the 
decision-making process. The dramatic changes that the UK’s European 
policy has undergone over the past 18 to 24 months, just as those within the 
members of the European Economic Community in the mid-1960s, put 
beyond all reasonable doubt that political leadership at the national level 
will have a decisive role to play even in the midst of apparently profound 
economic integration. As far as Russia is concerned, one of the partners 
lacking the economic motivation (from an extensive assessment of potential 
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advantages) that made possible the implementation by the EU founding 
fathers of their visionary plans in the 1950s may regrettably be decisive. 
The partners’ potential contributions are hardly comparable except in the 
sphere of space exploration. Integration in such a narrow field would not 
amount to much in political terms. Rather, it may itself fall victim to 
political circumstances.  
The bottom line is clearly Russian and EU convergence in standards 
and values. But such convergence does not seem attainable even in the 
medium term. Given that completely conflicting value systems have caused 
a crisis within the EU, the issue of new countries’ formal association with or 
accession to the EU should be given even more thought.  
The slowing down of the EU’s rate of expansion (instead of 
enlargement) – and above all legal expansion – may contribute towards a 
more sustainable form of cooperation with Russia. This cooperation cannot, 
at this juncture, include elements of integration. Rather it is more likely to 
proceed along the lines of a search for more equitable forms of 
understanding each side’s national priorities, as they take shape in the 
course of internal political processes. On that foundation, cooperation will 
be particularly surefooted. Further attempts at blending ‘pragmatism’ in 
relations (as declared in the statement to the effect that Russia is not going 
to join the EU) with a pursuit of integration as expressed in the road maps 
are unlikely to be successful. 
In this respect, promoting de facto equality in developing a joint 
agenda (dominated by the EU’s approach until recently) could become a 
priority in Russia’s relations with EU-centred Europe in the wake of the EU 
crisis. External international circumstances favouring rapprochement 
between Russia and the EU would reinforce this approach. 
Moreover, this approach could be spurred on by another 
consequence of the 2005 crisis – a higher standard of internal democracy 
and transparency within the EU’s decision-making mechanisms. Until 
recently, EU policy towards Russia had been shaped by the European 
Commission largely as an extension or a simplified version of plans for 
cooperation with new neighbour nations. As a result, the gap between the 
official order of the day and the two sides’ real potential grew wider, and 
reviews of bilateral relationships focused on polishing decisions already 
made at the bureaucratic level. Making this process more open to EU 
member states and representatives of their expert communities, on the one 
hand, and to Russian experts on the other, may lead to more balanced 
policy documents.  
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On the whole, since all the three elements of the EU’s crisis can be 
identified in its relations with Russia as well, the answer to these challenges 
may have a wholesome effect on the future of greater Europe from the 
Atlantic to Vladivostok. The possibility of Russia joining the community of 
nations that transfer their sovereign rights to the supranational level is still 
a distant prospect. Nevertheless, the process of EU recovery after the events 
of summer 2005 may set the stage for such truly strategic developments. 
… and low politics 
Apart from the much more vivid discussion about the future of the EU and 
its external policies, the EU crisis may have several far-reaching 
ramifications at the lower and medium levels of European life, including 
Russian–EU relations (low politics). Among them, the most important one 
will be the beginning of a major discussion about internal democracy and 
democratic legitimacy in the European integration process. The discussion 
of Europe’s future, with this Constitution or another, cannot be conducted 
without at least the intellectual engagement of Russia, the ‘odd insider(s)’ 
and the largest European country remaining outside the EU. It would be 
worth involving Russian experts, public figures and businesspersons in 
European forums, conferences and round-table meetings. 
The EU could also improve the quality of communication between 
citizens and supranational bodies in Brussels. This area can open new 
opportunities for the EU’s relations with Russia and its non-governmental 
actors. In the long term, the direct interaction of supranational EU bodies, 
along with the businesses and societies of the two sides will help create an 
atmosphere of confidence – something that the relations between Russia 
and the EU and, perhaps, among the EU countries themselves, lack most of 
all. In the sphere of business, the representation of interests is a major factor 
of stability in the European integration model. The degree of Russian and 
EU interdependence is so considerable that official bodies of the two sides 
must make efforts to broaden the frameworks and opportunities for the 
representation of business interests in Moscow and Brussels. Lobbying by 
civil society is no longer the preserve of companies alone and it must be 
supported at the state level. Otherwise, it will continue to be replaced by 
other forms of interest protection. In this specific case, Russia and the EU 
now need the following: 
• a common legislative base for representing private interests (a special 
agreement on access to government information and participation in 
preliminary consultations); 
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• the allocation of state funds to support the activities of representative 
offices of business associations in Moscow and Brussels; and 
• investment (support) in the training of Russia’s EU experts. 
To sum up, the EU, which is now in a state of internal difficulty and 
uncertainty, is a major political and economic actor in contemporary 
Europe. It thus deserves greater attention in terms of expert analysis and 
consideration as a partner. 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
To introduce a vital topic replete with semantic and political difficulties, we 
were fortunate to benefit from a number of excellent presentations. 
Delivering his paper on “The Multiple Crises in Dutch Parallel 
Societies”, Rob de Wijk (from Clingendael and the Royal Military 
Academy) laid emphasis on four points: 
• the frustration of reasonably well-educated middle classes in parallel 
societies at being blocked from climbing the social ladder. This 
situation, rather than the difficulties of the underprivileged, has been 
a major source of radicalisation; 
• the importance of second-generation citizens of Moroccan (often 
Rifan Berber) origin in Dutch parallel societies; 
• the existence of ‘virtual ummahs’ motivated by external causes (rather 
than by endogenous economic or social grievances), which find a 
ready home in the infrastructure of parallel societies; and 
• the need for innovative approaches to acquire inside knowledge of 
such groups, notably in terms of the role of social workers. 
Amel Boubekeur, from CEPS and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales (EHESS, in Paris) underscored points made in the paper 
she wrote with Samir Amghar (also from EHESS), on “The Role of Islam?” 
in Europe’s multiple crises. She recalled the weak role of Islam in France’s 
‘crise des banlieues’. Conversely, she singled out three roles of Islam in 
French and European society: Islam as a source of integration 
(‘embourgeoisement’), Islam as a territory in which to retreat (a quiet ‘lieu de 
repli’) and Islam as a vector of jihad.  
Alexei Malashenko, from the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, pointed 
out that while Russia has had its share of suicide bombings it has hardly 
had any burning banlieues. He made the point that ‘parallel societies’ 
                                                     
* François Heisbourg is Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in 
Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
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outside the modern economic mainstream were something the former 
USSR and especially Russia were rather accustomed to. In the case of 
Moscow, with a population of Muslim origin of some 1.5-2 million, mostly 
from the Caucasus, there was little ethnic ghettoisation, and only weak 
community organisation (setting aside criminal gangs). As a first-
generation population, they had strong links to their family and friends 
back home and did not suffer high rates of unemployment. Moscow’s 
immigration situation was different from the current situation in France 
and most other European countries – notwithstanding the existence of anti-
Caucasian and anti-Muslim racism. 
Speaking from his paper, “Islam in Russia in 2020”, he noted that 
Islam was often linked to nationalism – ‘burning regions’, rather than 
‘burning banlieues’. With between 14.5 and 20 million Muslims, Russia 
could witness major, converging troubles with its Muslim ‘south’ broadly 
defined (from the Volga to the North Caucasus) or a series of successive 
explosions in its individual Muslim republics. 
Responding to the question arising from the relative absence of 
home-grown jihad attacks in the United States, Steve Simon (from the 
Council of Foreign Relations) noted the particular characteristics of Islam in 
the US: a median income of $50,000 (above the national average) and a 
proportionately high representation in the professions. Nevertheless, 
complacency about America’s ‘immunity’ would be misplaced, given a 
number of factors. Among these are that anti-Muslim sentiment has 
become more acceptable since 9/11; generational issues are emerging with 
a quest for Salafi-type purity among some of the Muslim youth – not 
necessarily effective but damaging because of indiscriminate sweeps by the 
FBI. In addition is the over-representation of Muslims in the prison 
population (19% in the New York state prison system). Concerning 
Europe’s integration problems, he discounted the corresponding neo-
conservative literature, with its odd mix of Oswald Spengler and Winston 
S. Churchill appearing in American bookstores of late (inter alia Bruce 
Bawer’s 2006 work entitled While Europe Slept): the ‘banlieues’ were more 
about Karl Marx than about Osama bin Laden, notwithstanding the 
realities of political under-representation of the Muslim population. 
In the first round of discussions, a representative of the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) underscored the findings of the ICG’s recent report “La 
France face à ses Musulmans: émeutes, jihadisme et dépolitisation”, noting 
also the waning of political Islam in the French banlieues and stating that 
French politician Nicolas Sarkozy is wrong in his attempts to build up 
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Islamic organisations. On Russian issues, he asked among other things how 
the war in Chechnya has affected the attitudes of Muslims in other parts of 
Russia. An American participant with expert knowledge of the French 
scene criticised the juxtaposition of the ‘burning banlieues’ and ‘suicide 
bombers’: the two expressions do not actually go together. Terrorism is 
largely tied to external causes while the burning of suburbs is a result of 
internal factors, going well beyond issues related to either Islam or 
terrorism. He emphasised the need for growth in Europe to alleviate socio-
economic disaffection. 
A Danish discussant remarked that 70% or so of Danish public 
opinion supported both the publication of the cartoons and the policy of 
the Danish government; the reaction of mainstream European opinion 
needed to be watched. 
In the panel response, Alexei Malashenko noted the low level of 
Muslim solidarity with the Chechens, outside the immediate vicinity of 
Chechnya. Yet he singled out the apparent popularity of Osama bin Laden 
in much of the Muslim population. 
Rob de Wijk and the chairman both underscored the similarities 
rather than the differences between the situations in European countries: 
the better educated groups go radical and global; the less educated ones 
riot locally. In other words, simply improving conditions in the 
neighbourhoods is not going to deal with terrorism. He joked about the ‘I’ 
in ‘ICG’: it was a sign of the times that ‘international’ concern converges 
with internal issues. 
In the second round of discussions, a former US official reacted 
against the use of the expression ‘political Islam’ by the ICG: it was a play 
on words to indicate that political Islam was on the wane while at the same 
time pointing to the rise of radical expression and organisation. What was 
on the wane was traditional religious pressure groups. He shared the 
concern of those worried about the reactions of the mainstream population. 
Finally, he drew a parallel in both sociological and organisational terms 
between the jihadists and the Bolsheviks. 
Another participant queried the role of politicians in coping with the 
current problems in the Netherlands, and more broadly wondered about 
the possibility of promoting policies that are more inclusive. This query 
followed a remark by the chairman on the French government’s White 
Paper on terrorism, which supports policies of inclusiveness of the 
population as a whole (along the 7 July lines in London) rather than 
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policies of simply mobilising majority support (e.g. the 70% pro-cartoon 
Danes). A member of CEPS echoed another participant’s question about 
successful policies: Was Belgium doing something right as compared with 
the Netherlands? 
Finally, a representative of the ICG emphasised the basics of fighting 
terrorism: good intelligence, good policing and the like, rather than relying 
on socio-economic programmes, which are necessary but are put in place 
for other reasons. 
The panel picked up the Bolshevik analogy and the remark by the 
ICG representative. Rob de Wijk noted that social workers and law-and-
order officers have to learn to work together to improve the overall 
intelligence position. He expressed limited approval of the record of some 
Dutch politicians. Commenting on Miss Ayaan Hirsan Ali’s role, he 
remarked that she may be courageous, but she may also have further 
radicalised an already polarised situation. 
Amel Boubekeur remarked that the depoliticisation of structures does 
not imply the depoliticisation of people, posing the question: What will 
follow the November riots in France, since traditional polities do not work? 
Steve Simon eschewed the apparent simplicity of the ‘radical = 
global’ and ‘rioting = local’ paradigm. Local situations can prompt change 
in global visions, as occurred with young Che Guevara’s motorcycle tour of 
South America. He emphasised the importance of conferring citizenship in 
order to enable political activity. Finally, he recalled that areas with large 
concentrations of youth – and the banlieues are places with large shares of 
youth – lead to rowdy collective behaviour… 
Alexei Malashenko denounced Salafism as a challenge for both Islam 
and the world. Communism was an ideology that could be got rid of, but it 
is more difficult to deal with a religious belief. 
In his closing speech, the chairman strongly supported the concern 
about the reactions of the majority of the population. He also remarked that 
the period of violence in America’s black ghettos in the 1960s came to a 
close when the mainstream political parties took the corresponding issues 
to heart – and not as a result of the activity of more narrowly-based 
organisations such as the Black Panthers or the SNCC (Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee). 
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The Role of Islam in Europe 
Multiple crises? 
Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar* 
The contemporary history of Muslims in Europe extends over 50 years. 
Until the early 1980s, when a new generation of young Muslims born in 
Europe began rising to prominence, their presence was not particularly 
visible and European public policies tended to categorise them as 
temporary immigrants. Policies intended to curb discrimination and 
unemployment were developed along ethnic lines (in particular French 
migration and social policies affecting the beur children of immigrant 
parents from North Africa), sparking social discontent and rioting. 
Beginning in the 1990s, public discourse increasingly identified Islam as a 
major part of the problem. Developments including the terrorist attacks in 
Europe (Paris, Madrid and London), the Salman Rushdie controversy in the 
UK, the process of ‘re-Islamisation’ of young persons born in Europe, 
questions about the separation of religion and politics (laïcité), struggles 
against anti-Semitism and even concerns about delinquency in poor 
districts predominantly inhabited by Muslims reinforced the view that a 
new phenomenon – a ‘crisis of Islam’ – called for drastic policy prescript-
tions. 
Over time, virtually all social problems involving European Muslim 
communities have been reconceptualised within the framework of Islam as 
a crisis phenomenon. Questions of Muslim political and social integration 
have become inextricably tied to the ‘Islam crisis’. Traditional ideas of a 
‘clash of civilisations’ and the consequent need for intercultural policies to 
prevent crises involving Islam have dominated public debates surrounding 
the headscarf, French rioting and cartoon controversies. European policy-
                                                     
* Amel Boubekeur is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS) in Brussels and a sociologist studying the contemporary transformations of 
Islam in the West (Europe/US). Her current research focuses on the new Islamic 
elite, Muslim women leadership and political Islam. She is the author of Le Voile de 
la Mariée: Jeunes musulmanes, voile et projet matrimonial en France. Samir Amghar 
studies at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. 
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makers engaging in these debates are finding it difficult to agree on 
whether Europe’s Muslim citizens should be defined as minorities, 
immigrants or new Europeans. 
These multiple Islam crises and controversies are reflections of the 
existing gap between Europe’s policy elite and Muslim citizens living on 
the social periphery. The apparent failure of 30 years of European social 
policies to integrate Muslims is directly related to the lack of Muslim 
political participation in European affairs at both national and local levels 
on issues other than security and terrorism. Although the radicalisation of 
Islam is an important and urgent issue, the policy relevant concerns of most 
Muslims in Europe instead involve day-to-day problems of Islamophobia, 
worship management, and social, cultural and political exclusion – 
problems that tend to be ignored or poorly articulated at the policy level.  
To gain a better understanding of the role of political Islam in 
European society today, it is necessary to examine Islamic movements from 
many different angles, including their European roots, the external 
influences of Muslim countries and the Islamic arguments of some of 
Europe’s most prominent Muslim leaders. Any balanced analysis should 
also question whether radicalisation is rooted in Islam per se or more the 
result of deliberate attempts by various religious actors to garner influence 
through communautarisme – the establishment of ethnic or religious 
communities separate from mainstream life.  
Imported crises? 
Islam is now considered a European religion. Crises involving Muslim 
populations in Europe are often blamed on influences from ‘foreign’ Islam, 
with blame most often assigned to two types of external phenomena. 
First is what has been called ‘consular’ Islam. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the first Muslim immigrants to Europe (mainly from Algeria, 
Morocco and Turkey) organised worship, mosque finances, imam activities 
and Koranic teaching through their countries’ consulates. The consulates 
were intent on diffusing Muslim protests or crises in Europe carried out in 
the name of Islam.  
More recently, a second phenomenon – transnational or ‘foreign’ 
Islamic movements – have begun to compete for control over Muslims in 
Europe. These include the Tabligh from Pakistan, the Salafi movement 
from Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood organised by an Islamist 
elite in exile from Middle Eastern and North African countries. 
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These ‘imported’ groups and other Muslim diaspora communities 
employ various means in their attempts to influence the ideological and 
normative landscape of Islam in Europe. During the 2003 elections to 
establish the French council of Muslim worship organised by conservative 
French politician Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, Moroccan and Algerian 
consulates in France tried to affect the voting process. The goal was to 
secure a kind of national political majority among Muslim leaders from 
these countries through the elections. The Turkish diaspora has played an 
important role in advocating Turkey’s accession to the European Union. 
After fatwas were issued related to the Iraqi and Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
from Yusuf al-Qaradawi (an Egyptian-Qatari theologian with the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement), many European Muslims chose to oppose the 
war by boycotting Israeli and American products. Some among these 
‘foreign’ groups consider Palestinian suicide attacks as justified. 
Apparently, foreign Islamic activists living in Europe have been largely 
responsible for using violent videos advocating religious war against 
infidels (jihad), foreign fighter narratives and websites to recruit young 
European Muslims to fight among the Chechen and Iraqi jihad networks. 
Such movements promoting violence and terrorism can serve as an 
outlet for disenfranchised and frustrated European Muslim youth seeking 
upward social mobility. While most vent their frustrations through 
peaceful means (more and more young Salafis in Europe are returning to 
their native Saudi Arabia or Gulf countries, for example), a small number 
choose jihad.  
European responses to ‘foreign’ Islam 
This incursion of ‘foreign’ Islamic movements has led European policy-
makers to search for external solutions to European crises involving Islam. 
For example, in an attempt to fight radicalisation, France, the UK, 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands have launched expulsion 
campaigns against foreign imams to their countries of origin (Morocco, 
Algeria and Turkey). During the headscarf controversy, Nicolas Sarkozy 
travelled to the al-Azhar University in Egypt to obtain a fatwa from the 
Egyptian mufti Mohammed Sayed Tantawi requiring girls to remove their 
veils at school. During the riots, French media described the young Muslim 
rioters as foreigners leading an “intifada des banlieues” with France 
becoming ‘Baghdad’, while some commentators in the United States 
asserted that France was paying the price for its pro-Arab policies. Such 
clichés only serve to further convince Islamic actors of the need to be more 
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effective in influencing policy-making affecting Muslims in Europe. 
Following Mr Sarkozy’s Egyptian trip, Islamist movements led 
demonstrations against the veil law.  
Experience has shown that Muslim religious leaders are not able to 
defuse social crises affecting Muslims in Europe. The majority of young 
rioters in French cities were not practising Muslims; nevertheless, it is 
interesting that a fatwa to stop the riots issued by the Union of France’s 
Islamic Associations of France (UOIF) – one of the principal federations of 
Islamic associations close to the Muslim Brotherhood and member of the 
French Council of the Muslim Faith – had no effect.  
At the same time, most European Muslim citizens rally around 
European values during such crises. During the veil and cartoon 
controversies, European Muslims turned to their local judiciaries and the 
European Court of Human Rights in support of European values of 
freedom of belief, multiculturalism and even of secularity. In the same 
spirit, French rioters did not have clearly defined political proposals 
because they were not contesting the French model of integration, but 
rather sought its effective application. 
The religious factor in the processes of political radicalisation 
Three distinct groups of activist Muslims can be distinguished according to 
their views on the relationship between religion and politics: Muslims who 
develop a ‘religious citizenship’, those who reject all non-Muslim political 
systems and an ultra-radical minority that places jihadist Islam at the core 
of their political commitment. 
For the first group, Islam is their starting point for a sense of 
citizenship and commitment to European society. Demonstrations against 
the veil law, for example, were for them a political negotiation emphasising 
the need for citizens’ participation to build a common society in which 
Muslims act as a positive minority. They vote, engage in traditional secular 
political parties and participate in European political events such as the 
referenda on the European Constitution, organised events related to 
globalisation, etc. European Muslim leaders such as Tariq Ramadan 
contributed to the development of the concept of religious citizenship. 
We find the second group among Salafi and Tablighi disciples. Their 
conception of politics does not lead to violence, but rather a withdrawal 
from all political processes based on non-Muslim concepts. Their religiosity 
is sectarian in nature, meaning that they reject all interaction with non-
Muslim institutions. Islam is for them universalistic and timeless. The only 
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priority is to imitate the normative ways of the life of the Prophet. Thus, 
commitment to a secular state is not relevant. They do not conceptualise 
themselves within the framework of a non-Muslim political system. 
Withdrawal is considered to be preferable to participation. This group was 
not concerned by the demonstrations against the veil law or the publication 
of cartoon caricatures of the Prophet. 
The last group is the jihadist one. Although they do not share any 
particular social status, they do share the experience of social decline and 
displacement. Their reason for choosing violence stems less from religious 
conviction than from painful personal experiences of social and political 
injustice as a Muslim. They trust that Islam will defend Muslims from 
European/Western threats against them. They place jihad at the core of 
their religious beliefs and rely on violence as the only way to defend 
Muslims from discriminatory policies enforced by EU member states. They 
may believe that the London and Madrid bombings were justified because, 
in their view, they forced Spain and the UK to consider the withdrawal of 
troops from Iraq more seriously. 
Integration rather than confrontation 
The role of Islam in Europe’s multiple crises is as complex as are the 
various Muslim communities living in Europe. To address such crises 
better we need to understand the common interests shared by European 
institutions, EU member states and Muslim countries. These interests rarely 
converge, leaving European Muslims feeling trapped in a tug-of-war while 
Europe struggles to discern its changing identity. Muslim groups can be 
categorised according to their mode of political protest during European 
crises involving Islam, but they are extremely diverse. The single feature 
they have in common is their disappointment in European policies 
affecting their everyday lives in Europe. 
More than ever, Europe has a role to play in rethinking what can be 
proposed to its Muslim citizens in terms of political representation and 
participation. To minimise the likelihood of violence, Europe needs to 
create and make visible an alternative and common public space that 
provides its Muslims with a voice, especially concerning questions related 
to terrorism, religious radicalisation, Islamophobia, etc. 
The strength of the foundations of a new Europe will depend upon 
the extent to which Muslims are allowed to participate in the construction 
of a new European identity.  
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The Multiple Crises in 
 Dutch Parallel Societies 
Rob de Wijk* 
In the Netherlands the debate on the causes of radicalisation, terrorism and 
social unrest in the suburbs of major cities has narrowed down to failed 
integration and the social and economic deprivation of ethnic groups. The 
emergence of a subclass of underprivileged ethnic minorities is thought to 
be the root cause of both the riots in Amsterdam and the emergence of 
terrorist networks such as the Hofstad Group, members of which stood 
trial in early 2006. The reality, however, is more complex.  
In some of the major cities, parallel societies have emerged. Yet the 
concept of a ‘parallel society’ is hard to define. Major cities have seen the 
appearance of underprivileged groups of dissatisfied and disappointed 
ethnic minorities living in the poorest districts. But within these districts, a 
new middle class of ethnic entrepreneurs running a shadow economy has 
also evolved. The fact that these districts (partly) escape from government 
control makes them parallel societies.  
The emergence of parallel societies has three consequences. First, 
social and economic deprivation can lead to unrest, which is not necessarily 
related to cultural or religious grievances. Second, within parallel societies 
the new, better educated middle class tends to become increasingly 
indignant at the lack of upward social mobility. Members of this group are 
prone to radicalisation. Third, owing to their closed nature, parallel 
societies provide the perfect cover for criminal activities and consequently 
shield the infrastructure for terrorist networks. As a result, social unrest, 
criminal activities and radicalisation could ultimately go hand in hand with 
the development of terrorist networks. Moroccans are the cause of many 
problems in both cases. Some youngsters terrorise entire neighbourhoods 
while others turn into terrorists.  
                                                     
* Dr Rob de Wijk is a Professor of International Relations at the Royal Military 
Academy and a Professor of Strategic Studies at Leiden University. He is also the 
Director of the Clingendael/TNO Centre for Strategic Studies in The Hague. 
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This paper tries to unravel the complex problem of the development 
of parallel societies in the Netherlands.  
Parallel societies in the Netherlands 
Contrary to public perception, according to two reports integration has not 
really been a failure.1 Nevertheless, there are some disturbing trends. First, 
non-Western ethnic groups are structurally underprivileged. Second, inter-
ethnic contact is decreasing. Third, ethnic and indigenous groups 
increasingly have negative feelings towards each other. The problems are 
concentrated in a limited number of districts in the four biggest cities. In 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, one out of three residents 
is now of non-Western origin. In the top 10 ‘ethnic neighbourhoods’, an 
average of 74% are of non-Western origin.  
In major cities, a high degree of segregation of different population 
groups can be observed. Contact with the indigenous population is at its 
lowest in the neighbourhoods with large numbers of ethnic minorities. One 
study illustrated that if more than half of residents are from non-Western 
ethnic minorities, contact and interaction between the indigenous and 
ethnic populations generally declines.2 People of Turkish and Moroccan 
origin have the strongest orientation towards their own ethnic groups. 
Approximately two out of three living in the Netherlands focus on their 
own group. In concluding, the study stated: 
[I]n the last 10 years the frequency of social contact with the native 
population by Turks and Moroccans has declined…The social distance 
from the native population is thus not reducing. Of great significance 
in this interaction is that contacts between second-generation Turkish 
and Moroccan immigrants and the indigenous population have been 
steadily declining in recent years, a development that is linked to the 
steady rise in the numbers of ethnic minorities in the large cities…A 
further factor is the continuing high influx of Turkish and Moroccan 
‘marriage migrants’ who…remain largely ensconced in their own 
community. 
                                                     
1 See the report by the Blok Committee, the parliamentary commission set up to 
study integration (Tweede Kamer 2003–2004, 28689, no. 17) and RMO advise no. 37, 
The Hague, October 2005 (“Niet langer met de ruggen tegen elkaar”).  
2 See M. Gijsberts and J. Dagevos, Uit elkaars buurt [Love thy neighbour], Sociaal en 
Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 10 October 2005.  
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As a consequence, many also have a poor command of the Dutch language.  
Another problem is that second-generation non-Western minorities 
have a more negative attitude towards indigenous groups. More highly 
educated non-Western minorities, however, have extremely negative 
feelings towards indigenous groups. This attitude is explained by the 
poorly functioning labour market and a lack of upward social mobility.3  
Until recently, most Dutch politicians turned a blind eye to these 
developments. By providing generous unemployment benefits, many 
assumed that the social security system would simply prevent the 
emergence of truly deprived areas and parallel societies. In contrast to the 
United States, ‘ghettos’ simply could not exist. They pointed at the large 
number of heavily subsidised welfare projects, while the police could still 
patrol the streets. They also argued that no easy conclusions could be 
drawn because no districts were dominated by a single ethnic minority.  
Nonetheless, the situation in the Schilderswijk and Laakkwartier 
areas (The Hague), het Oude Noorden (Rotterdam), Amsterdam–West and 
the Kanaleneiland (Utrecht) is alarming. These districts have developed 
into parallel societies with limited government control, a mixture of 
underprivileged ethnic groups and a new middle class of entrepreneurs. As 
municipalities put a lot of money into housing projects aimed at improving 
their quality of life, some of these neighbourhoods do not even look poor.  
Moroccans 
The main problem is second-generation Moroccans. Their ancestors were 
born in the rural area of the Rif Mountains. This is an extremely poor and 
remote area in the northern part of Morocco, which successfully broke 
away from the influence of central government. As a result, education, 
infrastructure and food production lagged behind the rest of the country. 
The Rif area grew increasingly poor and underdeveloped. After 
unsuccessful attempts to find jobs in Algeria, many Berbers came to the 
Netherlands in the 1970s. Owing to recession, many became unemployed 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Supported by the government, they have 
continued to stay in the Netherlands and have been joined by family 
members from Morocco. The first generation is still largely unemployed, 
                                                     
3 See Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), De sociale staat van Nederland 2005, 
SCP, The Hague, 2005, pp. 82-85. 
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poorly educated and not integrated. Most first-generation Moroccans do 
not speak Dutch despite the fact that they have lived in the country for over 
30 years. Consequently, they are unable to assist their children in building a 
better future. While being Dutch citizens, second-generation Moroccans 
also struggle with the language and lack proper education. Moroccans born 
in the Netherlands have grown up without proper support from their 
poorly integrated parents and have been caught between the proud but 
repressive culture of the Berbers and the indifferent liberal culture of the 
Netherlands. As a direct result, a generation has been set adrift. Almost 
40% of young, second-generation Moroccan men are unemployed, against 
23% of first-generation men. Of course, there are many other poorly 
integrated minorities, but lacking the specific background of the Berbers, 
these groups cause fewer problems for public order.  
Problems with second-generation Moroccans are well illustrated by 
the case of the relatively wealthy Slotervaart district in Amsterdam. 
Slotervaart has some 45,000 inhabitants, with some 50% of autochthonous 
origin. Unemployment is at only 9%. To improve the quality of life, 
housing projects are in full swing. The municipality invests heavily in 
language courses as well as other education projects, such as computer 
courses. Nevertheless, the tension is clearly visible. Petty crime, 
intimidation, harassment and lack of respect for the authorities, especially 
for the police, cause severe problems. On 23 April 1998 the first major clash 
between Moroccans and the police occurred. In January 2006, small-scale 
riots again took place, with citizens harassed, cars destroyed and windows 
smashed. The riots broke out after a Moroccan, fearing a police chase, had a 
fatal car accident trying to escape. The trigger for the riots was comparable 
to the situation in Clichy-sous-Bois, the working-class Parisian suburb 
where an outbreak of French violence began on 27 October 2006. According 
to a report by the DCRG (Direction Centrale des Renseignements 
Généraux), the intelligence service of the French police, the riots were not 
caused by criminal gangs or Islam extremism, but by groups of angry, 
‘economically excluded’ youngsters feeling neglected because of their 
social and ethnic background. In Amsterdam, as district chairman Henk 
Goettsch has argued, the problem centres around a small group of 100 to 
150 Moroccans who are “completely and utterly mad” and who are “from 
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top to toe unreligious and completely lost for Islam”.4 Goettsch maintains 
that the only remaining option is to remove them from the street and put 
them in re-education camps for a long period of time. Politicians, however, 
fear that this measure conflicts with civil rights. This solution was put 
forward during the early 1990s by former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, 
and now large parts of the population believe there is no other option but 
to send these groups to re-education camps.  
Schilderswijk: The poorest of them all 
A relatively prosperous district, Slotervaart’s ‘only’ problem is Moroccans 
terrorising the neighbourhood. In other districts the situation is far worse. 
The Schilderswijk district in The Hague is the Netherlands’s poorest 
district. It is the archetype of a parallel society: 89% is of non-Western 
origin with Turks, Moroccans and Surinamers as the dominant minorities. 
The Schilderswijk area is the most densely populated in the country (23,500 
inhabitants per square kilometre, compared to 4,000 inhabitants per square 
kilometre in the major cities). Finally, more than half of the population is 
aged less than 25, and some 80% are unemployed.5 
Over the last 15 years, the Schilderswijk and to a lesser extent the 
adjacent Laakkwartier areas have developed into parallel societies, 
including a grey economy based on crime, semi-legal and illegal jobs and 
activities such as underground banking, caused in part by banks and 
insurance companies denying mortgages to residents in some postal code 
areas. Ethnic lawyers, housing agents, shops, bars, restaurants and phone 
houses focus exclusively on the neighbourhood. There is some evidence 
that Sharia has been introduced in some of these neighbourhoods. Citizens 
focusing on the outside world watch Al Jazeera and other Arabic stations, 
such as Al Manar (Libya), Sahar TV1 and Al Alam (Iran), Art Iqraa (Saudi 
Arabia), some of which were banned by the minister of justice in January 
2006. The main problem is crime, burglaries, car thefts and youth gangs 
committing violence against fellow citizens, especially against Jews and 
gay persons. Some criminal activities, such as the production of false 
                                                     
4 See H. Goettsch, “Zo maf als een deur zijn ze van top tot teen los van god”, NRC-
Handelsblad, 22 January 2006.  
5 Figures are derived from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, The Hague, 15 
August 2005.  
56 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
passports, money laundering, robberies and the drugs trade, are related to 
terrorism.  
Having completely renovated many of the houses, the municipality 
has created a district that is visually appealing. Ignoring the huge 
differences between ethnic groups in the city and the emergence of a 
parallel society, authorities have argued that all citizens of The Hague are 
‘Hagenaren’.  
In sum, the Schilderswijk district has turned into a separate area from 
the city of The Hague with a different economic and social structure and 
people with distinct values. This development has provided the perfect 
infrastructure for the supporters of terrorist networks such as the Hofstad 
Group, with some of its members living in the district and in adjacent 
neighbourhoods.  
Action plans 
Recently the authorities have embarked on radical action plans to deal with 
the emergence of parallel societies. Undoubtedly, the murder of Theo van 
Gogh and the riots in the French suburbs have contributed to new 
initiatives. Rotterdam has been a forerunner in these developments. In 
Rotterdam the political heirs of Pim Fortuyn (the politician who was 
murdered in 2002, having instigated radical political change), have 
experimented with various different measures. For example, a 120% 
minimum wage requirement was set for those citizens considering a house 
rent of over €250. Radical measures were codified in the ‘Rotterdam Law’. 
By 1 January 2006, every major city could impose tough income 
requirements for accommodation seekers; could create favourable 
conditions for entrepreneurs in specific streets or neighbourhoods and 
could prevent jobless persons moving from one city to another.  
Another interesting development is the so-called ‘Rotterdam Code’ – 
a code of conduct for all citizens of Rotterdam. Aimed at improving 
integration, the code asks citizens of Rotterdam to accept rules, including 
the use of Dutch as a common language, and actively to reject 
discrimination, radicalisation and extremism. Together with the publication 
of the code in January 2006, the town council started to organise debates in 
the city’s districts between the 160 ethnic minorities and the native Dutch. 
The Rotterdam Code is part of a broader attempt to prevent the emergence 
of parallel societies and to reduce the danger of radicalisation and 
extremism. Rotterdam is also planning experiments to change the ethnic 
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and social composition of neighbourhoods: housing projects that include 
more expensive houses for higher income groups, income quotas and the 
relocation of the poorest people within the city as well as a ban on the 
influx of the more underprivileged into certain neighbourhoods.  
Another project called Wij Amsterdammers [We, the citizens of 
Amsterdam], aimed specifically at reducing the risk of radicalisation, was 
set up after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. This 
project focuses primarily on combating terrorism by complementing the 
work of the police with specific integration projects seeking to prevent 
radicalisation by mobilising positive forces in society. So far, the results of 
this seemingly soft approach are quite encouraging. In practice, the 
approach is not that soft, because overt and covert counter-terrorism 
measures are actually quite tough. On the one hand, authorities try to win 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. On the other hand, activities related to 
terrorism are continuously disturbed. It is probably this combination of 
hard and soft measures that makes the strategy of Job Cohen, the mayor of 
Amsterdam, quite successful. A major problem, however, is the lack of 
instruments for assessing the level of radicalisation and the processes 
taking place within these parallel societies.  
All action plans focus on winning the hearts and the minds of the 
people. The aim is to prevent social unrest, riots and radicalisation by 
improving social and economic conditions and facilitating communication 
between ethnic groups. Action plans most probably ease tensions, but it is 
unlikely that these measures can prevent radicalisation and terrorism as 
well.  
Fighting terrorists 
As has been argued before, within parallel societies the poor usually do not 
turn into fundamentalist extremists. Rather, the problem seems to lie with 
the more highly educated and the emerging middle class. Reinforced by 
relative success in the black and grey economies, many have turned their 
backs on Dutch society.6 Some have become extremists. Radicalisation 
requires some degree of abstract thinking, of which only the better 
educated are capable. They transform religious, cultural and historical 
                                                     
6 See P.C. van Duyve, “Economisch succes zorgt niet automatisch voor integratie”, 
NRC-Handelsblad, 24 November 2005. 
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grievances into action. This process is exactly what happened with the 
Hofstad Group. 
The case of Mohammed Bouyeri serves as an example. During the 
1990s, he was active as a community worker in Amsterdam and a capable 
student who graduated from high school with good marks. Without 
providing an alternative, the authorities closed down the local youth centre 
in 1998. Until then Mr Bouyeri was quite successful in keeping young 
Moroccans off the street, but after losing the centre, they had no other 
choice but to gather in the streets of their neighbourhood. This consequence 
contributed to the riots of 1998 mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, Mr Bouyeri 
fruitlessly attempted to establish a new youth centre, and as time 
progressed, became radicalised and turned violent. He fought with the 
police and was sent to prison for 12 weeks. After being released, nine days 
after 9/11, he told his councillor about his new hero, Osama bin Laden. It is 
unclear to what extent his battle for a youth centre contributed to his 
radicalisation. His friends later observed that his detention and the death of 
his mother in December 2001 were the real turning points. It is clear 
however that his change of conviction cannot be solely attributed to an 
underlying hatred of the West in general and the Netherlands in particular. 
In a recent interview on Dutch television, the interior minister 
estimated that some 15 to 20 radicalised groups of some 10 to 15 members 
each are active in the country. Mohammed Bouyeri, who assassinated Theo 
van Gogh, was among the members of the Hofstad Group (Hofstad being 
another name for The Hague, where most of the bombings were to take 
place). Other members of the 16 who stood trial in 2005 and 2006 included 
Samir Azzuz, who was accused of planning attacks on parliament, the 
offices of the Intelligence Services, the nuclear power plant of Borsele, 
Schiphol Airport and the Ministry of Defence in The Hague. The group’s 
characteristics became well known: 
• Physically, the members of the group lived in the parallel societies of 
The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht.  
• Spiritually, they lived in a virtual, anti-Western world created on the 
internet and in private houses during sessions with self-appointed 
imams. They not only discussed Islam, but watched extremely violent 
jihadist videos and ‘snuff movies’ as well. 
• Most members had known each other for a long time. Kinship and 
friendship were important.  
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• Some suspects, including Mohammed Bouyeri, Jason Walters and 
Ismail Akhnikh had already developed a reputation of violence. 
• Most members were second-generation Moroccans who had become 
radicalised as teenagers. Some members, including Jason and 
Jermaine Walters and Martine van den Oever, had been converts. 
• Most were well educated. Some terminated their studies after 
becoming radicalised. The Koran rather than school became the 
source of all knowledge.  
As has been argued before, there is little evidence that parallel 
societies and social and economic deprivation contribute to radicalisation. 
A possible explanation lies in the role of the virtual ummah for radicalised 
individuals – a Muslim world created behind closed doors and on the 
internet. In the absence of a formal Islamic doctrine, the ‘citizens’ of this 
virtual ummah create their own truths, norms and values based on their 
own explanations of history and the Koran. If needed, fatwas can be 
obtained from unknown internet imams.  
Still, terrorist networks can only develop with at least some form of 
(passive) support of a majority of the citizens. Therefore, parallel societies 
provide cover and infrastructure for networks of radicals and extremists, 
but the virtual ummah reveal their true motivation. Their motivation 
usually comes not from social and economic grievances but from hate 
against the West. Conceptually, the emergence of home-grown terrorism 
has a resemblance to communist cells in Europe during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries and the insurgencies in former colonies. Consequently, 
counter-insurgency doctrine still provides some guidance for conceptual 
thinking. As a matter of fact, some elements of traditional counter-
insurgency doctrine could be used to fight today’s home-grown terrorists, 
applied as follows:  
• Protection should be given to the local, neutral and receptive part of 
the population against the insurgents. This undertaking requires 
improving the security of the neighbourhood by reducing criminal 
activities, especially those criminal activities in support of terrorism.  
• The reduction of crime is also necessary to deprive the insurgents of 
their support system. The objective is to isolate home-grown 
terrorists physically and psychologically.  
• Efforts in this area should include eliminating the insurgents’ 
intelligence network – closing down websites, television channels and 
the denial of internet access.  
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• ‘Hearts-and-minds’ activities should seek to separate insurgents from 
their support base. This objective requires dialogue between ethnic 
groups and projects aimed at improving the social and economic 
conditions of the population. Moderate ethnic groups must be 
convinced that the indigenous population is on their side.  
• A well-coordinated and continuous flow of intelligence based on 
human intelligence (HUMINT) is crucial. This element is an 
important by-product of the hearts-and-minds campaign. Close 
cooperation between the police and community workers is of great 
importance for knowing what is going on in parallel societies.  
• Direct, small-scale and possibly covert action should be taken against 
the insurgents to disturb their activities and arrest them if necessary. 
The use of force against home-grown terrorists could jeopardise the 
hearts-and-minds campaign and should therefore be a measure of 
last resort.  
To many, this approach is rather controversial. For example, 
community workers will have difficulties using the hearts-and-minds 
campaign to improve the intelligence position of the authorities. Close 
cooperation with the police could lead to mistrust among the population 
and losing hearts and minds. But, considering the nature of home-grown 
terrorism, there is no other alternative except to complement the infiltration 
of terrorist networks with HUMINT from community workers. Needless to 
say, HUMINT is also useful in preventing riots and criminal activities.  
Why do they radicalise? 
If social and economic deprivation is not the root cause of radicalisation, 
the key question is why Muslims radicalise. Mr Bouyeri’s radicalisation 
mentioned above seems to fit a broader pattern. After 9/11, many Western 
European countries saw the emergence of networks of extremists, 
including the Hofstad Group. They were part of the development of an 
international Salafi jihad as a force to be reckoned with in Europe.  
There are two sets of contributing background factors – origins and 
catalysts. Both are only marginally related to the development of parallel 
societies and underprivileged groups. The violent struggle against ‘corrupt, 
decadent and pro-Western’ governments in the Arabic world, which 
started in Egypt in the 1960s, is considered one of the root causes of the 
violent Salafi jihad. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 
provided the international dimension. This vector was formalised by the 
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shift from the near to the far enemy during the 1990s, especially with 
Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war in 1996 and his fatwas of 1998.  
Another root cause is Islamic culture. Fundamentalism is both a 
product of this development and Muslims’ attempt to deal with this 
development by rejecting Western culture and influence, and committing 
to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world. Muslim extremism is 
closely linked to this. Many Muslims consider fundamentalism as the 
solution to political and socio-economic problems that had become 
manifest in the 1970s. Owing to increasing oil revenues, rapid but uneven 
modernisation, urbanisation and economic liberalisation took place, which 
led to social tensions in large parts of the Muslim world, especially the 
Middle East. Youngsters in the fast-growing cities felt betrayed by their 
leaders, who failed to use the oil revenues to create a civil society based on 
Islamic values, and instead used the spoils for their own purposes. They 
also accused their leaders of becoming the puppets of Western companies 
and governments. In Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber argues that a 
collision is occurring between the forces of Islamic disintegral tribalism and 
reactionary fundamentalism (jihad) and the forces of integrative 
modernism and aggressive economic and cultural globalisim (‘McWorld’). 
Mr Barber sees this as a “dialectic expression of tensions built into a single 
global civilization as it emerges against the backdrop of traditional ethnic 
and religious divisions, many of which are actually created by McWorld 
and its infotainment industries and technological innovations”.7 
Osama bin Laden’s goal, to unite all Muslims and to establish a 
government that follows the rule of the Caliphs – the ancient religious 
rulers – is widely shared by extremists, including the Hofstad Group. 
Agreeing with Osama bin Laden that the Caliphate can only be established 
by force, the overthrow of all Muslim governments is deemed necessary. In 
this view, governments are corrupt and influenced by the ‘Judeo-Crusader 
Alliance’, an alliance of Jews and Christians, embodied by Israel and the US 
and supported by liberal democracies in general. This unholy alliance has 
occupied the land of Islam’s holy places (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem) 
and is trying to crush Islam. To end this influence, the destruction of Israel 
and the US is a prerequisite for the reform of Muslim societies. In January 
2006, Mohammed Bouyeri made his criticisms abundantly clear during a 
                                                     
7 See B. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, Terrorism’s Challenge to Democracy, New York, 
NY: Random House Publishing Group, 1996, p. xvi.  
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three-hour long testimony in court, mentioning the West’s hatred against 
Islam as his main grievance. 
In sum, the origins of radicalisation have little to do with parallel 
societies and the existence of an underprivileged class. The same holds true 
for most of the catalyst factors. Our as yet unpublished piece of research on 
some 35 plots and successful acts of terrorism revealed a number of catalyst 
factors: 
1) the ongoing struggle in the Middle East;  
2) the war against terrorism and how it is being fought in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Especially the indiscriminate counter-insurgency tactics 
used by the Americans – at Abu Graibh and Guantanamo Bay – have 
become symbols of Western attempts to oppress Muslims; 
3) the ideology of the West, namely President George W. Bush’s 
solutions for peace in the wider Middle East; 
4) the successful attacks of 11 September 2001. The events inspired 
young Muslims to turn into extremists and to join terrorist networks. 
The Hofstad Group is an example of this development. After 9/11, 
Europe witnessed an explosion in the number of attempted terrorist 
attacks, usually instigated by home-grown terrorist groups. Generally 
speaking, all successful attacks around the world are strong 
motivators; and  
5) calls by radical leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri.  
The terrorist’s inspiration is usually of foreign origin. Similar 
conclusions were drawn by a Norwegian study. It concluded that home-
grown terrorists were motivated by ‘global jihad’ rather than domestic 
grievances.8  
Mohammed Bouyeri declared war on the Netherlands. As there is no 
higher authority but Allah and the Koran he rejected politicians and other 
authorities as ‘non-believers’ and saw democracy and the rule of law as 
antithetic to God’s word and Sharia. His views were widely supported by 
other members of the Hofstad Group. As these grievances are common for 
                                                     
8 See P. Nesser, Jihad in Europe: A survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism 
in post-millennium Europe, FFI/Rapport-2004/01146, Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller, Norway, 2004, p. 69. 
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the supporters of the international Salafi jihad, they cannot be considered 
domestic catalysts. In the Netherlands, only a few domestic catalysts could 
be identified: 
1) Over-reaction by local politicians – in 2002 the Netherlands Security 
and Intelligence Service AIVD found evidence that opinion leaders 
contributed to the radicalisation of Muslims. Indeed, the film 
Submission, by MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh, undoubtedly 
contributed to the death of the latter. The recent cartoon affair is 
certainly also contributing to further radicalisation.  
2) Although the lack of social mobility merely confirms the West’s 
attitude towards Muslims, it does not seem to be a root cause of 
radicalisation. The same holds true for social and economic 
deprivation.  
In sum, while domestic grievances are held to show the West’s 
negative attitude towards Islam, home-grown terrorists such as the Hofstad 
Group are part of the international Salafi jihad. The movement is rooted in 
the Arabic world, which has gained momentum after 9/11 and has 
complemented al-Qaeda and its franchises with home-grown radicals 
setting up local terrorist networks. Some of these loose networks have 
international connections, as was the case with the Hofstad Group. Some of 
its members knew Abdelhamid Akoudad (alias Naoufel), who was arrested 
in Spain for his involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The Hofstad 
Group and most of the Madrid bombers share the same Moroccan 
background. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of parallel societies contributes to fractured societies. When 
entire districts no longer take part in the democratic process, they pose a 
threat to the constitutional state. Parallel societies are not only the source of 
criminal activities, illegal economic practices, intimidation and violence – 
they also provide the perfect cover and infrastructure for networks of 
extremists. In the Netherlands, major cities have embarked on a strategy of 
dealing with parallel societies. Most initiatives are aimed at winning the 
hearts and minds of ethnic minorities by improving social and economic 
conditions and by increasing interethnic communication. Such efforts could 
have two effects. First, raising the standard of living could reinforce 
stability and reduce the danger of riots. Second, winning hearts and minds 
is a prerequisite for counter-terrorist operations. Finally, local authorities 
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should study counter-insurgency doctrine and the lessons learned from 
military operations to find solutions for dealing with home-grown terrorist 
networks. 
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Islam in Russia in 2020 
Alexey Malashenko* 
The influence of the ‘Islamic factor’ on the socio-political process in Russia 
has long become routine. People are accustomed to it and it arouses 
concern mostly in connection with sporadic excesses of terror that occur in 
the context of religious extremism. At the same time, demonstrations under 
Islamic slogans and efforts by Muslim politicians and clergy to provide 
religious grounds or religious interpretations of contradictions and 
conflicts promote a slow but rising influence of Islam on society and 
politics. (The classical example is the Chechen war, which was proclaimed 
as a jihad by separatists and explained by some Russian politicians as a 
‘clash of civilisations’.) 
According to the official census of 2002, there are 14.5 million 
Muslims in Russia. In reality, there are about 19 to 20 million (taking 
migrants into account), which is equivalent to 12% of the population.1 
A consolidated Muslim community with a common religious centre 
has not formed in Russia. The Islamic society of the country consists of two 
large groups. The first group lives in the Volga–Ural region, Western 
Siberia and Moscow, where the Tatars and Bashkirs live; and the second 
group exists in the nations of the North Caucasus. The largest Islamic 
ethnicity in Russia is the Tatars (7 million people), followed by the Bashkirs 
(about 1.5 million people), and among the Caucasians, the Chechens (1 
million people). 
In recent years, the intensive migration of North Caucasian Muslims 
to the central region of Russia has been observed. This phenomenon has 
aggravated inter-ethnic relations as well as those among different Muslim 
ethnic groups. 
                                                     
* Alexey Malashenko is with the Carnegie Centre in Moscow. 
1 According to different data, 1.5–2 million Azerbaijanis, 0.8–1 million Uzbeks and 
over 1 million Kazakhs, Kirghizis and Tadjiks permanently, and predominantly 
illegally, live in Russia. 
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The short history of Islam in Russia (after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union) may be divided into several stages. The first stage was 
characterised by the beginning of religious revival, a rapid rise in the 
number of mosques, the forming of an Islamic educational system and a 
major emphasis on religion in people’s consciousness. The second stage, 
which took place in the middle of the 1990s, was characterised by the 
politicisation of Islam. Nationwide religious–political groups, such as the 
Union of Muslims of Russia, the ‘Nur’ movement and the ‘Refakh’ party, as 
well as regional religious–political organisations appeared. At this time, 
among Russian Muslims (primarily in the North Caucasus) the Islamist 
movement was formed, which was greatly although not entirely provoked 
by the Chechen war. Islamists began to operate in Dagestan, Kabardino–
Balkaria and Ingushetia. Centres of Islamism appeared in Tatarstan as well. 
The third stage occurred from 2000 to 2002, when the total level of Islamic 
politicisation fell and Islamists of the North Caucasus suffered losses 
during the second Chechen campaign. 
Still, from approximately the beginning of 2003, the activity of Islamic 
radicals was back on the upswing. The number of Jamaats in the North 
Caucasus grew and Islamists in the Volga region became more active 
despite the fact that in the opinion of some specialists they practically 
disappeared at the end of 1990s. Thus, it is possible to assume that a fourth 
stage began during this period. 
The radical ideology of some Muslims in Russia has proven more 
persistent than was assumed. In our view, various independent factors 
contributed to this. First, the growth of Islamic observance contributes to an 
awakening of interest among adherents in other areas besides just 
traditional Islam. The second factor is the formation among the young 
generation of Muslim clergy of various concepts coming from the Arabic 
East. Graduates of the universities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and 
Turkey offer their compatriots some different, more radical (including 
Hanabilah) versions of Islam, as well as ‘Islam without maskhabs’ or, in 
other words, Salafism. Third, as is typical primarily in the North Caucasus, 
domestic Jamaats continue to propagandise the organisation of society on 
the basis of Shariat and advocate the idea that social justice may be ensured 
only through Islam. Fourth, in connection with the previous thesis, Islam 
appears to be the natural form of protest against the injustice of local and 
central power and its corruption. Fifth, aid continues to arrive from outside 
(though not on the previous scale). Finally, the radicals’ activities 
contribute to the confrontational atmosphere between Islam and the West.  
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Although as noted above, Russia’s Muslims are not homogeneous, it 
is the radicals who most often manage to overcome ‘Tatar–Caucasian’ 
mutual alienation. The non-traditional interpretation of Islam currently 
being spread all around Russia transcends ethno-cultural barriers and 
consolidates Muslims on the basis of radical ideology. At the same time, 
contacts between Russia’s radicals and like-minded persons from Central 
Asia are gradually growing. This development is related to the periodical 
appearance of emissaries of Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islami in the Volga region 
and the South Urals.  
The integration process based on radical religious ideology is 
certainly dangerous because it supports extremist tendencies and as a 
result produces the basic conditions for destabilisation. Yet, it should not be 
forgotten that the sympathies of common Muslims frequently turn out to 
be on the side of Islamists, for Muslims understand Islam as connected to 
hopes for an improvement in their material position and securing social 
justice. Islamists, not being angels themselves, become allies of the 
disadvantaged part of society and gain popularity by virtue of their 
confrontation with authorities. In the North Caucasus, there is a view that 
local Islamists are the single power that authorities seriously fear.  
Islamism has the greatest prospects in the North Caucasus. The 
waning of war in Chechnya (which in itself does not mean the end of the 
conflict) is occurring simultaneously with the revival of Islamist activity in 
the whole region. Authorities who have fought the Wahhabists almost 
entirely by military means since 1999 have failed to prevent its expansion. 
Thus, Islamists have become the constant and de facto legitimate political 
power. It is indicative that the new separatists’ leader Abdul-Khalim 
Sajdullaev, who succeeded Aslan Maskhadov (killed in 2005), emphasises 
the creation of a ‘Caucasian front’ of jihad. There is no common front, but 
the coordination between Islamist groups in separate republics is growing.  
The self-confidence of the Islamists is also evolving. An increasing 
number of them believe that they are not fighting solely against the local 
administration and Moscow, but are part of a world jihad. Thus, they 
enhance their status not only in their own opinion, but also in that of the 
local and federal authorities opposing them. Authorities always emphasise 
that they are fighting not just bandits but rather the ‘vanguard’ of 
international terrorism. 
It should be acknowledged that during the last two years, Russian 
special services have achieved some success in annihilating several leaders 
of Jamaats in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria as well as 
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Chechen field commanders. In 2005, almost every week newspapers 
published stories about the successful operations of federal force units 
(‘siloviki’) against Islamists. 
At the same time, there is a feeling that the authorities did not 
manage to achieve the most important goal – to stop the influx of young 18-
20 year olds into Islamism. Recently, a ‘rejuvenation’ of Islamism has 
occurred. This phenomena may be observed, for example, in the Muslim 
Volga region where groups of followers organise themselves around young 
and radical imams.  
Throughout the entire, culturally Islamic area of Russia, intra-Muslim 
confrontation between traditionalists and those who try to indoctrinate 
individuals in ‘Arabic Islam’ continues – indeed, it is even increasing. This 
struggle is particularly intense because at stake is the influence of the 
present clergy on their flocks, access to material and other secular blessings, 
and also their authority in front of secular power, which is afraid of losing 
control over Islam. (It should be noted that the emergence of the liberal 
trend towards ‘Euro-Islam’ did not receive support from the clergy; it is 
still unknown among believers and has been relegated to the narrow circle 
of secular intelligentsia.)  
To some extent, the processes occurring within Russian Islam may be 
linked to a generation gap. Imams aged 40-50 who obtained recognition 
during perestroika (after the fall of the Soviet Union) are being opposed by 
ambitious 20 year-old young men. The latter have received an education in 
the Arabic language, know Fiqh and Shariat fairly well, and, most 
importantly, have acquired and are improving their preaching skills. 
The intensity of the conflict greatly depends on the tolerance of both 
sides, on the general situation in the country and also on the devotion of 
Russian Muslims to their historical and cultural traditions.  
Followers of traditional Islam are particularly anxious about the state 
of the educational process, the training programmes of many madrasahs and 
institutes and the abundance of books that popularise the views of 
traditional Islamic fundamentalists such as Said Kutba, Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
and others. Such a situation is characteristic not only for Russia but also for 
all Muslim states in post-Soviet space. There, attempts to found educational 
and informative programmes that may help to move the believers out of 
the influence of Islamists are being undertaken.  
In the past decade, Russian Muslims have persistently striven for 
integration into the world of umma. In certain cases, this tendency may 
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contradict Moscow’s official policy. Thus, the Muslim clerical and political 
elite opposed the Kremlin’s pro-Serbian policy and expressed solidarity 
with Muslims in Bosnia and in particular in Kosovo. Yet, the Kremlin 
position in the conflict around Iraq in 2002 was generally supported. 
Moreover, it is known that in Dagestan there was an initiative to help Iraqis 
by sending Caucasian volunteer units of (according to some data) up to 
6,000 persons. At that time, the head of the Central Clerical Board of 
Muslims of Russia Talgat Tatdzhutdin publicly declared “Jihad to 
America”. (This fact significantly irritated the Kremlin.) In 2006, Russian 
Muslims expressed their solidarity with people of their faith during the 
scandal about the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in some 
European newspapers. In the capital of Dagestan, Makhachkala, a protest 
march was organised, and acting Prime Minister of Chechnya Ramzan 
Kadyrov expelled the Danish humanitarian mission from the country. 
(Moscow later disavowed knowledge of this decision.)  
It is obvious that the central object of general ummah unity is still the 
conflict in the Middle East. After the unconditional support that was given 
to Palestine by the former Soviet Union, Russian Muslims were genuinely 
disappointed by the new policy of maintaining equal distance from the 
opposing sides. That is why President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to Hamas 
to send a delegation to Moscow, after it had just won at the parliamentary 
elections in 2006, was greeted by Russian Muslims with great satisfaction. 
(Incidentally, Hamas is not listed by Russia as a terrorist organisation.) 
In 1998–99, the Union of Muslims of Russia made the first 
(unsuccessful) attempt to bring Russia into the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). In 2002–03, this idea was developed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and approved by President Putin. And in spite of the fact 
that Russia still has not received the status (and it is unknown if it will) of 
an OIC observer, the fact that this question was even discussed gives 
Russian Muslims additional opportunity for self-identification as full 
members of the umma.  
Confessional self-identification may be in discord with one’s civil 
identity. In other words, the sense of affiliation with Islam becomes more 
acute than the sense of belonging to the nation state. In the Russian poly-
confessional state, this contradiction is catalysed by complicated 
interactions between major religions. The proclaimed constitutional 
equality of all religions is not always observed. The Russian Orthodox 
Church (the majority of the country’s population practises Orthodox 
Christianity) confidently lays claim to the special, leading role in the life of 
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society while underlining its exceptional importance to the building of a 
nation state. Ideologists of the Church are fully confident that it is 
Orthodox Christianity that must form the basis of the ‘Russian national 
idea’. Attempts to develop it have been made throughout the past decade 
but the process has never been completed.  
The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksii II, 
consistently ranks between 10th and 15th place in the list of top Russian 
politicians. The Church actively penetrates the army and primary schools, 
trying to influence educational programmes.  
There have been cases when representatives of the Russian Orthodox 
Church unofficially impeded the building of new mosques, the registration 
of Islamic communities and creation of Islamic centres.  
All of these facts cannot but irritate the Muslim elite, the 
overwhelming majority of whom have a benevolent relationship with the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Considerable conflicts are concealed behind the 
façade of the official inter-confessional dialogue, and from time to time 
they leak out onto the pages of newspapers and magazines and into the 
speeches of some representatives of the clergy. (For example, Andrey 
Kuraev, one of the leading ideologists of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
stated that it was necessary to establish total state control over Islamic 
education.) 
The latest conflict to break out over national Russian symbols is, in 
our opinion, the most absurd. The crown and the orb topped with crosses 
have always been depicted on the state emblem of Russia. In the autumn of 
2005, the All-Tatars public centre unexpectedly demanded the removal of 
this sign of Christianity from the state emblem. A rather heated dispute 
began. Several well-known religious figures, such as Deputy Chairman of 
the Council of Muftis of Russia Nafigulla Ashirov, were involved. Picked 
up by mass media, this senseless debate contributed to the rise of mutual 
irritation between Muslims and Orthodox believers.  
Nor did Russia avoid the notorious ‘headscarf conflict’ seen 
elsewhere in Europe. The Union of Muslim Women of Tatarstan demanded 
that women be allowed to be photographed for passports wearing a 
headscarf. Secular authorities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
then later judicial bodies, reacted quite tactfully and permitted Tatar ladies 
to be photographed for the official documents with their heads covered. As 
a result, this appeal of the Union of Muslim Women did not receive any 
significant backing from society and the conflict dissipated. 
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Another more noticeable attempt to bring back some standards of an 
Islamic way of living came in the form of appeals to restore the right to 
polygamy. In Russia, such discussions have gone on since the mid-1990s. 
One of those backing this idea is Ruslan Aushev, the former President of 
Ingushetia. The idea was also discussed at length by some Tatar politicians. 
In 2005, Ramzan Kadyrov insisted on legalising polygamy, arguing that the 
number of women in the republic exceeds the number of men by 10% and 
that polygamy would be the only way to rescue the Chechen nation from 
extinction. Some politicians and religious figures of Dagestan regard this 
idea favourably, and of course, Islamists support it unconditionally. It 
should be noticed that while polygamy is already practised by prosperous 
individuals, it is unlikely to become widespread. (Occasionally it is not 
clear what is behind the aspiration to legalise polygamy – the willingness to 
affirm Islamic custom or to legitimise someone’s family status.) 
Nevertheless, it should be accepted that the re-incorporation of 
Islamic models of behaviour into society really exists. One can judge it by 
how strictly the fasting and all sorts of food prohibitions are kept, in 
particular, those on alcohol. In the first part of 1990s, some politicians and 
experts expressed the view that Islam is in fashion. Of course, there is some 
truth to that. Yet the re-Islamisation of Russian Muslims has turned out to 
be much more profound than was imagined, and it appears that this 
process is still ongoing. 
What can be expected in 15 years, in 2020? What will happen to the 
Russian Islamic community in 30 years?  
The number of Muslims will increase and may amount to about 25 
million people, taking into account the population growth particularly in 
the North Caucasus, as well as the current rate of migration. And if one 
takes into consideration that the total number of Russian citizens will 
decrease to 130 million, the share of Muslims will be around 17 to 19% 
(with or without migration.) Simultaneously, the internal conversion of 
Muslims will occur, and the majority of them will be from the Caucasus. 
The number of migrants from the Caucasus who settle in Russian cities will 
likely increase in both absolute and relative terms. 
Two contrary tendencies will become more marked in the future. On 
the one hand, there will be the dispersion of Muslims, and in particular 
Caucasians, in Russian society. On the other hand, they will aspire to 
protect their identity and ethnic character, especially during the first stage 
of their businesses. Hence, the new generation of politicians who will 
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represent the interests of various groups will be based on different ethno-
confessional affiliations. 
Quasi-religious movements may appear. (Something similar took 
place in the 1990s, but an authoritative all-Russian party with social-Islamic 
motivation was never founded.) Such movements will not be of an 
inherently separatist nature.  
Russia and the rest of the world will not ‘get rid’ of radical Islam, 
which will continue to exist in different forms, such as Wahhabism, 
Islamism and fundamentalism. It will persist in its most pronounced form 
in the North Caucasus. Centres of religious radicalism will remain in the 
Volga region as well because of the preaching activities of a new generation 
of the clergy, who received education in Arab countries. 
The next 15 years of terrorism under religious slogans will continue 
to be a disaster in Russia and beyond. In spite of these circumstances, the 
authorities (and federal authorities as well) will have to begin a systematic 
dialogue with moderate Islamists. 
Ethno-confessional relations will remain somewhat strained, with 
direct clashes. Such a situation may already be observed now. And if the 
administration of all levels, leaders of ethnic communities and authoritative 
priests play the waiting game, such conflicts will become more frequent 
and violent (right up to ‘mini-wars’). 
Islamophobia will rise and will become part of the political and 
domestic consciousness and included in the behaviour of a significant 
proportion of Russian citizens. Such a rise will be furthered not only by 
ethno-confessional problems, but also by mutual prejudice between the 
West and the Muslim world. 
Thus, Russia will not become the Muslim state that is predicted by 
some of our contemporaries – political scientists and writers. But the 
‘Islamic factor’ will become more visible in social life and in the orientation 
of various political groups.  
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
In addressing the theme of European energy security, we were fortunate to 
have written presentations from Christian Egenhofer (CEPS, Brussels), 
Leonid Grigoriev (Institute of Energy and Finance, Moscow), Alan Riley 
(CEPS, Brussels) and Vladimir Socor (Jamestown Foundation, Washington, 
D.C.). 
In introducing the speakers, the chairman urged them to turn their 
thoughts to the following questions, inter alia: 
• Is energy a strategic good? If it is, to what extent does it make sense 
to deny the extraction of political leverage from energy policy? In 
criticising Russian energy policy, are we not protesting too much 
against the fact that Russia (as others) is using energy for political 
ends – instead of criticising, as we should, the content of Russia’s 
policy? And if energy is strategic, should a European Union energy 
policy be primarily about the liberalisation of the energy market? 
• Is claiming reciprocity always smart? After all, do we really want 
Russian firms to control both the downstream as well as the upstream 
elements of the EU’s energy supply chain, in exchange for access by 
EU firms to Russian energy production and transport? 
• Should it really be EU policy to help Turkey to make full use of its 
potential as a major energy hub? After all, half of Russia’s oil exports 
already pass through the Bosporus, creating a major risk if that very 
vulnerable route were to be cut. 
In addition to his written contribution, Christian Egenhofer stated 
that within the EU framework there is no basic contradiction between the 
quest for liberalisation and the need for energy security. He noted that four 
major risks needed to be addressed: 
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Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
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• at the economic level, insufficient long-term investment. The EU 
would, inter alia, have to double its electricity plant infrastructure 
(600 GW) by 2030, in terms of both new and replacement plants; 
• failed regulatory environments leading to ‘California electricity’-type 
outcomes; 
• political risks, notably Russian; and 
• environmental issues. On this score, he observed that climate change 
requirements and energy needs are not automatically congruent (thus 
the Athabasca tar sands in Canada could help alleviate the latter but 
at the expense of the former). 
He agreed with the view that political leverage would be sought by 
both suppliers and consumers. In this respect, diversification is rational 
behaviour on the part of both. 
Leonid Grigoriev noted the parallel evolution of Russian GDP and oil 
production. In the same way that oil production was now back to Soviet-
era highs, Russia’s GDP was now back to ‘normal’ (with personal 
consumption in 2005 at 140% of its 1990 level). Since 2000, however, 
Russian oil exports had doubled; this discontinuity had a major impact on 
world markets. He observed that the diversification of sources (by the 
consuming countries) and of the conduits of transit (by the supplying 
countries) were mirror cases. Nevertheless, diversification could also 
become a very costly ‘tax on fear’ – something that should be avoided. 
From a Russian standpoint, a tax on fear would push Russia towards 
securing new markets in the Far East (China) and through exports of 
liquefied natural gas. 
For his part, Alan Riley noted that the Russians had some reasons to 
oppose any liberalisation in EU access to Russia’s gas market that would go 
beyond that practised within the EU itself. Like Christian Egenhofer, he 
considered that liberalisation and security are not in opposition; on the 
contrary, the bigger the energy market (and the EU would be very big 
indeed), the greater the security of that market vis-à-vis any given external 
shock, hence the need for liberalisation from an energy security standpoint. 
On specific issues, he considered that the problems of liberalisation in 
the UK’s energy market were largely owing to incompetence: there had 
been no strategy for coping with the well-forecasted depletion of reserves. 
He noted that in Russia, Gazprom has a major problem in terms of 
refurbishing its infrastructure – some $170 billion were needed, but 
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Gazprom already has debts of $38 billion. Meanwhile, there still has not 
been any significant development of the Yamal field in Siberia. 
Walter Slocombe, who had kindly accepted to stand in for Vladimir 
Socor, underscored the need for EU–US (or NATO) consultations for an 
energy security strategy. He noted the EU’s focus on long-term goals 
through energy types, versus the short-term supply of oil and gas or transit 
issues. 
In contrast to Alan Riley, Vladimir Socor’s paper considers that 
ownership does matter. He holds that joint Russian–Ukrainian ownership 
of the gas pipeline is a strategic negative. 
To launch the first round of discussions, we were able to count on the 
interventions of two senior European Commission officials. The first noted 
that the Commission’s Green Paper (March 2006) on energy rested on three 
pillars: Lisbon (through the European Council’s aims of economic 
competitiveness as set out in the Lisbon agenda), Kyoto (concerning the 
environmental goals of the Kyoto Protocol) and Moscow (for the security of 
supply). These three were neither identical, nor even in some cases 
congruent (he noted, as did Christian Egenhofer, that energy supply and 
environmental issues could be in conflict). The choice of the energy mix 
required to achieve an EU policy was left to each member state, within the 
constraints set by the Kyoto targets. 
The German ‘Energy Gipfel’ [summit] and the UK’s energy review 
were examples on this score. Naturally, the Moscow pillar was linked to 
the ongoing Russia–WTO negotiations. As for reciprocity, the situation was 
not black or white; a lot of investment was already in place in both 
directions and it would be useful to take stock of the state of affairs in this 
regard. 
The other Commission representative noted that it is usually the 
monopoly suppliers who explain that security and competition are 
contradictory. Yet the old system did not deliver energy security. 
Furthermore, there could be no EU-wide energy security policy without 
having created a liberalised energy market across the EU. The issue of 
reciprocity (i.e. by Russia in downstream activity in the EU and by EU 
firms in upstream operations in Russia) remained a difficult one, on which 
advice was sought. 
In the first round of questions and comments, one participant 
wondered whether the makings of an EU–Russian energy deal were not 
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already to be found in the draft transit protocol to be discussed at the St 
Petersberg summit. 
On another score, he noted that the extension of the EU acquis to 
south-eastern Europe (the Balkans, Turkey and eventually Ukraine) would 
create a new situation. He expressed some doubt about the advisability of 
doubling the capacity of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline (between 
Russia and Turkey), as suggested by Russia. 
Another participant, from ‘new Europe’, underlined that energy is 
special merchandise and that market approaches would not be enough to 
keep the Russians in line. When European Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferraro-Waldner notes that 75% of Gazprom’s profits 
come from its sales to the EU, she is only giving a statistic, not an operative 
tool vis-à-vis Russia. In addition, for the EU, the geopolitics of energy 
extend far beyond the case of Ukraine. 
In response to these comments and remarks by the other presenters, 
Leonid Grigoriev observed that Gazprom is now trying to increase 
domestic prices (against the wishes of the energy-consuming industries), 
which are now at a level reaching profitability. Ukraine should be 
considered a special case. Ukraine had enough of its own gas for household 
use and Russian gas had essentially been provided ‘for free’ to local 
industry in exchange for political influence. A big problem now is that of 
the deteriorating transit pipeline through Ukraine, which needs repair. He 
disagreed with the notion that Russia would lack resources for oil and gas 
development, as 18% of Russia’s GDP is now available for domestic 
investment, after debt repayments and contributions to the stabilisation 
fund. The Stockman field (in the Barents Sea) would be an important 
precedent in terms of foreign investment. 
Christian Egenhofer provided a nuance concerning the importance of 
ownership: it does matter in the sense that the market is not going to work 
if the pipelines are all controlled by one single upstream agent. He 
cautioned, however, against exaggerating the focus on Russia alone. 
Walter Slocombe reminded participants that ‘one can’t drink oil’. 
Ownership thus may not be significant in the long run. But in the short 
term, monopoly ownership can act in a disruptive manner, for political or 
other reasons. 
In the subsequent round of discussions, a Ukrainian participant 
considered that Russia was not abiding by its agreements. During the 
1990s, Ukraine had benefited from major price rebates in exchange for very 
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low transit and storage fees. Ukraine was no longer purchasing Russian 
gas, which was only transiting. Ukraine’s gas comes from Central Asia as 
well as from domestic sources. He added a reminder that out of 160 billion 
cubic metres of Russian gas exports, 145 billion transited via Ukraine. 
Another participant, with an International Energy Agency 
background, observed that Gazprom was now taking over producers in 
Central Asia, in part because of Gazprom’s fear that it would not be able to 
deliver on its numerous commitments. Turkey, for its part, was moving 
from its role as an East–West corridor bypassing Russia (i.e. the Baku–
Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline) to a Russian–European corridor through ‘Blue 
Stream plus’. This move could have strategic implications. Finally, he noted 
that Russia’s economy was being distorted by its oil and gas dependency. 
A Scandinavian participant suggested that Gazprom should really be 
viewed as two companies – an international operator on the one hand and 
the owner of domestic infrastructure on the other. 
In conclusion, a participant raised the issue of trust, which along with 
rule of law and democratic decision-making were crucial to the EU’s 
ambitions: Where is trust in the energy relationship with Russia? In this 
respect, Leonid Grigoriev made the point that Russia’s cut-off of gas 
through Ukraine at the start of 2006 was not a smart move. 
Alan Riley posed a question that many oil and gas professionals have 
been quietly voicing: What happens when it becomes clear that Russia’s 
many commitments (notably in the field of gas) simply cannot be fulfilled? 
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Integrating Security of Supply, 
Market Liberalisation and 
Climate Change 
The European Commission’s Green Paper on 
Secure, Competitive and Sustainable Energy for 
Europe from a Security-of-Supply Perspective 
Christian Egenhofer* 
The security of energy supply, having attracted only limited interest on the 
part of policy-makers in recent years, is back on the agenda. This interest 
was first evident in the wide-ranging debate launched by the European 
Commission with the publication of its 2000 Green Paper on the security of 
supply (European Commission, 2000). It was triggered among other things 
by the revival of OPEC, higher crude oil prices and international political 
instability, and underscored by terrorist attacks and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as recent developments in Iran and Russia. 
Anxieties in the EU over Russia were fed by the Russia–Ukraine standoff in 
early January 2006. Fears were then reinforced by Russian attempts to 
increase its natural gas outlets in Asia. Higher than projected demand 
growth with a limited or belated supply reaction has led to worries of 
permanent shortages and the perception that securing energy supply is a 
zero-sum game, wherein nations or regional blocs scramble for decreasing 
supplies.  
Against this background the European Commission’s 2006 Green 
Paper on energy (European Commission, 2006) has launched a debate on a 
comprehensive response to the challenges facing the European Union. The 
overarching question is how to ensure secure and low-carbon yet 
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affordable energy. Hence, it focuses on the interface of market 
liberalisation, security of supply and climate change. 
Energy market liberalisation and growing international economic 
interdependence have affected the ability of governments to react to 
security-of-supply challenges. Prior to energy market liberalisation, 
security-of-supply policy predominantly consisted of government-initiated 
diplomatic (and sometimes military) actions to ensure physical supply, 
with limited emphasis on costs. With regard to the external aspects of 
security-of-supply policy, the focus was on diversification, in terms of both 
regions and types of fuel. This focus often led to relatively rigid long-term 
contracts, along with an accent on physical infrastructures, a dialogue 
between consumer and producer countries, and mechanisms that could 
deal with emergency situations (e.g. strategic stocks or interconnections). 
The frame of reference was usually the member state and seldom the EU. 
Domestically, the member states’ response was to commit resources to 
developing indigenous energy sources, such as coal, peat, hydro or nuclear 
fission (considered almost indigenous), combined with largely 
unconvincing demand-side policies. Moreover, strong domestic companies 
or even monopolies were created, which could carry the ‘necessary weight’ 
externally and be able to support heavy investments internally. There were 
some initiatives at the EU level, however, such as in the fields of research 
and external relations, and national borders played a smaller role in areas 
where market integration was more advanced, such as for oil products. 
With market liberalisation, many of these measures no longer work and 
other policy goals such as diversification need to be built into the new logic 
or markets (see Egenhofer & Legge, 2001). 
Yet meanwhile, a case has been made that the EU faces an energy 
‘trilemma’, in the form of potentially conflicting goals for security of 
supply, liberalisation and environmental objectives, and notably the link 
between energy supply and climate change. 
This short paper attempts a first analysis of the challenges related to 
security of supply and climate change and how they can be integrated into 
an overall energy policy, which increasingly has to work with the grain of 
the market. The paper is based on previous CEPS work on energy security 
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and climate change, notably the INDES Working Paper series.1 As the 
European Commission’s 2006 Green Paper arguably raises many more 
questions, which this short paper does not address, the analysis will 
necessarily be partial.  
Are the risks associated with Russia unique? 
Following the publication of the 2006 Green Paper on 8 March, the public 
discussion has largely been focused on Russia and the EU–Russian energy 
relationship, including the role that external policy can play. The Polish 
government has even called for a NATO-type of approach for energy. This 
section first reviews concepts of security of supply and the risks posed to it. It 
then considers the question of whether the risks involving Russia are special 
or unique and thus whether a particular approach to the Russian import 
dependency is needed.  
Definitions of security of supply  
On previous occasions (e.g. Egenhofer et al., 2004) CEPS has reviewed a 
number of concepts of security of supply (see also Box 1). They all have in 
common that they see security of supply essentially as a strategy to reduce 
or hedge risks that derive from energy use, production and imports. These 
security-of-supply concepts consist of a variety of approaches aimed at 
‘insuring’ against supply risks with an emphasis on cost-effectiveness and 
the shared responsibility of governments, firms and consumers.  
                                                     
1 See the following INDES papers: P. Cayrade, Investments in Gas Pipelines and 
Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure: What is the Impact on the Security of Supply?, 
INDES Working Paper No. 3, CEPS, Brussels, March 2004; V. Costantini and F. 
Gracceva, Social Costs of Energy Disruptions, INDES Working Paper No. 6, CEPS, 
Brussels, March 2004(a); V. Costantini and F. Gracceva, Oil Security: Short- and 
Long-Term Policies, INDES Working Paper No. 7, CEPS, Brussels, March 2004(b); 
L.J. de Vries and R.A. Hakvoort, The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised 
Electricity Markets, INDES Working Paper No. 5, CEPS, Brussels, March 2004; C. 
Egenhofer, K. Gialoglou and G. Luciani, Market-based Options for Security of Energy 
Supply – Summary and Conclusions, INDES Working Paper No. 1, CEPS, Brussels, 
March 2004; and G. Luciani, Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets: What is it and 
what is it not?, INDES Working Paper No. 2, CEPS, Brussels, March 2004. 
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There are nuances regarding cost-effectiveness, which are mainly 
driven by different appreciations of risks. Either directly or indirectly, the 
approaches include price as a concern. While price volatility can be seen as 
proof that markets work, nevertheless, security of supply is, albeit more 
loosely, tied to a concept of price. Energy must be available at a 
‘reasonable’ price – not at any price. By definition, if the price were allowed 
to increase without a limit, there would always be a sufficiently high price 
at which demand would equate to available supplies – but it would be 
naïve to say in this case that the security of supply was guaranteed.  
Box 1. Concepts of security of supply 
In its 2000 Green Paper on the security of supply the European Commission 
notes that “energy supply security must be geared to ensuring…the proper 
functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability…at a 
price which is affordable…while respecting environmental 
concerns…Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-
sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to 
such dependence” (European Commission, 2000, p. 2). The 2006 energy 
Green Paper very much stays in this line of thinking by describing the 
proposed energy strategy for Europe as an attempt “to balance security of 
supply, competitiveness and environmental protection” (European 
Commission, 2006). The International Energy Agency (IEA) attaches more 
importance to the market:  
Technological developments will affect the choice and cost of future 
energy systems but the pace and direction of change is highly uncertain. 
Governments will…have an important role to play in reducing the risk of 
supply disruptions. Regulatory and market reforms…will also affect 
supply. Increased competition between different fuels and between 
different suppliers of the same fuel will tend to narrow the gap between 
production cost and market prices, reducing monopoly rents, encouraging 
greater efficiency and lowering the cost of supply (IEA, 2001).  
The European Parliament sees that “being dependent on imports is neither 
necessarily a bad thing nor economically inefficient provided the sources are 
diverse, no one supplier is dominant and we can produce sufficient goods 
and services to pay for them” (European Parliament, 2001). 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY: WHAT SHOULD IT MEAN? WHAT TO DO? | 83 
If we were to lift any restrictions on the movement of prices, the issue of 
security of supply would simply evaporate (see Luciani, 2004).2 
What is a risk? 
The literature traditionally distinguishes between two different kinds of 
risks: short term and long term (see for example IEA, 1995 and Stern, 
2002).3 Short-term risks are generally associated with supply shortages 
because of accidents, terrorist attacks, extreme weather conditions or 
technical failure of the grid. Such risks are sometimes described as 
‘operational security’ or ‘systems security’. Long-term security concerns the 
long-term adequacy of supply, the infrastructure for delivering this supply 
to markets and a framework to provide strategic security against major 
risks (such as non-delivery for political, economic, force majeure or other 
reasons). In line with the European Commission’s 2000 Green Paper on the 
security of energy supply, the following types of risks can be identified: 
• Technical risks include systems failure owing to weather, lack of capital 
investment or generally poor conditions of the energy system. 
• Economic risks mainly cover imbalances between demand and supply, 
stemming from a lack of investment or insufficient contracting. 
• Political risks concern potential government decisions to suspend 
deliveries because of deliberate policies, war or civil strife, or as a 
result of failed regulation, which is referred to as ‘regulatory risk’. 
                                                     
2 Yet just how far is it acceptable to allow prices to move in order to restrict 
demand and allocate scarce supplies is a question that can only be decided 
politically (by the government or regulator) or contractually (by the parties 
accepting limits to price increases) and not by a theoretical discussion. At times the 
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) appears to consider 
price fluctuations themselves as a threat to security – in particular with respect to 
crude oil. Indeed, in the case of crude oil, the logistics are such that the risk of 
physical shortages is minimal and any tightness of supplies would immediately be 
reflected in prices. Gas, however, is different – it has different logistics, different 
pricing mechanisms, etc. 
3 There is no agreement on terminology. Different terms are used for the same 
concepts.  
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• Environmental risks describe the potential damage from accidents (oil 
spills or nuclear accidents), which include pollution, the effects of 
which are less tangible or predictable (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions). 
It is also interesting to note that all recent supply disruptions in the 
EU have had domestic causes, for example grid failure, a lack of reserve 
capacity or oil product shortages as a result of refinery blockages.  
As this above list shows, there are many different risks to the security 
of supply, of which import dependence on politically unstable or 
unpredictable countries is but one. Therefore, in order to identify a suitable 
response, it is necessary to first clarify the exact nature of the risk including 
its likelihood and potential consequences (i.e. a risk assessment) (Table 1). 
The second step is then to identify the possible responses and the 
responsible actor/s (i.e. risk management).4 
Turning to gas and notably European dependence on Russia, the 
risks associated with import dependency can be mitigated by a number of 
general, well-known (horizontal) measures. These not only include 
diversification by region or by fuel to the extent possible, but also storage 
requirements, mutual solidarity and the development of liquefied natural 
gas. In addition are measures for network development and for improving 
the functioning of the internal gas and electricity markets, which will 
provide for further flexibility within the gas markets and which by 
extension should increase security. Moreover, previous work by CEPS 
(Luciani, 2004) has shown that in the case of Russian gas, import 
dependence does not necessarily entail greater insecurity5 – actually, the 
opposite may well be the case, provided adequate EU policies are in place, 
as the next section and Box 2 shows. 
 
                                                     
4 Note that some risks might deliberately go ‘uninsured’ because they are 
‘uninsurable’, at least in the short term (e.g. terrorist attacks) or may be extremely 
unlikely (e.g. a meteorite falling on a major installation). It is impossible to 
maintain security of supply in any circumstance, for instance, if all major exporters 
to the EU were simultaneously to decide to interrupt exports. 
5 Such a threat means that if gas of a significant proportion is not delivered, it can 
cause physical interruptions over a period of time but not indefinitely. 
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Table 1. Classification of security-of-supply risks in the EU by sector – Oil, gas, coal, nuclear, renewable energy sources 
(RES) and electricity 
Price rise Fuel affected Classification Event Disruption 
Intl. Domestic 
Probability 
in 20 years 
Duration 
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear RES Elec. 
Political risks 
1 Export 
embargo 
Embargo of a 
specific exporter 
(e.g. Iraq) 
Little Little Little High Months, 
years 
x x – – – – 
2 Output 
reduction 
 
Quotas on 
production to raise 
prices (e.g. OPEC 
cartel) 
Yes Yes Yes High Months, 
years 
x – – – – x 
3 Local market 
disruption I 
 
By pressure groups 
(e.g. fuel price 
protest) 
Yes – Yes  Medium-
high 
Weeks, 
months 
x – – – – x 
4 Local market 
disruption II 
 
 
Regulatory 
shortcomings (e.g. 
California power 
crisis, Nordic 
market) 
Yes No Yes Medium-
high 
Weeks, 
months 
– – – – – x 
5 International 
market 
disruption 
 
Regulatory failure 
(e.g. regulation, 
competition and 
financial markets) 
Yes Yes (or 
rationing) 
Yes  Medium Weeks, 
months, 
years 
x x – – – x 
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Table 1. cont. 
6 Force majeure 
 
 
Civil unrest, war, 
deliberate blockage 
of trade routes 
Yes Yes Yes Low-
medium 
Variable x x – – – – 
7 Import 
embargo 
 
 
 
Embargo of 
importing state by 
ex- port or transit 
country (e.g. gas 
cut-off ) 
Yes No Yes Very low for 
EU 
Months, 
years 
– x? – – – – 
Economic risks 
8 Public opinion 
on large-scale 
investment 
Delay in planning, 
under-investment 
Yes No Yes High Years x x x x x x 
9 Supply 
discontinuity 
Lack of 
infrastructure 
Yes Yes Yes Low-
medium  
Months, 
years 
x x – – – x 
10 Production 
discontinuity 
Shortage of 
production 
capacity 
Yes Yes Yes Low Years x x – – – x 
Environmental risks* 
11a – Major oil spill 
(land or sea) 
No Yes Yes Medium Weeks, 
months 
x – – – – – 
11b – Major nuclear 
accident 
Yes No Yes Low Months, 
years 
– – – x – x 
11c 
Accidents 
 
 
 
 
 
– Burst of major 
gas pipeline  
Yes Yes Yes Low Weeks, 
months 
x x – – – x 
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Table 1. cont. 
12a Disruption/ 
destruction of 
habitat  
 
 
 
– Massive 
biomass 
plantations;  
– Ultrasonic 
waves (of wind 
turbines); 
Yes No Yes High Months, 
years 
– – – – – – 
12b Run-away 
greenhouse 
effect  
Clear indicators in 
biosphere (e.g. the 
melting of 
permafrost) 
Yes No  – Very low Perm./ 
irreversible 
x x x – x x 
Technical risks 
13 System failure 
 
 
 
Technical failure, 
e.g. due to extreme 
weather conditions, 
technical neglect 
No No Yes Medium Days, 
weeks 
– – – – – x 
* Environmental risks are risks to supply only in an indirect way. Risks from accidents or other environmental dangers are related to subsequent 
government action, which might act as a dampener to investment and therefore create bottlenecks. Strictly speaking, environmental risks could also be 
listed under political risks. 
Source: Adapted from Egenhofer & Legge (2001). 
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Box 2. A market-based mechanism to hedge risks arising from import 
dependence 
Luciani’s (2004) proposal for a market mechanism to deal with Russian import 
dependence starts with the premise that not all consumers have the same needs. 
He therefore makes a distinction between priority (firm or non-interruptible) 
and interruptible customers. Gas suppliers should be required to protect their 
priority customers, in essence households and other small consumers. As long 
as their exposure to the possible negative event (percentage shortfall in supplies) 
is lower than the share of priority over total customers, they may not need to 
worry about the security of supplies. This idea suggests that the security-of-
supply standard could be defined as the guarantee that all the gas volumes 
demanded by non-interruptible (firm or protected) customers are available at a 
reasonable price. Such a standard is best established at the EU level. As a result, 
an increase of natural gas in power generation will improve the non-
interruptible and interruptible consumer ratio and therefore increase the 
security of supply for gas. Nevertheless, to some extent this increases the risks 
for power generators, who would eventually need to invest in dual-fired 
generation, which is likely to increase their costs. Interruptible customers need 
to be offered lower prices since they do not require protection in the event of a 
crisis (they may opt to withdraw from the market or maintain their own 
alternative fuel capacity). 
Source: Luciani (2004). 
Security of supply as an externality 
The old monopolists used to claim that they guaranteed the security of 
supply – a statement supported by the experience of decades of service to 
the public, during which very little disruption was experienced. It is not 
clear, however, that security of supply was truly guaranteed in the past – as 
it was in fact never challenged by any major disruption. The old 
monopolists were in a position to decide unilaterally how much security 
they intended to provide and did engage in some precautionary 
investment, thanks to their ability to pass on the cost to the final consumer. 
The security they provided may have been too little or too much. There was 
no benchmark for measurement.  
The concern about security of supply in liberalised markets is 
connected to viewing security as a public good or externality. In liberalised 
markets, new competitors will be tempted to ‘free-ride’ on the security 
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provided by the incumbent suppliers and competition may have a negative 
effect by downplaying security or prioritising cost-cutting. Similar fears 
have been expressed with regard to other network industries such as 
airlines, railways and electrical grids.  
Normally, security is viewed as a matter for governments to look 
after. This perception holds true for small commercial or household 
customers, who will not be in a position to judge their security 
requirements exactly and will need standard contract formulae that set the 
level of protection to be decided by the regulator. The level of protection 
does not need to be 100%. Gas in households and small commercial 
establishments is primarily used for cooking and for ambient- and water-
heating. In situations of emergency, all such uses can be reasonably curbed 
to some degree. It is therefore also reasonable to set the guaranteed level of 
supplies at an appropriate percentage of ‘standard’ consumption. 
Not all customers need to be protected against supply disruptions. In 
liberal markets, customers have a choice of whether to assume 
responsibility for security of supply themselves or to allow the supply 
company to bear the responsibility and subsequently pay for it6 through 
higher energy prices. The former is typically done by large industrial users, 
for which (short-term) security might not be a problem if they can switch 
fuels. A large industrial user may choose to buy gas from a risky but cheap 
source, accepting the risk of higher short-term prices from a spot market or 
mitigating the risk by installing a dual-firing capability or a back-up from 
another supplier. See also Box 2, which proposes a market-based 
mechanism to cope with risky supplies.  
Indeed, the Commission has frequently argued that a unified EU gas 
market would be intrinsically more secure than the individual member 
countries’ markets. The reasoning here appears to be based primarily on 
scale: a larger market, served by a wider and well-interconnected network 
that receives supplies from a larger number of exporters, may be expected 
to be more stable. This conjecture may well be the case; however, numerous 
conditions need to be fulfilled, notably that the markets function, that the 
                                                     
6 Payment in this respect includes a risk premium. With oil, for example, prices in 
long-term energy supply contracts tend to be higher than in spot markets, 
reflecting a lower security-of-supply risk. 
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interconnections are established and more generally that the necessary 
regulatory or contractual arrangements are in place.  
Integrating climate change and security-of-supply policies 
In addition to availability (the physical dimension) and affordability (the 
price dimension), the Green Paper adds a third element, sustainability (the 
environmental dimension), to the security of supply, more specifically to 
address climate change.  
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in its Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001), evidence is growing stronger 
that most of the temperature rise that has occurred over the last 50 years is 
attributable to human activity. This authoritative scientific body warns that 
an increase in global temperatures is likely to trigger serious consequences 
for humanity and other life forms, including a rise in sea levels (which will 
endanger coastal areas and small islands) and a greater frequency and 
severity of extreme weather events.7 The spring 2005 European Council 
endorsed the target of limiting the future global average temperature 
increase to 2°C above its pre-industrial level and indicated its willingness 
to explore with other countries the possibility of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from industrialised countries by 15% to 30% from a 1990 level by 
the year 2020 (see Egenhofer & van Schaik, 2005).  
In the long term there is probably a need to reduce some 25 billion 
tonnes of CO2 per year globally after 2050 (IPCC, 2001 and WBCSD, 2004; 
see also Figure 1) to avoid dangerous climate change. For comparison, the 
initial Kyoto Protocol target of the EU was around 400 mn tonnes, i.e. a tiny 
fraction of it. The 25 billion tonne reduction assumes that in the long term 
industrial countries will need to reduce emissions by some 50-60% by 2050 
and 80% or beyond by 2100. Given that within the EU 80% of all emissions 
 
                                                     
7 For the EU, the European Environment Agency has found similar indications (see 
EEA, Impacts of Europe’s changing climate: An indicator-based assessment, EEA Report 
No. 2/2004, EEA, Copenhagen, 2004). For the most recent update on climate 
impacts, see H.J. Schellnhuber et al., Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.stabilisation2005.com/index.html). 
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are related to fossil fuel burning in the energy, transport, household and 
industry sectors, energy policy will increasingly be constrained by climate 
change objectives.8 
Figure 1. Achieving an acceptable CO2 stabilisation 
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Notes: The figure of 22-26 Gt of CO2 is equal to 6-7 Gt of 
carbon. A1B-AIM/B2-AIM are IPCC scenarios used by 
the WBCSD; B2 describes the lower energy-use scenario, 
i.e. an intermediate level of global growth while A1B is 
the higher energy-use scenario, i.e. very rapid global 
economic growth. 
Source: WBCSD (2004), based on scenarios from the IPCC’s 
Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001). 
Table 2 shows the scale of the task by breaking down the overall 
target into specific activities, the implementation of which could achieve 
reductions of 3.7 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions (or 1 gigatonne (Gt) of 
                                                     
8 It is generally assumed that fossil fuel use will not peak not because of resource 
availability but because of requirements to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although oil is predicted to peak around 2020, fossil fuel use (i.e. when including 
coal) is not expected to do so before 2050. 
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carbon), out of the total 22-26 Gt of CO2 that will be needed. For example, 
one could install 150 times the current wind power capacity, bring into 
operation 1 billion hydrogen cars to replace conventional cars offering 30 
(US) miles per gallon (7.84 litres per 100 kms) or install five times the 
current nuclear capacity. Alternatively, one could use half of the US 
agricultural area for biomass production.  
Table 2. The challenge: A fall of CO2 emissions by 3.7 billion tonnes per year 
requires reductions to achieve 550 ppm of stabilisation (a decrease of 25 Gt 
of CO2 by 2100) 
Technology Required for 3.3 Gt of CO2 per year 
Coal-fired power plant with CO2 
capture/storage 
700 x 1 GW plants 
Nuclear power plants replace average 
plants 
1500 x 1 GW (5 x current) 
Wind power replaces average plants 150 x current 
Solar PV displaces average plants 5 x 1 million ha (2000 x current) 
Hydrogen fuel 1 billion H2 cars (CO2-free H2) replacing 
1 billion conventional cars of 30 mpg 
(7.84 litres per 100 kms)  
Geological storage of CO2 Inject 100 mb/d fluid at reservoir 
conditions 
Biomass fuels from plantations 100 x 1 million ha (half of the US 
agricultural area) 
Notes: Based on an assumed stabilisation at 550 ppm (parts per million); an ‘average plant’ 
describes the current fuel mix; mb/d = million barrels per day. 
Source: Egenhofer & van Schaik (2005), p. 8, updated. 
For illustration, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), a pro-environmental grouping of multinational 
companies including most energy industries, has developed a possible EU-
25 pathway (WBCSD, 2005). It foresees an overall reduction in primary 
energy demand, electricity as the main end-use energy source, a broad-
based energy mix including nuclear power, petroleum, bio-fuel or 
hydrogen in the transport sector and the large-scale use of renewable 
energy sources. Milestones by 2025 would include some 30-plus large 
generating stations using carbon capture and storage, a rise in the use of 
natural gas by 35% from 2002 (mainly for power generation) and a restart 
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in nuclear power growth. Alongside these targets would be a rapid spread 
of renewable energy, an increase in the use of wind power by some 10-15 
times the 2002 level and vehicle efficiency improvements by nearly 50% 
with bio-fuels or hydrogen (or both) having a strong foothold (resulting in 
10% of on-the-road usage). Going down such a pathway will have a 
fundamental impact on energy policy. 
The EU has claimed on several occasions (European Commission, 
2005a and 2005b) that energy security and climate change policy are 
compatible, and even mutually reinforcing. Both energy security and 
climate change objectives would benefit from an improvement in energy 
efficiency, a higher market share of renewables as well as investment in 
technology development. While this is the case for the short term (i.e. 
meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets), the relationship between energy 
security and climate change might also see tensions. Strategies to reduce 
import dependence on oil and natural gas could lead to a shift to ‘dirty’ 
substitutes such as tar sands, oil shales, coal or coal-to-liquids, all of which 
are available from countries seen as more friendly by the West. Similarly, 
worries about nuclear proliferation could lead to a rethinking of the 
expansion of atomic energy. The natural substitute for nuclear fuel is coal.  
The likely absence of a global climate-change agreement – as the 
setting of a carbon constraint at the global level is unlikely to be achieved 
before 2020 – will reduce investment certainty, principally in the energy 
sector. The resulting uncertainty might lead to insufficient investment in 
low-carbon technologies that are in line with long-term climate change 
targets, necessitating an early retirement of the capital stock that is 
currently built. The importance of this issue at the present time is 
underlined by the need for investments in the capital stock over the next 20 
years. For example, the EU will require 600 GW in new investment before 
2030 in the power sector alone, while being unsure about the exact nature 
of the future carbon constraint. 
Conclusion 
In 1963, in a book Harold Lubbell expressed his concern about the 
vulnerability of the Western economies to potential future events. He 
sketched some possible scenarios, including an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a 
revolution in Iran, a coup in Iraq that brings a ‘young Turk’ to the helm, a 
breakdown in relations between oil companies and governments, civil war 
in Lebanon and the nationalisation of the Arabian American Oil Company 
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(Horsnell, 2000, p. 1). In 2006, talk about similar scenarios can be observed. 
There is a lot of discussion about the new role of governments and 
generally more interest in the ‘securitisation’ of energy policy, i.e. using 
security and defence policies for security-of-supply purposes. Markets and 
security policy can make strange bedfellows, however. 
Our analysis has found little evidence that market liberalisation is in 
conflict with the security of supply, and hence the need for heavy state 
intervention, other than traditional measures such as diversification, 
consumer-producer dialogue or technology development. As the 2006 
Green Paper argues, by and large market liberalisation will enhance the 
security of supply, provided adequate provisions are put in place to deal 
with certain specific risks. While dependency on Russian gas may indeed 
pose a supply risk, the point has been made that there are many other 
supply risks of which Russia is but one. In fact, all recent supply 
disruptions have been ‘domestic’, i.e. caused by events within the EU. 
Some possible market-based measures have also been sketched out to deal 
with gas-import dependence on Russia. 
Further attention is needed, however, to address the climate change 
dimension of energy security. While energy security and climate change 
policies have synergies with regard to energy efficiency, renewable energy 
sources, nuclear fuel (where politically acceptable), public R&D spending 
and technology development, there are equally tensions between the two 
objectives. Fears about import dependence for oil and natural gas might 
lead to a revival of high-carbon fuels such as tar sands, oil shales, coal and 
coal-to-liquids, notably for the power sector. Worries about nuclear 
proliferation could undermine further nuclear investment. Moreover, 
current uncertainty about the future global climate regime is likely to stop 
or at least delay investment in the power sector, which will put added 
pressures on energy supplies and potentially increase the risks surrounding 
supply adequacy. 
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Growth with Energy and  
Energy Security 
Leonid Grigoriev* 
The global economy has been enjoying an economic upturn for four years. 
Normally, at this stage of the global cycle economists would be discussing 
the threat of inflation and high interest rates coming from high commodity 
prices. The current situation is different, however.1 If one had expected that 
high oil prices would slow down economic growth in OECD countries (as 
has happened before), the effect has yet materialise. So far, the strong 
import demand from oil-producing countries has been facilitating a rise in 
the exports of manufactured goods and services from the United States, 
Germany, China and other countries. A few of the other important features 
that have emerged in the first decade of the 21st century include 
• persistent major imbalances (such as in the US current accounts); 
• the continual move of manufacturing to Asia; 
• the demands for heating/cooling and fuel by a growing middle-class 
worldwide; 
• oil (and gas) prices that remain high (although still under 1982 levels 
in real terms); and 
• the savings that are accrued from emerging market economies 
(especially Russia) are not being utilised domestically. 
The current situation follows 15 years (1986–2000) of relatively low oil 
prices – $19-20 per barrel. The long period of low prices resulted in a low 
level of investment in the oil industry. During this period, supply was 
sufficient and in 1998–2000, it seemed that inexpensive oil was assured for 
                                                     
* Leonid Grigoriev is with the Institute for Energy and Finance, Moscow. 
1 See for example D. Gros, T. Mayer and A. Ubide, A World out of Balance?, Special 
Report of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group, CEPS, Brussels, 2006. 
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the time being.2 But seemingly overnight, political events rapidly began to 
destabilise some of the oil-producing countries. At first, no one believed 
that oil prices would exceed $30-40 per barrel, but it soon became a new 
reality. During 2001–04, an additional 3 million barrels of oil per day from 
the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States – chiefly Russia 
– helped to balance the market. Yet with OPEC’s spare capacity (if any) 
sitting at its lowest level historically and no immediate prospects for 
tranquillity in the Middle East, the price of oil shot up to the range of $60-
70 per barrel, pushing up the price of natural gas alongside it.  
Here we have three initial points to make. First, the global political 
instability – especially in oil-producing countries – makes everyone 
nervous about future investments and supplies. Second, Russia and 
Russian companies have played a positive role recent years. Third, the 
prospect of global energy demand growing by 50% (according to the 
International Energy Agency or IEA) by 2030 makes a perfect case for 
international cooperation, given that time is rather short. 
Current trends in Russia – Economic growth and the interests of 
companies 
Russian economic recovery in 2000–03 was based on four factors: 
devaluation of the ruble, spare capacity in many industries, a devaluation 
(or writing off) of enterprise debt and the growth in oil prices. By that time, 
the country had made a short-cut from a quasi-egalitarian society to one 
similar to those in Latin America in terms of market liberalisation, but had 
failed to revive manufacturing and innovation. The long-awaited 
macroeconomic stabilisation did not bring modernisation and a burst of 
investment. The specific aspects of privatisation favoured the formation of 
big industrial groups, mostly in the natural resource sectors. Russia’s elite 
and intellectuals keep hoping that after the prolonged and painful 
transitional crisis the country will eventually re-emerge as an intellectual 
and cultural force. That is important with regard to the case of energy 
because Russia’s main problems (which influence everything) are domestic: 
democracy and modernisation. Domestic debates mostly concern health 
                                                     
2 See J. Mitchell, K. Morita, N. Selley and J. Stern, The New Economy of Oil – Impact 
on Business, Geopolitics and Society, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
2001. 
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care and education, administrative reform and the survival of hi-tech 
industries. 
After two more years of economic upturn, Russia’s GDP had reached 
89% of its 1990 level and 140% of real personal consumption. Nevertheless, 
Table 1 shows evidence of what Russia still lacked economically at that 
stage.  
Table 1. Main economic indicators for key EU countries, Russia and the US 
(2001–05 averages) 
 GDP per 
capita 
2005 
($) 
GDP 
2005/1990 
GDP 
average 
growth 
rate 
(%) 
Savings 
rate  
(% of 
GDP) 
Invest-
ment rate  
(% of 
GDP) 
General 
gov. 
expend-
itures  
(% of 
GDP) 
General 
gov. 
budget 
deficit 
(% of 
GDP) 
EU-15  33,390 1.35 1.6 20.8 19.5 47.4 -2.2 
France  33,734 1.35 1.5 19.8 19.2 52.9 -3.1 
Germany  33,922 1.23 0.7 22.2 18.1 47.5 -3.5 
Italy  30,450 1.23 0.6 21.3 20.8 47.8 -3.4 
UK 36,599 1.44 2.3 13.2 16.4 42.3 -2.2 
NMS-10  9,450 n/a 3.6 19.3 22.0 42.3 -3.3 
Poland  7,875 1.67 2.9 16.4 18.8 43.6 -3.6 
Norway  64,268 1.63 2.1 33.2 18.1 45.7 11.6 
Russia  5,369 0.89 6.7 36.0 18.2 28.8 3.6 
US 42,101 1.56 2.7 14.2 19.1 33.0 -3.7 
Sources: Eurostat, Rosstat, IMF and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of 
Commerce. 
Russia could not utilise its savings (36% of GDP) and turn them into 
capital formation (18%). Russia exports commodities and imports 
consumer goods because the strong ruble makes a substantial proportion of 
domestic industries less competitive. The export of capital from Russia is 
composed of foreign direct investment in addition to capital flight, while 
the import of capital is mostly portfolio-related (including some round-
tripping). Without improvements to its investment climate, strengthened 
property-rights protection, reductions to corruption and the development 
of small and medium-sized firms, etc., it is hard make better use of its own 
savings. So far, the country has failed to use available financing for 
investments, either private or public. Russia’s budget surplus represents a 
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relatively low level of government expenditures – 29% of GDP versus 47% 
for the EU-15. In any case, Russia is a country with substantial economic 
problems, supplying energy and other materials to more developed and 
prosperous countries. 
Actually, Russia is just coming out of the crisis and may reach its 1990 
GDP level in 2007 (Figure 1). High oil prices have brought new income to 
the government budget and to companies, which serves as a resource to 
solve some problems, but it has come hand-in-hand with a severe case of 
the ‘Dutch disease’. The government is experimenting with national 
projects in an effort to find a way to put some money into housing, 
agriculture and the rehabilitation of education and health care systems.  
Figure 1. Dynamics of GDP, oil and gas production, and oil exports for Russia 
during 1990–2005 (1990=100) 
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Sources: Rosstat, BP Statistical Review and the IMF. 
Figure 1 shows that the economic decline and recovery in terms of 
real GDP and oil extraction were quite similar. The limited domestic 
demand for oil provided for substantial additional exports of oil in the 
period of 2001–04. Russian oil exports have doubled in recent years. The 
gas industry was able to prevent a major reduction in upstream gas during 
the transitional crisis in the 1990s but has had limited additional supply in 
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the last few years. Recently, the blackout in Moscow on 25 May 2005 led to 
the discovery that regional limitations may appear in the supply of 
electricity. 
In these conditions, we believe the government is taking into account 
the interests of large companies in terms of economic legislation and 
regulation. Russian firms in the energy sector are trying to extend their 
service chains and achieve higher tariffs for gas and electricity in the 
domestic market. The interests of Russia’s national utility firm RAO UES 
and Gazprom are often involved in the conflicts over tariffs, with their 
general aim of higher domestic prices. Oil companies are trying to establish 
a name for themselves globally and are hiring good technicians, lawyers 
and financiers to pave the way to the world of major international 
companies.  
Russian energy companies are positioning themselves strategically 
for long-range development. They have just come to the global market to 
compete with the veterans of a century of competition. This approach is 
rather close to one that the World Bank suggested for large net exporters, 
whereby the reasonable strategy would focus on three major goals: 
• establishing a position on the strategic markets with reasonable prices; 
• diversifying the export markets for energy; and 
• securing financing for investments in infrastructure and the exploration 
of energy resources. 
Russian national interests lie in modernising its society and the state, 
strengthening democracy and advancing its economy from being oil- to 
technology-driven. From our point of view, corporate governance and 
financial systems are still very weak. Building a national financial market 
and institutions is not an easy task in a country with huge social and 
regional inequalities, along with the dominating interests of big companies. 
While oil money is useful, it is causing a rise in the ruble and import 
competition. At the same time, the general advice for Russian monetary 
authorities is to put such income into a portfolio fund. Currently, public 
and other new investment funds for financing domestic projects are small, 
especially in the circumstances created by 15 years of low investment. The 
varying interests of companies and regions are not easy to reconcile with 
federal policy. In this situation, large Russian companies are positioning 
themselves globally as any trans-national corporation would do in their 
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place. And domestically they are trying to improve and protect their 
positions in taxation and competition policies.  
What is described here is not a situation of ‘Russia Incorporated’ as 
some view from the outside, but a multifaceted world of competing 
interests. Domestically it is a problem for economists and politicians to find 
an effective way of rebuilding such a complex country, which has lost 15 
years of development during the very period of strong technological 
progress worldwide. Russia’s energy sector and policy cannot be studied 
separately from the deep modernisation problems the country currently 
faces or the analysis may be doomed to be incomplete and from time to 
time mistaken.  
Current trends in the EU – Economic objectives and energy 
 security 
Economic growth in the EU in recent years required relatively little 
additional oil but a lot of gas – as shown in Figure 2. There are numerous 
forecasts for the future needs of the EU-25 in terms of oil and gas, but most 
were formulated before the last surge in prices. Now the EU is facing the 
time of decision on its energy future. Actually, the energy security issue has 
a long history, during which the supply of oil from the Middle East has 
come into focus in recent years: “Russian oil is being seen as a ‘security 
blanket’ in case of a Saudi disruption”.3 The cold winter of 2006 forged a 
new angle in the problem – the sufficiency and security of gas supplies to 
the EU. 
The European Commission’s Green Paper of March 2006 is an 
excellent document describing the actual problems of sustainability, 
competitiveness and the security of energy supply for the EU-25. Growing 
EU dependence on imported energy resources is considered a threat for 
three reasons: a rising dependence on imports (for up to 70% of overall 
energy and 80% of gas by 2030), too large a share of imports are derived 
from just three neighbouring countries and high prices affect 
competitiveness.4 From the Russian perspective we need to look at the 
                                                     
3 This quote is derived from J. Nanay, “Russia and the Caspian Sea”, in Energy 
Security, Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press, 2005, p. 133. 
4 See European Commission, Secure, Competitive and Sustainable Energy for Europe, 
Green Paper, Brussels, 8 March 2006. 
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forecasting process anew – how the demand for imported energy would be 
affected by high prices and decisions about saving energy in the long run. 
At least the demand for energy in the EU with respect to GDP growth was 
somewhat lower for 2005. Still, the objectives the Green Paper presents for 
meeting the EU’s energy demands are very wide-ranging and complex – 
and it is indeed a very complicated undertaking even for developed 
countries with the huge economic, financial and managerial capacities of 
the EU. The economic analysis is quite correct on the trends and forecasts 
of energy needs. But in the short run it is a very hard to expect an effective 
solution for all problems. 
Figure 2. Growth rates of GDP and consumption of oil and gas in the EU-15 
(1980–2005) 
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Source: BP Statistical Review. 
Prioritisation is an important issue, as a multi-objective policy may be 
overly complex and experience delays and indecision. We will not judge 
for the EU or its countries but it appears that hard budget constraints must 
be considered when sequencing actions. The costs related to high energy 
prices plus EU enlargement and other important tasks are considerable. A 
figure of €1 trillion for energy investments breaks down into €50 billion per 
year, so it still looks like prioritisation is needed. We do not doubt the 
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possibility of achieving all three goals (ensuring competitiveness of the 
economy and environmental protection along with securing energy 
supplies) in the long run. But it is a gargantuan job to achieve all of them at 
the same time. We see the prioritisation of EU energy objectives as follows: 
1) sustainability, 2) competitiveness (liberalisation) and 3) security.  
First, on the goal of sustainability, stabilising the climate is the real 
problem now and in the near future. Natural disasters are becoming more 
and more damaging and costly in terms of human lives, infrastructure, 
financial costs (e.g. insurance), repairs, etc. Climate change is also starting 
to affect the lifestyles and expectations of people. All decisions in this 
sphere are expensive because they limit output, but there is no escape.5 This 
objective invokes the issue of nuclear energy policy, which is not popular in 
Germany or among the majority of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) worldwide. Climate change is growing more serious and 
exacerbating the global situation; it will inevitably lead to political 
decisions and spending.  
Renewable energy sources are still rather costly and in the next 25 
years we will not be able to change the lifestyles and modalities of energy 
consumption radically. Major technological changes are on the horizon but 
are not ready for use today. The Russian government is ready to go 
forward on a major revival of nuclear electricity, which is likely to face less 
resistance from domestic NGOs. The American–Russian nuclear initiative 
and all other sophisticated aspects of this issue are connected to the trade of 
nuclear materials and potentially to the Energy Charter negotiations.  
Second, the liberalisation of energy markets looks like a natural and 
low-cost option for governments but not for companies.6 It affects the 
interests of major players in the energy sector on the corporate level. 
Sometimes it is much easier to change legislation than the method of 
operation. Furthermore, the openness of a market affects the way outsiders 
(large companies from supply countries) see their future in that market and 
                                                     
5 See the statement published by Civil G8 of the NGO meeting in Moscow on 9-10 
March 2006, “On Activities to Ensure Global Energy Security, Recommendations of 
the Forum on the Meeting of the Heads of G8 Countries in St. Petersburg in July 
2006”, Civil G8 Documents, G8 Civil Forum, 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.civilg8.ru). 
6 The European Commission is conducting an investigation into corporate 
behaviour in the gas market. 
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how much investment they can bring to the EU. We sometimes read 
statements by incumbent companies on ‘preventing’ new entrants in the 
EU downstream (retail) market, which are not consistent with official EU 
policy. 
The success of gas market liberalisation in the UK is obvious – only in 
the UK do we observe the predominance of short-term contracts and 
transparent access to pipes. But it has not been able to prevent price rises in 
2004–06 for general reasons. Gas prices in the winter of 2006 exceeded those 
on the continent, despite the fact that the interconnector was half-empty (or 
half full).7 In any case, in the short run the EU is dealing with the potential 
gas supplies covering the period 2015–20. In this respect, the effectiveness 
of policies should not be overestimated, while gas requirements should not 
be underestimated (Figure 3).  
The continued concentration of dominant businesses in the EU’s 
energy sector is affecting competition in this market. At the same time, it is 
clear that the EU-wide liberalisation of the gas market is still mostly at the 
‘paper and regulation’ stage. Actual access to pipelines and the number of 
contracts remain very limited in the EU. In this situation, outsiders are 
naturally very cautious about subscribing to future rules. The history of 
negotiations on the transit of energy resources across the EU shows that the 
rules of conduct associated with this important matter have not been 
defined so far within the EU. A liberalised gas market in the EU will take 
years to build additional physical infrastructure, information systems, legal 
rules on the ground and actual good practice. It would be much easier to 
convince outsiders in neighbouring countries to liberalise after such 
liberalisation in the EU market shows some attractive success. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 See IEA/OECD, Natural Gas Market Review, IEA/OECD, Paris, 2006, p. 28, Fig. 8. 
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Figure 3. Forecasts of demand for oil and gas by the EU-25 (mn tonnes of oil 
equivalent (TOE)) 
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Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, IEA/OECD, Paris (2004). 
The liberalisation of energy markets with huge energy (combined 
gas–electrical) companies as major players will not be easy. To assure the 
positive competitive result some new players would be helpful. New 
producers will be trying to reach the retail level of gas distribution by 
applying the old market rule of squeezing ‘the middle man’. The positive 
impact would as usual be shared between consumers and suppliers. With 
the prospect of falling oil and gas prices in the medium term it is important 
to have these players enter the market and start spending their profits on 
investments before these entrants face cash limitations. One may expect 
that companies from outside the EU would come from a different business 
culture and business climate. From our point of view, the obligations 
undertaken by entrants, the amount of money paid for equity stakes and 
the legal and business environment for new entrants in the sophisticated 
world of the EU (institutions!) matter. These factors could help companies 
to adjust their practices to EU standards much faster than the EU’s trade 
agreements in terms of the agreements’ aim of changing the business 
climate in the countries from which the entrants originate. Again, some of 
these new players may be Russian – and include Gazprom at the very least. 
Russian capital is pouring out abroad because of limitations in the business 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY: WHAT SHOULD IT MEAN? WHAT TO DO? | 107 
 
climate at home and the amount of available financing. Many analysts 
foresee different possibilities for corporate deals in the future – including 
downstream activities for upstream participation. And actually, the 
transformation of wholesale suppliers into a vertical structure with a retail 
chain for a major share of final customers is something trivial in the history 
of economic development. 
Third, the secure delivery of energy is a complicated matter for at 
least four reasons: 
• At all stages, the access (rights) to resources, upstream operations and 
the transit or transport of energy have their specific risks, possible 
reasons for delays, etc. 
• The existing delivery infrastructure inside and outside the EU was 
built for different historical, commercial and other reasons, and 
sometimes for different purposes (especially that in the former USSR 
area). 
• Demand forecasting, investment planning and the actual construction 
of infrastructure and the development of big fields take years and are 
very risky for investors. 
• Finally, there is the subjectivity of risk perception, the difference in 
the languages of comfort and assurance between nations and political 
cultures, the different readings of real events and the political and 
mass media interference in economic considerations. 
The security of energy supply leads us to the issue of contracting and 
pricing. We have contracting conflicts of the usual nature with deep 
historical roots. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between political 
pressure for enforcing a contract and political pressure for rent protection. 
The so-called ‘Ukrainian gas conflict’ in the winter of 2006 had two 
stages and may now be used as a learning experiment. At first, it was 
essentially a conflict over gas prices in a country that has a monopoly of 
transit, yet a dominating supplier. Gazprom sought higher prices, since, as 
the IEA states, “Ukrainian prices were at very low levels compared to those 
paid by Western European countries in 2005”.8 Another reason for the 
conflict was an attempt by Gazprom to disentangle the fees for transit from 
                                                     
8 Ibid., p. 26. 
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the price of gas, in accordance with the rules of the Energy Charter. The 
gap between Ukrainian prices and those charged for the EU had been 
creating huge levels of rent for Ukrainian enterprises in the steel, chemical 
and fertiliser sectors. Gazprom had been unable not single out and cut 
supplies to Ukraine alone because of the structure of the pipeline system. It 
thus tried to reduce deliveries to the transit country without affecting 
contracts in the EU. The reduction lasted for a day and a half and totalled 
150 mn cubic metres (m3) (1 promille of annual transit capacity) according to 
IEA/OECD estimates.9  
The second episode happened later in January and February against 
the background of a very cold winter in Europe. Regarding this instance 
Gazprom insists that it had tried to increase delivery but that the additional 
gas had been consumed in Ukraine outside any contract. So far, there have 
been no formal claims against Gazprom for non-delivery against contracts. 
Additional demand in the EU was probably offset by stored gas, which is 
considered a normal approach to shortfalls.  
The nature and history of this conflict was covered by some very 
informative works by Western analysts.10 The position of this author has 
already been published (in the spring of 2006).11 We believe that the 
political (and emotional) reading of this event was inevitable under the 
circumstances (one year after the Orange Revolution). The point is that a 
new contract for gas supply is a step in the right direction and closer to the 
Energy Charter rules (especially with regard to separating transit fees and 
the price for gas). It stirred up serious resistance because of the huge rent 
costs involved ($230 minus $50 per 1,000 m3). Diplomatic relations were 
involved since the previous low prices had been politically motivated. 
                                                     
9 Ibid., p. 25. 
10 See J. Stern, The Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, Oxford, 16 January 2006; see also РАСЕ Global Energy Services, 
White Paper: Russia–Ukraine natural gas dispute, PACE, Fairfax, VA, 13 January 2006, 
p. 2 (retrieved from http://www.paceglobal.com). 
11 See L. Grigoriev and M. Salikhov, “Ukraine: Growth and Gas”, Economic Survey, 
No. 2, Institute for Energy and Finance, Moscow, 2006 (in Russian – but also 
published in English in Russia in Global Affairs, April–June 2006, St Petersburg: 
Globus Publishing House, 2006, pp. 156-76). 
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Basically, Ukraine has enough of its own gas for its households (20 
billion m3), and the cheap Russian gas was more for boosting the 
competitiveness of local chemical, fertiliser and metal companies (including 
Mittal Steel) and their profits. It is likely that the political side of the story 
was significantly exaggerated to protect the rent. Nevertheless, Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yushchenko finally supported the new deal. An American 
proposal for phasing in the new gas prices looks very attractive. But a few 
implementation problems and questions remain: Why has gas been singled 
out among all other market commodities? Why, after 15 years of shock-
style (‘therapy’) transition for the 25 countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, has this case become so prominent? Why should Gazprom as a 
commercial entity continue to subsidise Ukrainian manufacturing, and if 
so, how (and who bears the cost)? Actually, as things have evolved, the 
price package agreed looks like the proposal for phasing-in – from $50 to 
$95 and up to $130 by autumn 2006. It should be noted, however, that the 
story of 2006 is again becoming difficult: Ukraine’s state-owned energy 
firm Naftogaz is in debt (to the level of $600 mn in June) and it appears that 
it is not pumping enough gas into storage for winter 2006–07 to offset 
seasonal fluctuations in demand by local consumers. 
Finally, the hard issue of trust is difficult to discuss and predict. Yet 
we would just suggest separating the actual events from the media 
coverage of them in the gas delivery story, and ask business people from 
the EU energy community about the contractual issues in the supply of gas 
along Russian–German pipelines. We would all probably like to avoid 
being driven by the media into costly debates (‘Hurst wars’) and delays of 
important investment decisions. We have a 25-year history of honoured 
contracts. Given the time and investment constraints, it is important to look 
at the rational interests of the parties involved. If we try to apply the Basel 
principles of weighing banking risks to assessing the sources of supplies by 
political instability in the respective countries, we would find Russia – the 
traditional supplier to the EU – in the low-risk quarters. 
Investment and diversification costs 
We believe that some costs of ensuring alternative routes of oil and gas 
delivery and the diversification of supplies for countries are inevitable. But 
these costs should not be excessive and should be an avoidable burden for 
both sides. We hope some of the security costs will be reduced in the course 
of achieving two major objectives: more renewable energy sources or 
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nuclear power stations and a greater number of corporate deals. Both sides 
– suppliers and consumers – must work to create more transparent rules, 
which will provide greater assurance to all the parties with regard to 
expected events, contractual requirements and so forth. These rules will not 
necessarily be the EU’s internal ones; nevertheless, harmonisation of the 
legal space is important and achievable.  
For suppliers the assurance of safe transit is a very important matter. 
Diversification of the sources of supplies and methods of transit are 
‘mirror’ cases. Here it is important to avoid what we would call a ‘tax on 
fear’ – an escalation in the building of pipelines and other facilities to create 
the illusion of independence on both sides. It is even more important to 
avoid overspending on these goals, as that would take money away from 
climate objectives and investing in upstream operations. And it would 
probably delay solutions to the problems of high prices and reserve 
capacity. With the naturally increasing role of different sources of oil and 
gas across the globe and the rise of liquefied natural gas, the immediate 
diversification of supplies looks by our account to be the third priority 
among the three tasks of the European energy policy. 
In many ways, the existing delivery infrastructure in Eastern Europe 
represents the sunk costs of previous projects. It especially matters in the 
case of pipelines from Russia and Central Asia. For example, gas from 
Turkmenistan is physically processed (for quality reasons) in Orenburg. In 
another case, the Ukrainian transit system actually does not have the 
capability to limit consumption from the transit pipelines – the latter were 
built mostly for local supply and now badly need renovation. It is difficult 
to account for old and new investments in the case of the former Soviet 
Union – nothing is simple in the separating segments of the originally 
integrated systems. 
The global reserve and supply situation is rather clear (Table 2). 
Consumers may try to make some energy savings and increase their energy 
efficiency but China, India and other growing countries are looking for 
sources of energy and trying to secure future supplies. For the next 25-30 
years, the upstream operations for oil and gas will depend on reserves and 
the transaction costs of access and investments to a greater degree than in 
the recent past. At the very least, it will be a major factor for returning to 
‘affordable’ prices. 
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Table 2. Production, consumption and reserves of oil and gas (2005) 
Oil Gas 
Production Consumption Reserves  Production Consumption Reserves  
  
(Mn t) 
 
World 
(%)  
(Mn t)
 
World 
(%)  
(Bn t)
 
World 
(%)  
(Bcm)
 
World 
(%) 
(Bcm)
 
World 
(%) 
(Bcm) 
 
World 
(%) 
Canada 145 3.7 100 2.6 2 1.4 186 6.7 91 3.3 1.6 0.9 
France – – 93 2.4 – – – – 45 1.6 – – 
Germany  – – 122 3.2 – – 16 0.6 86 3.1 0.2 0.1 
Italy – – 86 2.2 0 0.1 12 0.4 79 2.9 0.2 0.1 
Japan – – 244 6.4 – – – – 81 2.9 – – 
UK 85 2.2 83 2.2 1 0.3 88 3.2 95 3.4 0.5 0.3 
US 310 8.0 945 24.6 4 2.2 526 19.0 634 23.0 5.5 3.0 
Russia 470 12.1 130 3.4 10 6.2 598 21.6 405 14.7 47.8 26.6 
G-8 1,010 25.9 1,803 47.0 17 10.2 1,425 51.6 1,516 55.1 55.7 31.0 
EU-15  109 2.8 647 16.9 1 0.5 189 6.8 422 15.4 2.4 1.3 
NMS-10   5 0.1 45 1.2 0 0.1 11 0.4 49 1.8 0.2 0.1 
China 181 4.6 327 8.5 2 1.3 50 1.8 47 1.7 2.4 1.3 
OPEC 1,626 41.7 363 9.5 123 75.3 488 17.7 343 12.5 88.1 49.0 
Saudi 
Arabia  526 13.5 87 2.3 36 22.2 70 2.5 70 2.5 6.9 3.8 
Total 
world  3,895 100.0 3,837 100.0 164 100.0 2,763 100.0 2,750 100.0 179.8 100.0 
Notes: Mn t = million tonnes; bn t = billion tonnes; bcm = billion cubic metres 
Source: BP Statistical Review. 
A speed race for new upstream input against the depletion of old 
fields and additional demand for oil and gas is the reality of daily life. The 
cost of diversification is growing because of multiple needs and objectives. 
In any case, the EU-25 is too large a consumer to have any security from 
global affairs. Any country may try to achieve some diversity in energy 
input by spending some money on infrastructure and developing a system 
of supply contracts, strategic reserves, spare capacity, etc. All it takes is just 
time and investments. But by no means can one avoid interdependence on 
a global scale. Table 3 presents well-known numbers for Russian 
involvement in supplying the EU. Given Russian reserves, that 
involvement will be continued in the future. The EU and EU companies 
may predictably spend enough money on liquefied natural gas, nuclear 
energy and renewable energy sources to limit Russia’s share in the delivery 
of total energy supplies. That process will naturally force Russian 
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companies to diversify their exports according to the situation. The global 
share of Russian deliveries of oil and gas will probably be flat, but may rise 
after coal and electricity are included. Naturally, any uncertainty in the 
terms of operation for outsiders usually postpones investment decisions. 
Companies may tend to divert exports to countries with low legal barriers 
and administrative costs in terms of operations. 
Table 3. Russia’s share in EU oil and gas imports, 2004 (%) 
  Oil Gas 
EU-15, including 24.4 39.1 (EU-25) 
Germany  33.7 43.3 
France  14.9 21.2 
Italy 23.5 34.8 
UK  14.7 n/a 
NMS-10, including 90.6 58.1 
Poland  94.3 62.3 
Sources: Eurostat and IEF estimates. 
The economic cost of supporting the supply of energy for 2001–30 
was put by the IEA at 1% of global GDP for this period or $16 trillion.12 
Although this figure is widely accepted, we have the courage to weigh it 
with some doubt – we think it will cost more. First, the current exchange 
rate of the dollar may have an impact on the final number. Second, the 
IEA’s 2003 report was prepared before the price surge and the reality is 
already different. Third, for oil alone some analysts estimate the figure for 
investments at $5 trillion for 2006–30 (whereas an estimated figure for 2005 
is $205 billion) while the 2003 report for this sector assigns it just $3 trillion. 
In this respect, even the new figure of €1 trillion for the EU for the next 20 
years does not look sufficient. We should probably add to that the 
investments made outside the EU in the search for future suppliers.  
The 2003 report expected Russia to contribute 5% of its cumulative 
GDP in 30 years to energy investments alone. At that time, such a figure 
looked excessive and unaffordable. Now Russia exports (or cannot use) 
three times more of its savings. Russian companies are either trying to 
                                                     
12 See the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Investment Outlook 2003, 
IEA/OECD, Paris, November 2003. 
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develop energy projects on their own or on a joint venture basis, 
subcontracting the technology inputs. The successful example of oil from 
Western Siberia may continue and see certain aspects replicated elsewhere. 
Yet the country has domestic problems in using its own savings for 
development. Companies will be pushed hard to use their own national 
ground and resources as a platform for establishing themselves in the 
global economy.  
Russia hopes to promote the growth of those branches of its economy 
that are not related to its natural resources. Progress in more advanced 
areas of manufacturing and innovation would make Russian society more 
receptive to the idea of greater extraction of natural resources for financing 
its modernisation and raise confidence about its future. An increasingly 
modernised and democratic Russia will be a better partner for the EU and 
will help to meet long-term energy needs. 
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The Caspian–Black Sea Region: The Key 
to Diversifying Europe’s Energy Supplies 
Vladimir Socor* 
Europe woke up suddenly in 2006 to a massive Russian challenge to its 
energy security. The challenge is five-fold. First is the seemingly unchecked 
growth in the market share captured in Europe by Russia’s state-connected 
energy companies – a process fraught with political risks. Second is 
Moscow’s ability to manipulate the flow of supplies, demonstrated in 
Ukraine’s gas crisis this past winter, with repercussions in European 
countries farther downstream. (Russian oil companies have also cut 
supplies to Latvia and Lithuania for extended periods in recent years.) 
Third is the disruption of energy export flows even before leaving Russian 
territory: thus, in the winter just past, a Siberian cold wave briefly reduced 
the gas volume available for Europe, while a well-organised though never-
explained sabotage of three energy supply lines on a single day in the 
North Caucasus had a devastating impact on Georgia and Armenia. Fourth 
is Moscow’s middleman-monopoly on eastern Caspian hydrocarbons – a 
novel type of leverage, usable on producer as well as consumer countries. 
And fifth are the rapid inroads made by Russian state-connected energy 
companies into downstream infrastructure and distribution systems in 
Europe, aiming at locking out potential competitors. 
These ongoing processes directly conflict with the European Union’s 
supply diversification and de-monopolisation goals and are incompatible 
with market economics. In the short to medium term, growing dependency 
on Russian energy supplies could impinge on the EU’s and some member 
countries’ foreign policy decisions and the political cohesion of the Euro-
Atlantic community.  
Last winter’s events have highlighted these long-neglected but now 
rapidly mounting risks to the energy security of the enlarged West and its 
partners in Europe’s east. Brussels and Washington are beginning to 
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acknowledge some aspects of this manifold challenge. But they have yet to 
focus on the dangerous nexus now forming between disruptions by Russia 
or in Russia and growing dependence upon Russia.  
The EU needs to organise consultation and coordination with the 
United States towards an overall strategic concept and measures for energy 
security. Brussels ought to clarify for itself and for the European public that 
energy security has become a key dimension to overall Euro-Atlantic 
security, and on that basis propose the establishment of a standing EU–US 
consultative mechanism that can evolve into a policy-planning framework. 
Were the EU to stop short of proposing a Euro-Atlantic approach, 
then consideration might be given to asking NATO to initiate such an 
approach to energy security. A start to the discussion of this problem 
within NATO would seem to be a natural development. The alliance is 
rapidly evolving into a multidimensional security organisation; energy 
security has become more critical to the enlarged West’s overall security 
than at any time in modern history; and NATO remains – as it must – the 
principal trans-Atlantic consultation and policy-making forum.  
The EU is moving piecemeal towards its declared long-term goal of a 
common foreign and security policy, but it has never proposed to develop 
a common energy-supply policy or at least an energy-security strategy. 
Such a step can no longer be delayed after last winter’s experience. Brussels 
should announce that goal and propose the necessary institutional format. 
The relevance of EU policy will hinge on identifying these risks and 
calling for the development of a common energy-security strategy. This 
strategy must be based on the diversification of supply sources, with direct 
access via the Black Sea region to the eastern Caspian as a major objective, 
and on ensuring national or EU control (as opposed to Russian-shared 
control) of energy transport systems in Europe.  
Although Western companies have found and are extracting the oil 
and gas from Caspian countries, Russia holds a near-monopoly on the 
transit routes to consumer countries from the eastern Caspian shore, where 
the great bulk of reserves are concentrated. This situation has no precedent 
and no parallel in the world of energy and geopolitics. Russia, the world’s 
second-largest producer and exporter of oil (behind only Saudi Arabia), 
and the global ‘no. 1’ for gas, absorbs the oil and gas produced in the 
eastern Caspian basin. As a result, Europe, the main potential consumer of 
Caspian energy, is sliding into a dual dependence on Russia – for Russian 
supplies as well as the Russian transit of supplies from this region. Such 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY: WHAT SHOULD IT MEAN? WHAT TO DO? | 117 
 
dependence on a single, powerful transit country is economically 
damaging and politically risky to producer countries as well. 
Any EU strategy must recognise that eastern Caspian oil and gas and 
its westbound transit via the Black Sea region are key to diversification 
away from EU dependency on Russia. Such recognition is long overdue 
and yet seems far from the grasp of policy-makers even now. Policy 
prescriptions in Brussels tend to focus mainly on diversifying the types of 
energy being used, and less so on diversifying the oil and gas supply 
sources in general or obtaining direct access to Caspian reserves in 
particular. While conservation and saving, greater use of renewable 
sources, interconnection of energy systems and additions to storage 
capacity on EU territory are all necessary measures, it would be unrealistic 
to expect any significant decline in hydrocarbon requirements for at least 
the medium term.  
Thus, a viable strategy for supply diversification should aim at 
linking the EU with the transit and producer countries in the Black Sea and 
Caspian basins. This link means opening up direct access to eastern 
Caspian supplies, and not going through Russian territory. In parallel, the 
EU needs to ensure that Ukraine and other countries that traditionally carry 
Russian energy to Europe do not lose control of their transit systems to 
Gazprom or other Russian interests. At the moment, the first of these goals 
has not yet been declared by the EU, while the second is in jeopardy, as 
Moscow began setting the stage this winter for transfers of control over the 
Ukrainian and other transit systems.  
Transit projects indispensable to EU energy security (as defined 
above) and vital to anchoring the countries of Europe’s east include the 
following, among other proposals:  
1) Trans-Caspian westbound pipeline for Turkmen gas via the Black Sea region 
Turkmenistan’s gas output potential may well approach 80 billion 
cubic metres (bcm) annually at present, from incompletely explored 
reserves. The trans-Caspian pipeline project, initiated by the US in the 
late 1990s, envisaged an annual export volume of 16 bcm annually in 
the first stage (mainly to Turkey) and 32 bcm in the second stage (to 
south-eastern and potentially Central Europe). This project was 
shelved in the face of Moscow’s opposition (in tandem with Tehran) 
and the Turkmen president’s prevarications, which largely stemmed 
from fear of Russian reprisals against him. 
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The gas export potential of Turkmenistan – augmented by that 
of Kazakhstan – increases the commercial attractiveness of this 
project. The import requirements of the EU, Ukraine and the Balkan 
countries demand its reactivation and energy security considerations 
make it imperative. Russian objections to a trans-Caspian pipeline on 
legal and environmental grounds are poorly substantiated excuses for 
imposing a Russian monopsony on Turkmen and other Central Asian 
gas.  
2) Expansion of the Shah Deniz (Azerbaijan)–Tbilisi–Erzurum (Turkey) gas 
pipeline 
The line is due on stream in 2007. Proven reserves at Shah Deniz, 
considerably exceeding the earlier estimates, now suggest that 
exports of more than 20 bcm per year are realistic. With the Turkish 
market oversubscribed, Turkey’s primary role in this project can 
change from that of a consumer to that of transit country for 
Azerbaijani gas en route to Greece and the Balkans. 
Yet Azerbaijani gas volumes – even if augmented by volumes 
anticipated from Kazakhstan in the next few years – are too small to 
meet the needs of markets targeted by Gazprom for its expansion. 
Governments in those countries do not seem convinced by the 
argument that they can hold off Gazprom while awaiting supplies 
from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Those volumes would need to be 
combined with volumes from Turkmenistan in order to compete with 
Gazprom.  
3) Kazakhstani oil transport and the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline 
Along with the completion of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, a 
framework agreement was signed in June 2006 on a Kazakhstan–
Azerbaijan oil transport system that would feed Kazakhstani oil into 
that pipeline. This agreement signifies the first serious dent into 
Russia’s monopoly on the transit of oil from Kazakhstan. But it seems 
limited for the time being to transport by tankers (not pipeline) and 
an annual volume of only 7 mn tonnes initially, reaching 20 mn 
tonnes annually in the peak phase several years from now.  
Therefore, this system should be seen as a short-term palliative. 
Tanker transport in the Caspian Sea is not cost-effective. Ultimately, 
this system will not be viable without a pipeline. Kazakhstan’s oil 
output is projected at some 150 mn tonnes annually after 2015, largely 
on the strength of the Kashagan offshore field, which is due to come 
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on stream by 2009. Routing that field’s output via Russia would be 
unacceptable from the standpoint of energy security. The necessary 
solution is a westbound pipeline on the Caspian seabed to handle the 
volumes from Kashagan. 
4) Extending Ukraine’s Odessa–Brody oil pipeline into Poland 
Originally intended to carry Caspian oil via Ukraine for refining in 
Poland and to serve Central European oil product markets, the 
Odessa–Brody pipeline lacks Caspian oil and is being used in the 
reverse direction by Russian oil-producing companies. Reverting to 
the originally intended function would necessitate supplies of 
Kazakhstani oil via the Black Sea to Odessa and enlarging the 
pipeline’s annual capacity from 8 mn tonnes to 14 mn. This would 
make it commercially attractive and is considered technically feasible.  
Two possible terminal destinations in Poland have been 
envisaged for this pipeline: the refining centre at Plock or the port and 
refinery of Gdansk. The Gdansk option might now be receding, as the 
Polish PKN Orlen company has just acquired the majority stake in 
Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery and proposes to target the market for 
oil products in northern Poland and north-eastern Germany. This 
leaves the Plock option of extending the Odessa–Brody pipeline or – 
an alternative proposed by some Ukrainian officials – of building a 
refinery at Brody for Kazakh crude oil. This solution would reduce 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian crude oil and Russian-controlled 
refineries.  
A European policy focus on the Caspian Sea–Black Sea region holds 
major opportunities for common EU–US policies on energy security. The 
US initiated the East–West Energy Corridor almost 10 years ago, largely in 
the interest of European consumer countries’ security of supply within the 
Euro-Atlantic community. The Corridor project has only materialised from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey, but stopped short of extending as planned in the 
1990s to the far larger eastern-shore reserves in Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan.  
The EU ought to make clear that monopolisation of access to eastern 
Caspian hydrocarbons is unacceptable – a principle that can also form a 
basis for EU–US policy coordination – and that the EU has legitimate, 
indeed pressing, interests in obtaining direct access. 
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A credible EU policy would need to demonstrate that the EU means 
business in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Brussels must include 
energy supply and transit as high priorities in the mandates of its special 
representatives for the South Caucasus and Central Asia and of its 
delegations in Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. The EU can also propose 
launching and institutionalising discussions with Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan on commercial development of their energy deposits and a 
European alternative to the Russian monopsony.  
The EU also needs to step in with expert assistance to Ukraine and 
Moldova, as these countries are having to renegotiate their gas agreements 
with Russia under pressure. Russia seeks to extend its dominance over gas 
transit to EU countries by obtaining incremental control over Ukraine’s 
pipeline system and full control over Moldova’s, leveraging the supplier’s 
monopoly. Ukraine now apparently wishes to extricate itself from the 
dangerous five-year agreements it signed in January and February with 
Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo, while Moldova faces the expiry of its interim 
agreement with Gazprom. At Chisinau’s initiative, Kyiv and Chisinau 
jointly requested the EU in January to provide advice on the formation of 
market prices for gas supplies and transit and to delegate expert observers 
to the Ukraine–Russia and Moldova–Russia negotiations. The EU missed 
that unprecedented opportunity in January. But it is still not too late to 
become involved. 
Preventing a transfer of Ukraine’s gas transit pipelines to some form 
of ‘joint’ Russian–Ukrainian control (as a guise for Russian de facto control) 
is a major EU interest in Europe’s east. Moscow holds out two rationales to 
Ukraine for such a transfer: the incentive of price and debt relief, and that 
of Russian investment in the pipelines’ modernisation. A transfer into 
Russian co-ownership would increase Gazprom’s market dominance in the 
EU as a whole and would place Ukraine’s western neighbours in the EU 
under pressure to cede portions of their national infrastructure to the 
monopoly supplier.  
Before Ukraine’s energy predicament deepens any further, the EU 
can immediately offer to send a taskforce of experts to Kyiv for an overall 
assessment of the situation. The assessment process could soon evolve into 
an EU–Ukraine standing consultative mechanism. Such a body could help 
formulate a Ukrainian energy strategy, map out energy sector reforms, plan 
the modernisation of its ageing transit systems for gas and oil to the EU and 
consider the formation of a European investment consortium to overhaul 
those systems as an alternative to a Russian-dominated consortium. 
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By the end of 2006, the European Commission will table specific 
proposals for action at the level of member states and the EU, taking into 
account suggestions from member governments, energy companies, 
analysts and neighbouring countries. The Commission’s proposals should 
highlight the Caspian basin and Black Sea region if the EU wishes to seek a 
credible common policy and an external strategy for supply diversification. 
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Energy Security, Gas Market 
Liberalisation and Our Energy 
Relationship with Russia 
Alan Riley* 
The thrust of this short paper is to argue that despite member state and 
European Union institutional endorsement of market liberalisation in the 
gas sector, liberalisation has almost entirely failed. The recent sectoral 
review paper in March 2006 by the European Commission’s Directorate-
General (DG) for Competition reads like a bill of indictment against the 
institutions, the member states and the incumbent energy firms as to their 
collective failure to liberalise European gas markets. Liberalisation is not a 
rightist free-market ideology; it is itself a means of enhancing European gas 
security and should reduce consumer prices over time.  
This paper goes on to argue that while DG Competition’s current 
focus on energy and particularly gas markets is welcome, the exclusion of 
upstream producers from the scope of its review is misguided. Only by 
reviewing the whole of the market upstream and downstream can the 
market be effectively liberalised and energy security enhanced. 
In respect of Russia, the paper argues that the major threat to energy 
security does not come from the ‘energy weapon’ – the threat of politically 
motivated gas ‘cut-offs’ – but from the lack of investment in new gas fields. 
As a consequence, there is a serious developing threat to gas supplies to the 
EU as existing Russian fields go into decline. The solution to this problem is 
for Russia to liberalise its markets and improve legal security for investors 
to enter Russian energy markets by, for example, honouring the obligations 
under the Energy Charter Treaty and signing up to the Transit Protocol. 
The Russian state is currently opposed to such a development and the 
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Kremlin can legitimately point to the EU and question why Russia should 
liberalise its gas market when the EU itself has signally failed to do so.  
The paper argues for substantial and real market liberalisation 
including ownership unbundling to begin liberalisation and enhance 
energy security. In respect of Russia, the EU needs to focus on the real 
issue, the lack of gas supplies, and engage with Russia on the potential 
problems of falling gas supplies for both the EU member states and Russia.  
Market liberalisation 
Classically the EU gas markets were national markets in which a national 
energy company owned the pipelines and supplied the gas down the value 
chain, sometimes exclusively all the way to the consumer. In some markets, 
there may have been a number of retail companies but usually the national 
incumbent dominated the wholesale market and had exclusive import 
rights with any producers. The national incumbent had long-term supply 
contracts with both the retailers and the producers, which effectively 
foreclosed large parts, if not all the market to any potential competition.  
Russia participated enthusiastically and was (and still is) part of this 
European managed-market system. Even after the end of the cold war, it 
continued, renewed or enacted new long-term supply contracts (LTSCs) 
with the newly independent Eastern European states, and it continued to 
develop and renew LTSCs in Western Europe. 
This managed-market system had its advantages. It provided a 
significant degree of predictability. The LTSCs certainly provided a means 
of funding major pipe construction programmes such as Yamal. It also 
secured the market to a few operators, minimised competition, limited 
innovation and kept prices high.  
By contrast with almost all European markets (Spain and parts of 
Scandinavia being exceptions), under a Thatcherite ethos the UK liberalised 
its energy markets. As a result, the British market saw full ownership 
unbundling, the access of several players at the wholesale and retail levels 
and low gas prices compared with most of the rest of Europe. 
Now in principle the single market rules applied to the gas market. 
Yet aside from some very early and weak single market legislation, along 
with the 1990 price transparency and 1991 transit directives, very little 
happened in the gas sector. In 1994, a European Energy Council meeting 
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took the decision to prioritise the opening-up of the electricity market – 
effectively putting gas liberalisation on the back burner. 
The gas market only saw its first sector-specific liberalising 
instrument in 1998, with the first gas directive. This directive was a 
relatively timid beast, however, in that it only required the unbundling of 
accounting, i.e. the separate accounting of the transmission pipes operation 
and the supply operation, and limited opportunity for third-party access to 
pipelines. It was only with the Lisbon European summit in 2000 that the EU 
member states formally committed themselves to market liberalisation of 
the gas sector. That political impetus resulted in the second gas directive 
and gas regulation, which require legal unbundling (i.e. the formal 
separation of the national incumbents into transmission and supply 
businesses) along with the establishment of a national regulator to ensure 
third-party access to the supply network and binding non-discrimination 
rules. Under the second directive, commercial gas customers were 
supposed to be free to choose suppliers by July 2004; residential customers 
are to have the ability to do so by July 2007. 
Liberalisation, if achieved, would have a major energy-security 
benefit. Moving from national managed markets to a single European 
energy market massively increases energy security. By simply being a 
much larger market, the EU is better protected from the consequences of 
disruption. In a genuine, single European market, it is much easier to 
allocate the additional energy resources to deal with a market disruption 
than in a smaller national market.  
Application of the competition rules to the gas market 
Unfortunately, liberalisation has been comprehensively frustrated by the 
member states and domestic incumbents. DG Competition has launched a 
major sectoral review into the state of competition in the gas and electricity 
markets. The preliminary report of this review published in March 
suggests that many member states and their domestic incumbents have 
effectively sidestepped the liberalisation directives and the gas regulation. 
Although the laws may be on the statute books, effective circumvention 
practices are in place, for example: 
• Legacy contracts. Just prior to markets opening up, dominant 
incumbents have been tying up both upstream and wholesale 
markets with 20-year contracts with renewal clauses, effectively 
foreclosing markets for the foreseeable future. 
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• Confidentiality clauses. Specific clauses are used to deny information 
on capacity and storage to potential new market entrants. 
• Possible market-sharing agreements among incumbents. There is very little 
cross-border trade even where interconnectors make it possible. 
There is concern that this may be because some incumbents have 
colluded in illegal market-sharing. 
From the evidence collected by DG Competition, it would appear that 
despite EU legislation the domestic incumbents remain in place across a 
large swathe of the EU and are largely unaffected by liberalisation. Any 
new entrants are wholly dependent on incumbents.  
The European Commission has identified a whole host of problems 
concerning the European gas market. These problems include 
• Market concentration. This problem essentially concerns the high level 
of concentration of the domestic incumbents of the pre-liberalisation 
era. 
• Vertical foreclosure. This effect exists through both ownership and 
long-term supply contracts, and in both cases the result is similar – 
the foreclosure of new entrants. 
• Market integration. Cross-border sales are not presently exerting any 
competitive pressure. Incumbents rarely enter each other’s national 
markets; new entrants have difficulty obtaining pipeline access and 
LTSCs make it hard to obtain capacity. 
• Lack of transparency. Potential entrants complain again and again 
about the lack of reliable and timely information on markets, 
particularly concerning capacity and storage. 
• Price issues. Price formation is very opaque and many producer 
contracts are linked to oil prices, which do not reflect the levels of 
demand, supply or seasonal flows.  
The determination of Ms Neelie Kroes, the European Commissioner 
for Competition, to tackle anti-competitive practices is welcome as is the 
opening of EU energy markets. Nevertheless, DG Competition has 
expressly left out of its energy review upstream issues, i.e. the role of 
energy producers in the market. This omission is unfortunate as it is 
difficult to leave out upstream or downstream actors without undermining 
any effective liberalisation process.  
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In particular, there is concern about a number of specific issues. One 
of these is the effectiveness of the competitive process upstream in the gas 
sector in relation to the potential for collusive activity by producers. 
Another issue is price formation and especially the link between oil and 
gas. There is also the matter of the destination clauses in supply contracts – 
the LTSCs between gas producers and domestic incumbents foreclosing 
national markets, as well as the impact within the EU of anti-competitive 
acts that foreclose foreign gas resources to the EU. An example of this latter 
issue is Gazprom’s refusal to permit its pipeline to be used to export 
Central Asian gas into EU markets.  
Russia 
Although the Central and Eastern European states have faced 
approximately 40 energy cut-offs since the end of the cold war, and may 
face some more, the major threat to EU gas supplies from Russia does not 
stem from the ‘energy weapon’. 
The major threat in the gas sector is Gazprom’s lack of investment in 
new gas fields resulting in the company, despite 47 trillion cubic metres of 
gas in the ground, being unable to supply the EU with gas. According to 
former Russian energy minister Vladimir Milov, Russia already has a gas 
deficit between foreign and domestic demand and its actual gas supplies of 
69 billion cubic metres (bcm) – which may explain why Russia was not able 
to fulfil its contractual supply requirements to some EU member states last 
winter. He conservatively estimates that the supply gap could be 
approximately 130 bcm by 2010.  
Gazprom’s problems arise to a large extent from the need to supply a 
domestic market at very low prices, as a result of which the company does 
little more than break even in its domestic gas supplies. Even with the 
revenues coming in from the EU, Gazprom still does not have the financial 
firepower to refurbish the Soviet-era pipelines and compressor stations or 
develop new fields, which would cost tens of billions of dollars. The 
International Energy Agency recently put the figures required at over $170 
billion. Gazprom, it should be noted, is currently $38 billion in debt. 
A second factor is the lack (and perceived lack) of legal security in 
Russia for property rights, which makes Western investors wary of 
providing the scale of investment required. A third practical factor is that 
currently it is extremely difficult for Western investors to acquire upstream 
or downstream assets in the Russian gas sector (whereas by contrast 
Russian investors can easily buy up EU energy assets). 
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Part of the solution would be to honour the Energy Charter Treaty 
and sign up to the Transit Protocol, which provide guarantees of legal 
security to foreign investors to encourage Western capital to come into the 
Russian gas market. Currently, however, the Kremlin appears to be against 
such a development. The Kremlin can legitimately ask the question: Why 
should Russia liberalise its energy market when the EU has so signally 
failed to do so? 
Conclusion 
If the EU wants to engage with Russia in respect of encouraging Russia to 
open up its energy market it must take real and effective steps to liberalise 
its own market. The European Commission’s DG Competition may have a 
very valuable role to play here. Evidence of substantial frustration of the 
EU’s liberalisation rules by the member states and domestic energy 
incumbents gives the Commission justification to bring out its big antitrust 
guns. DG Competition has two major weapons to enforce liberalisation. 
The first is Art. 86(3), under which the Commission can adopt directives 
without recourse to the Council or Parliament requiring the member states 
to open up national markets. The second is the new power contained in 
Art. 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, to adopt structural remedies against 
companies. Using these two weapons the Commission could potentially 
enforce liberalisation in the gas and electricity sectors by ordering the 
complete unbundling of ownership.  
Such a step would enhance EU energy security through the 
liberalisation process and demonstrate to Russia the value of liberalisation. 
In the engagement process, the point has to be made to the Kremlin that 
both the EU and Russia face real problems if the gas runs dry. Thus, it is in 
both the EU’s and Russia’s interest to encourage large-scale investment into 
Russian energy markets, with the EU providing the capital and Russia 
providing legal security through the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia is 
misunderstanding its own vital interests in restricting foreign investment. 
The Russians do not have to listen to the EU on this point; they just have to 
take note of the policy of their ancestors. The greatest period of growth in 
Russian history, from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 to 1914, was 
fuelled to a very large extent by a huge volume of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). FDI does not threaten a loss of control of the ‘crown jewels’ of the 
energy sector, it is the means by which Russia can rebuild itself as a 
wealthy, great European power. 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
To introduce our proceedings we were fortunate to benefit from four 
papers, presented by their authors: Alexander Bogomolov of Maidan 
Alliance, James Sherr of the UK Defence Academy and Lincoln College, 
Arkady Moshes of the Finnish Institute for International Relations and 
Stephen Larrabee of the Rand Corporation, Washington, D.C. 
They were urged by the chairman to address in their reflections four 
questions: 
1) What kind of country has Ukraine become? (Is it like the Baltics, with 
a politically dominant non-Russian population? Or is it a bilingual 
contract with a common nationhood, democracy and civil society? Or 
is it basically a divided country?) 
2) What kind of state is Ukraine? (Is it presidential or parliamentarian? 
Is its structure oligarchic and clientelist or that of a civil society 
democracy?) 
3) What is the ability of the outside world – the West but also Russia – to 
influence outcomes in Ukraine? 
4) What is the potential for developments in the Crimea to present new 
difficulties for Ukraine? 
In presenting his paper, Alexander Bogomolov emphasised that 
neutrality would lead to isolation; thus it is a threat alongside other 
negative outcomes such as authoritarianism ‘à la Putin’, separatism or 
division, or becoming part of a larger unstable region stretching from 
Transnistria to the Caucasus. He considered that the Crimea constituted the 
most serious ethnic issue. Overall, there was strong support in Ukraine for 
‘moving towards Europe’. 
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James Sherr stressed that Ukraine’s basic problem and weakness lies 
in the connection between politics, business and crime, with rent-seeking 
groups having a vested interest in avoiding political transparency and the 
conditions for entrepreneurship. The RosUkrEnergo saga was symbolic of 
the trouble. The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is not simply a 
status-of-forces issue but constitutes criminal problem as well. Crimea 
could become like Transnistria. 
NATO’s interest is less about Ukraine moving towards NATO’s 
Membership Action Plan than about sustaining the agenda of change. 
Although Ukraine’s separate existence is now accepted by Russia, the 
freestanding exercise of its independence is not. And Ukraine takes 
insufficient heed of President Vladimir Putin’s reminders that only the 
strong are respected in international relations. More generally, there is 
dissonance between the post-modernism of the European Union (and 
NATO and Ukraine’s need for classical nation-building. The situation is not 
improved by Ukraine’s current behaviour, with the risk that the West will 
lose interest. 
Nevertheless, Arkady Moshes indicated that there were three reasons 
for cautious optimism: 
• Ukraine is and will remain pluralistic; it may well complete its 
democratic transition. The continuity of Ukraine’s language policy 
also deserves to be noted. 
• There will be no return to the kind of Russian–Ukrainian relations 
that characterised the Kuchma regime (preferential treatment in 
exchange for loyalty). Even Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych had 
American consultants run his successful 2006 campaign. By moving 
away from preferential energy prices, Russia is speeding up this 
process; Ukraine, like the Baltics of 15 years ago, should go for world 
energy prices. 
• The West can continue to exert influence by supporting reform and 
through its energy policy, even in the absence of EU and NATO 
membership. 
But again, there are causes for concern: 
• The quality of governance is low. 
• There is a lack of transparency along with a wide prevalence of 
corruption. 
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• Finally yet importantly, there is the possibility for the manipulation of 
general public opinion in Eastern Ukraine. 
The keys for the future are threefold: 
• The efforts to increase domestic transparency need to be continued. 
• The West should judge Ukraine by what it is actually doing rather 
than playing favourites with this or that party. 
• An agenda is needed that includes the prospect of EU accession. 
Stephen Larrabee saw his perspective as being closer to that of James 
Sherr than to Arkady Moshes. The Orange coalition had never had a 
unified purpose. Ukraine now has two policies, one with a Euro-Atlantic 
orientation, the other being neo-Kuchma (with the dissolution of Foreign 
Minister Borys Tarasyuk’s Euro-Atlantic Committee and the reduction of 
funding for defence reform). 
Mr Yanukovych’s policies, like those of former President Leonid 
Kuchma, are not strictly pro-Russian. Rather, the West is viewed as a useful 
counterweight vis-à-vis Russia. Indeed, it should be recalled that Mr 
Yanukovych had supported NATO membership when he served as 
President Kuchma’s premier. 
In the discussion, a NATO official viewed the Ukrainian situation as 
being different from that of the Baltics during the 1990s. NATO 
membership is not popular in Ukraine: a notable aspect of the recent 
elections was the fact that parties viewed as friends of the West had 
decided that supporting NATO membership was not going to help them. 
He further noted that those who push for NATO membership in the United 
States are also those who want to limit the Russian–NATO relationship. 
This will not do. 
A Ukrainian politician emphasised that the Orange Revolution was 
not about East versus West but about democracy versus autocracy. Ukraine 
is becoming a normal European country (and not solely in its capital), even 
if it has had an abnormal past. Civil society and the free press are not at all 
in the same situation as they are in Russia. The current paradox is that Mr 
Yanukovych has received a measure of legitimisation in the West, but not 
in Russia – Moscow wants him to deliver first on the gas package. And 
there will be no return to President Kuchma’s ‘milking two cows’ policy: 
Mr Yanukovych has neither the constitutional nor political power for that. 
Like others, this participant was worried about the Crimea and Russia’s 
policy of instability. 
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An EU official, like the previous speaker, compared Ukraine with 
traditional stereotypes of Italy: the situation is critical but not serious. 
Ukraine has become a nation, whereas that was an open question 15 years 
ago. Crimea may be the exception. Ukraine has democracy at the popular 
level. Indeed, in that regard, the population at large is more predisposed 
than are the elites. Russia’s options in relation to Ukraine are limited. The 
Donbass oligarchs are not pro-Russian in structural terms, given that their 
greatest economic competitors are in Russia. Meanwhile, the European 
carrot, alluded to by Stephen Larrabee, exists: membership is not on the 
agenda but then again it is not excluded either. 
In the broader discussion, Arkady Moshes, in replying to the 
chairman on energy issues, observed that Ukrainians were beginning to 
realise that energy efficiency was necessary. Ukraine has managed to digest 
the increase in gas prices from $50 to $130 per 1,000 m3 quite well. Russia 
no longer scares the Ukrainians in the field of energy. It was Moscow that 
had pressed for rapid settlement after the January 2006 cuts, in part for lack 
of storage space for the gas. 
A Finnish participant stressed that the political issue of energy 
dependency would be greatly mitigated by the reduction of energy over-
consumption through higher prices. James Sherr remarked that the 
Ukrainian energy sector was even less transparent than that of Russia. 
Others agreed with this, with the question being put: Who runs the 
Ukrainian energy sector? One participant noted that there was no 
systematic approach by Ukrainian civil society towards the control of the 
energy sector or tariffs. 
An American participant reminded the Ukrainians that what 
happens next depends not only on Ukraine getting its act together but also 
on NATO and other Western institutions. 
A European analyst considered that the debate should not go too far 
in the direction of de-dramatisation: Russia is playing games in the Crimea 
and is strongly asserting itself in the field of energy. 
In his final remarks, Stephen Larrabee stressed that President Putin 
and other Russian officials had lost no time in raising the issues ‘associated’ 
with the gas deal (e.g. NATO, Sebastopol and World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) membership) when the Russian news agency Kommersant leaked 
its version of that deal. Yet Arkady Moshes urged that what counted was 
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what was actually going to happen: Ukraine would join the WTO in 2007 
and there would be no referendum on NATO membership. 
James Sherr considered that Russia was behaving in a pre-1914 mode. 
As for the EU, the talk should not be about membership but about the 
actual integration of Ukraine in specific areas, such as visa policy. 
Functioning democratic institutions in Ukraine are of the essence. 
Finally, Alexander Bogomolov remarked that the EU’s relations with 
Ukraine are more heavily influenced by the question, “What about the 
effects on the relationship with Russia?” than by the actual status of 
Ukrainian–Russian relations. 
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Ukraine’s Strategic Security 
On a Crossroads between Democracy 
and Neutrality 
Alexander Bogomolov* 
Over the past 15 years, Ukraine has certainly become a much freer nation 
than many of its former Soviet neighbours. Yet, as events in 2006 have 
demonstrated, the point of no return in the transition towards a sustainable 
democracy has not been passed. Elements of an authoritarian culture are 
still preserved within a number of institutions, notably the security sector. 
There are powerful forces in the region working to undo the nascent 
democracy. The latter’s very institutional structure is still too incomplete to 
be immune from these challenges.  
The Orange Revolution has put before Ukraine a number of choices. 
It would be an oversimplification to reduce their complexity to a cultural 
choice formulated in terms of an East/West dilemma or an issue of the 
nation’s political and geographical attribution – to Europe or some 
imaginary Eurasia. The dilemma is more complicated, concerning the 
essence of numerous institutional and policy steps taken by a variety of 
actors at different levels as well as the relative timing of such steps, which 
altogether will define what kind of country we will have in the next several 
decades – a successful or a failed one, a democratic one or otherwise. From 
a security perspective, the most important issues currently include 
accession to NATO, the development of state institutions (including those 
in the security sector), the emergence of a consistent regional policy and 
finally the sustainability of the nation’s political progress towards a fully-
fledged participatory democracy.  
 
                                                     
* Alexander Bogomolov is a member of Maidan Alliance (maidan.org.ua), a 
grassroots-based pro-democracy civic movement in Ukraine. 
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Political scene 
With the adoption of new electoral legislation abolishing the majority 
voting system, political parties became the main actors in Ukrainian 
politics. The major issue, hence, is what these parties are actually 
comprised of and whether they adequately represent Ukrainian society’s 
complicated social, class and cultural make-up. The simple answer is no, 
they certainly do not. Political party development lags behind society’s 
growing diversity and dynamics. The persistently low credibility of the 
parliament, with 30% of the population declaring that they do not trust it, 
provides a numerical indicator of its incapacity to reflect society’s interests. 
A sociological study found that party programmes in the wake of the 
March 2006 parliamentary elections had little or no overlap with the actual 
expectations of the electorate.1  
Of the five parties that won seats in the recent parliamentary 
elections, three of them – the Party of Regions of Ukraine (PRU), the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party – finally formed the so-called 
‘anti-crisis coalition’ in July 2006. For all the seeming ideological 
inappropriateness of this alliance of leftist and oligarchic forces, their 
common denominator is a reference to what has remained of the Soviet 
identity (mainly in the eastern and southern regions) and appeal to certain 
age- and culturally-specific populations, which explains such 
epiphenomena in the coalition policies as a clear pro-Russian tilt. Over 
time, the distribution of votes across this group has shown an interesting 
trend – a change of hearts in the combined ‘pro-Soviet’ target audience 
away from the left and towards a more nationalist interpretation of the 
common Soviet references, which mirrors a similar ideological trend in 
neighbouring Russia.  
The other two parties include Our Ukraine, a bloc of liberal, 
patriotically minded groups forming the main political force that won in 
the Orange Revolution of 2004, and Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc (BYT), 
another partner/competitor in the Orange team. The competitive 
                                                     
1 See Maidan Alliance, Usvidomlenn’a vyboru 2006: Interaktyvne spivsatvlenn’a 
interesiv vybortsiv ta obits’anok politychnykh syl. [Conscious Choice 2006: An 
interactive comparative study of the voters’ interests and promises of the political 
forces], Halyts’ka Vydavnycha Spilka – 200 UV, Maidan Alliance, 2006.  
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advantages of the latter are its appeal to broader cross-sections of society 
and greater political flexibility, which are offset by an ideological 
uncertainty. Over a short period of time the faction has shifted from rather 
vaguely expressed populism to outdated ‘solidarism’ and finally to 
socialism (consider Ms Tymoshenko’s most recent decision to seek 
membership in Socialist International), contrasting with its material 
dependence on large business groups as its major resource base.  
Despite their failure to pass the threshold in the March parliamentary 
elections, ethnic nationalist parties such as the Ukrainian People’s Party (an 
offshoot of Rukh) and the bloc consisting of PORA and the PRP (the 
Reforms and Order Party) have not disappeared from the political scene, 
having retained a high level of presence in regional politics – particularly in 
Western and Central Ukraine. With these parties, the local political 
spectrum looks significantly more pluralistic than it does at the top political 
level.  
In 2005, the Orange bloc had the chance to mobilise an 
unprecedented level of popular support for a new national project, but 
failed to do so because of its incapacity to formulate such a project and to 
see beyond its immediate social base – groups and individuals representing 
or affiliated with a patriotic segment of the business elite. The two major 
Orange parties, Our Ukraine and BYT, initially had a seemingly correct 
distribution of support across the social strata – the former as a liberal 
project reflecting the interests of the business elite, the latter in terms of 
what the Orange parties interpreted as reflecting the ‘people’. Eventually, 
both of them missed the golden middle – failing to find support among the 
most active and motivated segment, the middle class. To be fair, the task 
was not as easy as it may now sound. The ability to mobilise the middle 
class at that time would have called for the capacity to see several steps 
ahead of the current situation. The Ukrainian middle class is not an 
accomplished social phenomenon, but rather a process, a class/group 
identity in the making. But the two processes, the political and the social 
one, could have been mutually re-enforcing.  
Ukraine’s approach to the politically decisive March 2006 elections 
involved a protracted debate among the team of the apparent winners. The 
defection of a minor Orange partner, the Socialists, overturned the shaky 
political balance and ended the hopes for the Orange coalition. The ensuing 
political developments, although hardly yet final, have inflicted much 
damage upon Ukraine’s international standing. Domestically, the 
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enormous drawbacks became very obvious of the new political system of 
the so-called ‘presidential–parliamentary’ democracy with its party list-
based electoral system, which resulted from the European Union-blessed 
pacted transition in November 2004. 
A major issue remains the identification of the differences between 
the PRU and the Orange parties, given the large overlap between them in 
both ideology and social base. From the perspective of the perceived 
threats to democracy associated with the rise of the PRU to power, at least 
one point merits attention. The Conscious Choice 2006 project2 analysed 
key elements in the political cultures of the top 15 parties that ran for the 
March 2006 parliamentary elections. Sharp differences were found with 
regard to openness and the willingness to go for social dialogue, with the 
BYT and Our Ukraine ranking second and third and the PRU almost at the 
bottom of the 15-party list. There are other indications as well of reduced 
transparency in the decision-making process of the PRU-led government as 
opposed to its predecessors.  
The central theme of domestic politics is the competition for power 
between the cabinet and the president’s office. While President Viktor 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party has lost much of its power base, the 
presidential office, including the National Security and Defence Council 
(NSDC), is gaining more support backed by the Industrial Union of 
Donbass. Although in the amended constitution security, defence and 
foreign policy fall under the competence of the president, the cabinet is 
effectively striving to put these policy domains under its control as well. 
The cabinet is following the same course of action with respect to local 
government, in trying to impose financial control over the executive 
committees of the local councils. The government is thus split over the 
foundations of its foreign policy and energy security and by its internal, 
economically-driven feuds.  
The political scene in Ukraine should not be viewed as confined to 
party politics alone, however. There are many new developments at the 
grass-roots level, as revealed in the regions, in local government and in 
various forms of citizens’ self-organisation, which are no less (and probably 
more) important for the nation’s future than the party politics at the top of 
                                                     
2 Ibid., p. 9.  
138 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
the political ladder. The change from the unprecedented high level of 
support for the Orange forces immediately after the Orange Revolution to 
the vast withdrawal of this support carries a different meaning from the 
traditional Soviet or Russian distrust of politics (the notorious post-Soviet 
‘gap’ between the government and the governed). It reflects significantly 
higher demands being made on politicians by society and the perceived 
inadequacies of the current political class in addressing these demands, 
which create space for new political projects with a broader social base as 
well as those better adjusted to regional needs.  
The NATO debate 
The issue of NATO accession in Ukraine emerged in the context of the so-
called ‘multi-vector’ policy approach of the Kuchma government – mainly 
reflecting the need to offset Russia’s influence. In 2004, the NATO issue 
assumed greater prominence in the oppositional electoral programme, 
being seen as both an efficient security arrangement and an instrument to 
upgrade the country’s global standing. Earlier, on 23 May 2002 the NSDC 
had passed a resolution on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which on 19 June 
2002 was signed as the Law on the Foundations of the National Security of 
Ukraine. According to the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political 
Research, it was since that time that references in the official language 
changed from the euphemistic ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ to the 
unambiguous ‘NATO accession’.3 Finally, in 2005 Ukraine entered the stage 
of intensified dialogue with NATO. Yet the above-mentioned law is 
currently being disputed in parliament by the PRU-led coalition. The 
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) that was expected soon to follow 
was put on hold by the visit of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to 
Brussels in September 2006, on the pretext of low public support for the 
accession.  
The Kyiv-based Razumkov Centre, the most-quoted source of public 
opinion polls on the NATO issue, found in 2002 that 31.4% of voters 
supported NATO accession, 32% were against it and 22.3% were 
                                                     
3 See the article on the Intellect.org.ua website (retrieved from http:// 
www.intellect.org.ua/index.php?lang=u&material_id=31774&theme_id=0). 
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undecided.4 Characteristically, those in the younger age groups showed 
significantly more support for the accession compared with the rest (40.4% 
vs. 22.4%), with almost the same proportion of undecided respondents 
(19.8%).  
On 6 October 2006, the survey figures showed a dramatic decline in 
public support for NATO accession, with 18.2% for and 60.9% against it. 
These figures were extensively publicised by the historic opponents of 
NATO. They served as a convenient argument for the newly appointed 
Prime Minister Yanukovych in his effort to condition Ukraine’s accession 
on a public referendum when signing a deal with President Yushchenko in 
August 2006 and to later back away from Ukraine’s commitment towards 
the adoption of the MAP. The validity of this argument was hard to 
dismiss, but it left Western politicians wondering what could have 
happened to a nation that had demonstrated its strong commitment to 
democratic values just two years ago, i.e. the values whose protection is the 
very raison d’être of NATO. Moreover, the nation, whose majority voted for 
a president explicitly calling for the country’s accession, had at least 
suggested by default that the majority of Ukrainians were pro-NATO.  
Viktor Yanukovych’s electoral campaign of 2004 was the first and so 
far the last electoral campaign in Ukraine that so heavily exploited the 
subject of NATO. It produced tonnes of flyers and posters portraying Mr 
Yushchenko as an agent of the West.5 The campaign ideology was not so 
much directed against NATO as it was built upon the assumption that 
NATO is negative and Mr Yushchenko’s association with it was used to 
weaken his positive image. Although this approach proved ineffective in 
2004, having failed to undermine Mr Yushchenko’s chances, it formed the 
basis for a subsequent anti-NATO propaganda campaign, particularly with 
the deployment of Natalia Vitrenko’s group (the Progressive Socialist 
                                                     
4 See the website of the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Research 
(retrieved from http://www.uceps.org/ua/opros/16/?show_q_id=15&idTema= 
0&m_razdel=102).  
5 In October 2004, the opposition uncovered a stock of 100 tonnes of posters and 
other propaganda material of this kind at the storage facilities of the Kyiv National 
Exhibition Centre. Even with this stock excluded from circulation, the anti-Western 
propaganda campaign associated with the PRU remained extremely visible 
throughout Ukraine.  
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Party) as a prop for the PRU. Ms Vitrenko made the topic a key issue in her 
political campaign up to the March 2006 parliamentary elections and part 
of her group’s political brand. It soon became clear that anti-NATO 
campaigning represented a political commodity in its own right regardless 
of the elections. A hyper-visible anti-NATO issue group thus began to form 
– with Ms Vitrenko and Russian nationalist organisations, Communists, 
religious activists and a task force of Russian politicians showing persistent 
interest in Ukraine.6 The most recent actions of the issue group include the 
Communist Party-led campaign “Crimea – An anti-NATO stronghold”.  
The backdrop of the war on terror and the perceived threats 
associated with Ukraine’s engagement in the Middle East are being used as 
evidence for anti-NATO campaigning. But more important is the fact that, 
backed by the ongoing propaganda on Russian television, the issue group 
has succeeded in forming a direct cognitive link between NATO and 
Russia, and in sending a message that NATO means some serious 
problems with Russia. Furthermore, the public activities of the anti-NATO 
group and the ongoing hot party debate surrounding the issue have 
fostered strong negative connotations of domestic unrest. Bearing all this in 
mind it is clear that when asked about NATO accession,7 an average 
Ukrainian would be answering quite a different question – relating to what 
the accession would imply for Ukraine’s political identity and the situation 
in the country. In other words, when asked about NATO, most respondents 
would probably think of wars, terror, Russia, the annoying Ms Vitrenko 
and ‘commies’. They certainly would not be thinking of security guarantees 
against what happened to Georgia or another Tuzla (or Kerch Strait) 
incident, a better military service and membership in a real Western club, 
to which, according to the same polls, so many aspire.  
The problem is not so much the declining popularity of NATO, which 
has been undermined by a synergy of efforts of the anti-NATO group, the 
Russian media and so forth. More worrying is that even some liberal 
                                                     
6 The most outstanding case in point is that of the Russian MP Konstantine Zatulin, 
who was declared persona non grata by the Ukrainian Security Service for 
organising the June 2006 anti-NATO rallies in Feodosia, Crimea.  
7 The usual question in the opinion polls is along these lines: If the referendum on 
NATO accession were held tomorrow, how would you vote (for accession to 
NATO, against the accession to NATO, difficult to answer or would not vote)?  
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politicians outside the PRU-led parliamentary bloc have found a 
convenient excuse in the new social dynamic and embarked upon a 
campaign promoting the idea of Ukraine’s neutrality. The main argument 
that this school of thought offers is the reference to Switzerland and four 
EU member states. The argument, however, disregards the realities that 
Ukraine is not Switzerland and that it is located in a significantly different 
security environment, let alone that other collective security arrangements 
– such as the EU’s emerging security and defence policies – have largely 
overwritten the neutrality status of European non-NATO members.  
A political commentator of distinctly non-Orange background, Kost 
Bondarenko, has succinctly formulated the basic tenets of the neutrality 
doctrine, stating  
[T]he foreign policy doctrine changes: the President abandons the 
previous Rybachuk’s conception – [of] immediate entry to Europe – 
and Tarasiuk’s one – [of] turning Ukraine into Georgia, and stakes on 
Chalyi – multi-vector policy, good-neighbour relations with the EU, 
Russia and NATO – without integration into supranational projects that 
harm the national sovereignty of Ukraine  (emphasis added). 8 
Although such a programme probably implies refraining from 
Russian-led integration schemes as much as Euro-Atlantic ones, it is clear 
that such an autarchic stance would be too difficult to maintain and, if 
adopted, the policy would effectively trigger a backslide into the grip of 
Ukraine’s more powerful neighbour, running a risk of de facto international 
isolation. The project’s philosophical underpinnings become clear in the 
other parts of Mr Bondarenko’s five-point programme. The energy issue is 
presented as the primary (implicitly the only real) problem of Ukraine’s 
                                                     
8 See K. Bondarenko, “Mysterious Hayduk: Final Part”, Ukrainska Pravda, 16 
October 2006 (retrieved from http://www2.pravda.com.ua/news/2006/10/ 
16/49107.htm). The whole lengthy article is dedicated to interpreting (or 
promoting) the appointments made in the presidential administration of 
individuals affiliated with the Industrial Union of Donbass – Vitaliy Hayduk, 
Oleksandr Chalyi and Arseniy Yatseniuk (the latter of whom publicly denied the 
link). Of the threesome, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Chalyi has 
become a symbol of the neutrality doctrine. Although the author’s view is not 
necessarily representative of the presidential secretariat’s position, the foreign 
policy ideas outlined in the article rings bells with a cross-section of corporate 
politicians both inside and outside the parliament.  
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national security,9 and a special line is dedicated to what the author sees as 
the adoption of the interests of Ukrainian-based transnational corporations 
as the guiding lights to foreign policy formulation. Important though these 
things may be, this technocratic tilt reveals the incapacity to see the 
strategic issue, namely the plight of the nation’s integrity.  
For all the prominence of the energy agenda, the Eastern European 
security dilemma stems not so much from energy disputes as from the 
conflicting visions of the mode of political and social development of these 
countries and the entire region. The energy issues, essential and 
troublesome as they are, come lower down in the taxonomic rank. For 
Ukraine, issues other than energy are more pressing: how to hold the 
nation together and stimulate social and political progress towards a fully-
fledged democracy, for which the key words are the rule of law, isonomy 
and good governance (participatory democracy, local self-government, 
effective anti-corruption mechanisms, etc.). Solutions for the socially 
explosive issue of increasing energy tariffs lie in the fields of tax and 
property reform, housing and land privatisation, and ending the de facto 
policy of artificially limiting wage growth – i.e. measures to ensure the 
steady and commeasurable growth of household income.  
Moreover, modern Ukraine emerged as an independent state at the 
very moment when the bipolar world collapsed. Born into the complexity 
of post-modernity, would the nation be able to go all the way back on the 
axis of time to recreate all the stages that other historic nation states went 
through? At a time when the world’s interdependency is growing, and the 
very notion of a nation state is being dramatically re-assessed and in reality 
overwritten by more complex forms of political organisation (the EU for 
one), it seems that an isolationist project would be a bit outdated.10  
                                                     
9 It is interesting to note that adherents to this school of thought richly utilise the 
old Soviet ideological clichés – such as the base/superstructure model – drawing 
on the assumption that once economic needs are satisfied, all the other problems 
will be sorted out automatically.  
10 Refer to G. Yavorska, “Constructing European identity in Ukraine”, paper 
presented at the Conference International et Pluridisciplinaire: Pour une Maison de 
l’Europe contemporaine, « L’Europe: utopie ou levier du changement », held in  
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Apart from other risks, this neutrality tilt bears another domestic 
policy risk – the only way for modern Ukraine to produce a new national 
project that is capable of engaging people living in regions, where 
Ukrainian ethnic culture does not dominate, is by re-interpreting the 
Ukrainian ethnic nationalist ideology as a Ukrainian–European one. In all 
the opinion polls, Europe appears as the only ideologically common 
denominator across all the regions.11 Needless to say, without a clear EU 
membership prospect there is no way that such a model could succeed. 
And that is something that only a united EU can help with but it appears 
not to have enough political will. The notorious social division of Ukraine 
that has been widely discussed since the March 2006 parliamentary 
elections – having most clearly transpired over the issue of NATO – does 
not reflect a case of Russian vs. Ukrainian ethnic nationalism but in fact a 
nascent European–Ukrainian identity vs. the Soviet one. Obviously, 
domestic peace in Ukraine is not about reconciling these two identities, as it 
hardly makes sense to reconcile concepts that belong to the past with those 
of the future. A democratic, Europe-oriented project has the capacity to 
engage more followers while a Soviet-oriented identity is not even a 
project. A similar situation can be observed elsewhere in the region and a 
common European identity may provide clues to solving the region’s 
chronic ills: in Transnistria, Moldovan identity is not attractive to Russian 
or Ukrainian speakers, while the new sense of belonging to Europe is 
capable of overcoming the rift. Paradoxically, while the EU is struggling to 
construct a common European identity, it is already functioning outside its 
borders.  
A thorough analysis of the official texts of political programmes 
performed on the eve of the March 2006 parliamentary elections in Ukraine 
revealed that the hidden intent of most parties was neither EU nor NATO 
                                                                                                                                       
Paris on 16-17 June 2006. The author maintains that if Ukraine does not develop 
into a post-modern European nation it risks becoming a pre-modern one, and 
eventually, a failed state.  
11 Consider the following figures in favour Ukraine’s accession to the EU by region: 
Western – 67.4%, Central – 57.1%, Southern – 28.8% and Eastern – 39.1%.  
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aspirations – but rather some kind of ‘third way’ development.12 This 
conclusion could be corroborated by the impressions of some EU 
politicians working closely with Ukraine. A month before the elections, 
former EU Commissioner Sandra Kalniete said just as much, stating, “The 
impression is that the majority of the elite would like to have Ukraine to 
themselves, as their own fiefdom, to do whatever they want.”13 
Another verbal tactic in public campaigning used by the proponents 
of Ukraine making its own way is to present the EU, the United States and 
NATO as disconnected items, among which Ukraine can choose.14 The 
argument goes that we can drop out of NATO, which is presented as solely 
the project of the Americans, and head towards the EU, which is presented 
more positively. This rhetoric clearly resonates with the opinion polls, 
which show the greater popularity of the European Union as opposed to 
                                                     
12 See the website article by S. Mykhailiv, “Unexpected soul-mates: European 
values in the mirror of elections”, Maidan Alliance, March 2006 (retrieved from 
http://maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1142845102.html). While most Ukrainian 
commentators dismissed the programmes as irrelevant to understanding the ‘real’ 
intentions of politicians, the author (using discourse-analysis techniques) found a 
number of characteristic omissions in the texts of the programmes – key concepts 
associated with European integration – across the entire ideological spectrum from 
the Orange parties (except Our Ukraine) to the ethnic nationalists, centrists, leftists 
and liberals.  
13 Sandra Kalniete’s comments appeared in the website article by H.M. Kloth, 
“Eastern Europe in Crisis: Democrats versus Dictators”, Spiegel Online 
International, 21 February 2006 (retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/0,1518,402135,00.html).  
14 It is interesting to compare this line of argumentation with slogans used as part 
of the Communist Party-led anti-NATO campaign in Crimea: “Yushchenko, 
enough [dancing] to US tunes!”; “This is our land, and not [that] of the 
Americans!”; and “Ukraine – neutral [vneblokovaya]”. The presupposition of US–
NATO aggression is just as clear here as in the television programmes hosted by 
Igor Slisarenko (Channel 5), and overlaps with the rhetoric of the proponents of 
neutrality.  
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NATO and the United States, with 48.8% favouring membership in the EU 
in comparison with 31.9% who support accession to NATO.15  
Business and politics 
In many ways, politics, business and justice have become a single 
marketplace in Ukraine. The nature of this marketplace suggests that not 
just market but black market types of relations have served as the model, as 
a kind of parallel economic universe with loose and inherently opaque 
regulating principles and ever-present uncertainties, which are particularly 
dangerous for strangers. Political authority represents an economic value 
just as much as the presidency of a corporation or an enterprise would. The 
economic value of posts on the local council or in the mayor’s office comes 
from the capacity to affect the distribution of land resources. In a recent 
interview, Mykhailo Brodsky refers to an episode in which Ms 
Tymoshenko called her faction leader in the Kyiv city hall to ask him to 
facilitate the allotment of 11 hectares of forestland to judges of the Supreme 
Court.16 This little episode provides the best description of the basic scheme 
underlying how the networks involving political, judicial and business 
authorities operate. Of course, in another cultural context, this kind of 
scheme would be interpreted as corruption, and indeed Mr Brodsky objects 
to it. What makes this particular episode absolutely legal, despite the 
obvious actual loss incurred to the local budget, is the existence of a very 
Soviet-style law allowing local councils to allot land free of charge to any 
Ukrainian citizen for housing purposes anywhere in Ukraine.17 Clearly, 
those who actually obtain the land titles are Ukraine’s ‘most equal’ citizens.  
                                                     
15 Even in Western Ukraine, where 67.4% are for EU membership vs. 11.7% against, 
the polls on NATO accession are still not clear-cut, with 39% in favour vs. 24.6% 
against. 
16 See the interview of Mr Brodsky by the Glavred news agency, “Mikhail Brodsky: 
‘I am the party’s doctor: I will cure the BYT – I give you my word’”, 19 October 
2006 (retrieved from http://www.glavred.info/print.php?article=/archive/2006/ 
10/19/112637-5.html) (in Russian). The use of material pertaining to Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s faction as an illustration here is of course purely random, but the 
conclusions drawn on its basis hold true just as well for all other political actors. 
17 More specifically, the legislation referred to here is the Law on Local Self-
Governance of 21 May 1997. 
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The logic of cross-sector networking – much as the black market 
ideology – is not a new one, and dates back to the shortages-ridden and 
privilege-driven planned economy. Hence, informal networks of persons 
with similar social and corporate backgrounds continue to play powerful 
roles in politics and business. As elsewhere in post-socialist countries, the 
formation of large-scale businesses and the development of state 
institutions in Ukraine went hand-in-hand, and was largely performed by 
the same set of individual actors/groups and represents elements of almost 
the same process. With such logic inherent in the economic reform and 
privatisation programme, which rendered those controlling the distribution 
of vast public property assets both economically and politically powerful, 
the process could hardly have produced a different result. Western 
consultants and governments that acted as the designers and sponsors of 
privatisations bear as much responsibility for the consequences, including 
widespread corruption, as the local parties themselves. Many of the failures 
and inadequacies that provided a fertile ground for the growth of the grey 
economy – such as improperly developed mechanisms of property disputes 
– could also be attributed to the legal, cultural and institutional heritage of 
the past, which resisted quick decomposition. Consider the following 
statement by the Harriman Institute project on “Networks, Institutions, and 
Economic Transformation”:  
Seventeen years have passed since the process of reform began. Yet, 
deal-making and ties between businesspeople and politicians still 
greatly affect the performance of markets; the consolidation of 
institutions; and the process of policy-making in both the 
economically well-performing post-socialist countries and those that 
have fared poorly [sic].18 
Mr Brodsky’s comments on the way the party lists for the Kyiv City 
Council had been formed before the March 2006 elections also provide an 
insight into the way business and politics interact at the local government 
level:  
I demanded not to enlist the former members of the Kyiv Council, 
explaining to them, ‘Guys, you should not do it. These people already 
                                                     
18 For further information, see the description of the Harriman Institute initiative, 
“Networks, Institutions and Economic Transformation in Post-socialism” 
(retrieved from http://networks.harrimaninstitute.org/project.html). 
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have their schemes, they are involved in [other people’s] schemes, 
they are not public figures anymore, and they will not protect the 
interests of Kyiv.’ ...God forbid they will all leave the faction, it will be 
a blow in the face of the party.19 
Within the network, motivations may vary from economic ones to 
those that are more political. But they are so interlaced that purely political 
ones are more likely to be an exception that only proves the rule. A 
characteristic phrase was once dropped by a local businessman-cum-
politician in Lviv: “There are people, who with their businesses, just cannot 
afford to be in opposition”. After the Orange Revolution the phenomenon 
of so-called ‘changed colours’ was widely discussed – referring mainly to 
those who supported the blue-and-white PRU and then quickly changed to 
an Orange alliance – with new recruits often outnumbering the genuine 
Orange supporters in the local party and government lists. These apparent 
changes-of-heart became visible for the general public with the notable 
ideological rift that was highlighted by the revolution. They represent a 
rather established habit when changes at the top provoke clients in the 
lower ranks to seek a new patron up the hierarchy. Officials act as resource 
managers (with resources having both economic and political values, and 
being mutually convertible anyway) when one type of power is converted 
into another. Ukraine’s predicament, compared with neighbouring 
countries such as Poland, comes from the fact that in the latter the core 
structural, institutional and legal changes were undertaken at the peak of 
political movements still very popular in their nature and led by 
ideologically motivated and economically very modest politicians. The 
Orange Revolution brought large numbers of new individuals into the local 
political process, many of whom were initially involved with the new 
Orange parties, but were subsequently sidelined in much the same way as 
described above. Yet this glass can also be seen as half full – the revolution 
highlighted the willingness and the availability of local civic activists, and 
hence the potential of further civil society development. Apart from a 
purely ideological impetus, there is also the potential economic motivation 
for a change towards a more participatory democracy and rule of law, 
which after all is the best-tested way to protect oneself from most 
unpleasant uncertainties, such as those related to widespread raiding.  
                                                     
19 Derived from the interview of Mr Brodsky by the Glavred news agency, supra. 
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According to Olena Bondarenko of Ukrainska Pravda,20 during the last 
several months a new wave of raiders’ attacks (i.e. the illegal takeover of 
assets) has been mounting in Ukraine. It has included a crane-building 
factory in Brovary in the Kyiv region, a steel-casting factory in 
Kremenchuk, an oil-extracting factory in Dnipropetrovsk and many 
others.21 The author marks as a new development the fact that the focus of 
the attacks has shifted to medium-sized enterprises, while previously large 
business groups were featured as parties to such property disputes.22  
Although the raider normally seeks a court ruling to obtain a legal 
title to the property, according to the author the real deal occurs ‘behind the 
scenes’ between more powerful actors, who back the disputing parties. This 
description highlights the importance of vertically integrated power 
networks based on client–patron principles. According to Ukrainska 
Pravda’s other source,23 the cabinet has recently formed a special 
commission to curb the illegal takeover of assets. For all the importance 
and scale of the phenomenon, however, there is practically no mention of 
the commission’s existence let alone its proceedings on the internet.  
The issues of raiding and ‘free’ land distribution highlight a serious 
legislative and policy gap that constitutes a major domestic security threat 
– which is the inadequacy of private and public property regulations. The 
problem stems from an earlier spate of ideological fence-sitting, which 
created a major opening for the grey economy and multiple opportunities 
for property manipulations.  
                                                     
20 See O. Bondarenko, “Kirovohrad trial”, Ukrainska Pravda, 18 October 2006 
(retrieved from http://pravda.com.ua/news/2006/10/18/49224.htm). 
21 There are numerous other cases reported in the media – see for example the 
business daily Delo article of 16 October 2006 on the shopping mall Detsky Myr in 
Kirovohrad and the bread-baking plants in Zhytomyr.  
22 The author quotes experts who believe these enterprises have attracted raiders 
for two reasons: the lower costs associated with these types of raiding operations 
and the comparatively higher potential for profitability in view of the fact that such 
enterprises remain under priced in the market. 
23 See K. Matvienko, “Society does not need such [a] state”, Ukrainska Pravda, 19 
October 2006 (retrieved from http://pravda.com.ua/news/2006/10/19/ 
49311.htm). 
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Multiple other problems, including those immediately affecting the 
household economy such as the current housing utilities crisis, are 
connected to this issue. A weak household economy represents a major 
problem in its own right. The situation in which any miniscule rise in food 
prices or housing utility tariffs makes the nation easy prey for immense 
external pressures and heats up domestic policy temperatures is hardly 
normal and as such, it should be viewed as a major security threat. 
Meanwhile, a series of Ukrainian governments have artificially prevented 
the growth of wages and now the means to mitigate the current gas-price 
burden are only discussed at the level of subsidy programmes.  
Ukraine’s economy shows little intensive development primarily 
because much of the effort of its business elite goes into the extensive 
dimension – protecting those assets that have been appropriated already 
and acquiring new ones, along with investing in the creation of political 
strongholds in order to secure and improve the economic status quo. For 
many Ukrainian oligarchs, development is tantamount to expansion.  
Large foreign investments, such as those occurring in the banking 
and steel sectors, certainly have a role to play in changing the paradigm for 
Ukrainian corporate governance in due course. But this will take time. 
Regional challenges 
One of the major challenges Ukraine faces today is the fact that there are 
still parts of the country that have not fully integrated culturally into the 
new Ukraine. This challenge permeates all levels, notably the local 
bureaucracy, which theoretically has to be representative of the nation 
state. Those affected remain in a political limbo – referring largely to and 
greatly influenced by modern Russia primarily as a substitute for the 
former Soviet state. Throughout the electoral history of the past 15 years 
the political and cultural frontiers of the Ukrainian nation – as opposed to 
just those regions that are mainly ethnically Ukrainian – have been 
gradually moving eastwards and have engulfed much of the south and 
east, and certainly the centre,24 even in the context of the March 2006 
                                                     
24 In this context, ‘moving’ refers to the change in the geographical distribution of 
voters’ preferences, shifting from political models built on elements of Soviet 
identity to those that are more Ukraine-oriented. 
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parliamentary elections. This shift was somewhat interrupted by the rise to 
power of the Party of Regions, but there is no reason yet to say that the 
trend has reversed. The pro-Ukraine movement did not stem from a 
conscious government policy, but rather came about by default – through 
regions with large or dominant populations of ethnic Ukrainians (including 
the Russian-speaking patches). When the stumbling blocks were 
encountered, the Orange leaders appeared incapable of realising that a 
systematic policy was needed to address the challenge. The issue was 
generally interpreted as a linguistic one – Russian-speakers as opposed to 
Ukrainian-speakers – and the Orange team naively thought it would be 
able to cope by occasionally speaking in Russian alongside the official 
Ukrainian on trips to eastern regions and when asked questions in Russian 
during public sessions.  
The lessons of the Orange Revolution, which demonstrated the 
potential of civic activism, have not remained the exclusive property of 
Ukraine’s civil society and have been eagerly picked up by anti-democratic 
forces. Over the past couple of years, the Western newly independent 
states, with the exception of Belarus, have witnessed an onslaught of a host 
of fake civic groups sponsored by political technologists mainly with roots 
in Russia. The most prominent names include Proryv [Breakthrough] in 
Transnistria and subsequently in Sevastopol, where it openly called for 
Crimea’s succession from Ukraine in January 2006. Proryv is also affiliated 
with the Che Guevara School of Political Leadership.25 Branches of either 
Russian or pan-Slavic extreme nationalist organisations – such as the 
Eurasian Youth Union – have also sprouted in Ukraine since late 2004.26 
                                                     
25 The International Youth Corporation Proryv and the High School of Political 
Leadership named after Ernesto Che Guevara are joined by some Ukrainian 
organisations such as Dmitro Korchynsky’s rent-a-crowd Bratstvo in this Tiraspol-
based project.  
26 The list of Russian-affiliated (or even Russian Federation-based) organisations in 
Crimea is growing. Recently, the Kremlin-sponsored youth movement Nashi [Ours 
– in reference to ‘our people’] appeared in Simferopol distributing anti-American 
flyers. Consider some of their characteristic slogans: “Do not buy dollars! [The] 
ruble is our currency”; “Stop investing money in [the] American economy, a time 
will come when its might will turn against you” (see 
http://www2.maidan.org.ua/news/index.php3?bn=maidan_krym&key=1161340
216&action=view).  
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They have acquired some media prominence and caused concern among 
Ukrainian authorities by organising anti-NATO rallies under the banners of 
Russian nationalism in Crimea and campaigning against official 
recognition of the Ukrainian Rebels’ Army (UPA).27 Together these groups’ 
activities contribute to creating an impression that the essence of modern 
Ukraine’s plight is a dispute over a pro-Russian versus a pro-Western 
orientation, and not democracy versus authoritarianism.  
The combined efforts of these groups and local Russian nationalists in 
Crimea, who established a stronghold in the regional parliament,28 are now 
working to undermine the inter-ethnic peace on the peninsula. On 11 
August 2006, the Crimean MP and Russian community activist Oleg 
Rodivilov orchestrated a violent assault on the peaceful Crimean Tatar rally 
in Bakhchisarai. Since the mid-1990s, paramilitary units under a common 
umbrella of Cossacks and a Russian nationalist ideology have been 
proliferating in Crimea.29 There are up to a hundred Cossack organisations 
that are registered at a district level, and together they make up four 
regional associations. They most frequently appear on the other side of any 
conflict involving the Crimean Tatars and are actively engaged in the war 
of religious symbols – which involves marking visible places with large 
stone crosses much to the chagrin of the local Muslim population. If the 
                                                     
27 The UPA fought for Ukraine’s independence against both the Nazis and Soviets 
in the period from World War II to 1953.  
28 An alliance with the Party of Regions helped the nationalist Russkaya Obschyna 
[Russian Bloc] win 7 seats within the largest 43-person strong faction of ‘For 
Yanukovych’, including the influential post of the First Deputy Chairman of the 
Parliament (Sergei Tsekov).  
29 The units have a military kind of hierarchy: ranks and uniforms, and in clashes 
they use whips but are not noted for possessing firearms. The Cossacks were 
instituted through a decree by Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov on 16 May 1994. 
Mr Meshkov was expelled and the institution of the Crimean presidency was 
abolished, but the Cossacks have continued to develop since then. They not only 
busy themselves with bothering the local Tatar population, but also are involved in 
businesses (particularly corporate security) and offer their members other 
advantages of an informal network that connects them with persons in authority 
across various sectors. Of course these modern militants have nothing much to do 
with the historic Cossacks, who were severely persecuted by the Bolsheviks in the 
1920–30s, perhaps with the exception of aesthetic inspiration.  
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tensions between the Muslim population and ethnic Russians continue to 
grow, the Cossacks have the capacity to provide an infrastructure for an 
armed phase of potential conflict.  
The Bakhchisarai events were a milestone in the growing inter-ethnic 
tension. They were followed by a series of fights between young Crimean 
Tatars and Russians in various localities and a graffiti campaign openly 
calling for a war against Tatars in Simferopol and other localities in Crimea. 
During the March 2006 elections, the national government lost much of its 
control over the regional authorities, as even the local supporters of the 
PRU in the regional parliament showed little willingness to heed the 
cabinet on many issues, notably including the cabinet’s attempts to deal 
with the inter-ethnic tensions.  
A new warning signal as to the security situation in Crimea was sent 
in the recent declaration of President Vladimir Putin, when in response to a 
question on the situation in Crimea, he stated that Russia is ready in case 
Ukraine appeals for protection from interference from abroad into internal 
Ukrainian affairs.30 This message all too obviously rings bells for those who 
recall Hungary in 1956 or Afghanistan in 1979 and it subsequently 
generated a heated discussion in Ukraine.  
The security sector  
The institutional culture and underlying philosophy of the security service 
largely remains Soviet-style and intellectually dependent on modern 
Russian sources. The system is not capable of assimilating modern, 
Western security thinking as much for the reason of suspicion as for the 
lack of appropriate background knowledge in social sciences and 
humanities, which are still largely unpopular and underdeveloped fields in 
local security training. The security sector continues to cooperate 
uncritically with neighbouring authoritarian regimes and there is always a 
risk of re-enforcing or adopting unlawful practices through such 
cooperation. In February 2006, the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) 
attracted much criticism on the part of civic groups when it detained 11 
                                                     
30 See the Unian News Agency website article “Russia ready for talks to extend 
Black Sea Fleet’s stay in Crimea”, 25 October 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-170874.html).  
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asylum-seekers in Crimea based on Uzbek extradition warrants, and 
forcibly returned 10 of them to Uzbekistan on the night of 14-15 February. 
As the most recent example of a negative influence upon law enforcement 
practices, our sources in Crimea reported a visit to the local interior 
department in October by a group of police from Krasnodar, a region of 
Russia that gained notoriety for local government-sponsored persecutions 
on ethnic grounds. Ostensibly, the purpose of the visit was to share 
experience in dealing with migrants, which received much praise on the 
part of their Crimean colleagues. The law enforcement agencies seem not to 
have a policy as to how far cooperation with regional neighbours should 
go. On the other hand, Crimean Tatars often complain that the local police 
and security departments have an ethnic bias against them.  
Ambitious security-sector reform based on a Western-inspired model 
and developed by the NSDC in 2005 has so far only produced a numerical 
reduction in staff (in the SBU) and one major structural change – the 
Governmental Communications Service has been singled out and become 
an agency in its own right directly subordinated to the cabinet. Now, in the 
context of the new budget for 2007, a struggle for financial control over the 
SBU is underway: the scheme of funding proposed by the cabinet provides 
for the cabinet-controlled Treasury to underwrite the SBU’s bills, as 
opposed to the National Bank as has been the case so far. The logic of 
seeing government agencies as political assets hinders proper institutional 
development. In as much as security sector agencies are seen as assets of 
one politico-economic group versus another, any serious structural reform 
could hardly be expected despite ongoing sporadic attempts to push 
forward the reform at the level of the NSDC. It seems that only major 
security crises, such as the recent one in Crimea highlighting the low 
regional capacity of the security services, could stimulate significant 
changes in human resource strategies and organisational arrangements.  
Conclusions 
At the crossroads at which we are now, when choosing which way to go, it 
hardly would be wise to go backwards. Partial solutions such as the 
neutrality doctrine (which claims that it would protect “the national 
sovereignty of Ukraine”31 from integration into supranational models) 
                                                     
31 See K. Bondarenko (2006), op. cit. 
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stand only to reduce the country to subnational status, immerse it in 
isolation and fall short of mending its internal social divides. Such a 
doctrine would obviously put at peril the level of democracy that the 
nation has already achieved just as much as integration with authoritarian 
neighbours. The outcome may be detrimental to both Ukraine’s national 
security and that of Europe. Instead of contributing to regional stability, a 
neutral or otherwise non-European, non-democratic Ukraine runs a risk of 
becoming a source of instability and a connecting link to other conflict 
areas beyond its borders. The major internal and external threats that the 
nation now faces are outlined below. 
1) Backsliding into an authoritarian mode. This threat concerns the 
prospect of adopting a model that takes inspiration from Mr Putin’s 
Russia or, much worse, becoming its satellite. The formation of a 
PRU-led oligarchic monopoly could be the starting point for this 
mode of governance. So far, the PRU shows many signs of heading 
there. To avoid it, Ukraine needs to preserve at least its current levels 
of political and economic competition.  
2) Political isolation and hence arrested democratic development. If 
the country continues to follow an ambiguous and indecisive political 
course towards two major actors – Russia and the West – sugar-
coating it with outdated political concepts such as neutrality or multi-
vector policies, or if it openly joins any of the Russian-led 
integrationist initiatives such as the Single Economic Space, Ukraine 
risks de facto international isolation. Meanwhile, democracy and an 
open society can only thrive in an open world. It seems that to ensure 
a stable solution to this problem, Ukraine needs to find a better 
arrangement for solving its energy dilemma – such as being part of a 
common energy system with the EU – or strive as much as possible to 
divide these two issues, which will be impossible without European 
partnership.  
3) Social division, regional instability, separatism and loss of 
sovereignty over parts of the territory. This challenge most seriously 
concerns Crimea. It calls for upgrading the institutional capacity of 
the security sector, but even more so for a serious, open public 
discussion and a new inclusive national project, which would be able 
to overcome the constraints of ethnic nationalism. Without a new 
Ukrainian–European national project, Ukraine will hardly be capable 
of addressing either of these two aspects.  
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4) Becoming part of a larger instable region, which might include the 
continuously destabilised Northern Caucasus, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia and Transnistria. This sad prospect seems possible and 
presents a security concern for both Ukraine and the EU in the 
medium to longer term. Factors in the neighbouring Russian 
Federation that are likely to contribute to it include the ongoing civil 
war in Chechnya and the militant re-Islamisation of the Northern 
Caucasus, growing xenophobia, state-sponsored persecution on 
ethnic and religious grounds and the proliferation of radical Russian 
nationalism. All this comes against the backdrop of policies 
effectively reducing the nation’s immunity to these negative 
influences – such as limitations on democratic freedoms, police 
harassment, censorship of the media and the persecution of 
journalists, and restrictions on civil society organisations.  
References 
Bondarenko, K. (2006), “Mysterious Hayduk: Final Part”, Ukrainska Pravda, 
16 October (retrieved from http://www2.pravda.com.ua/news/ 
2006/10/16/49107.htm).  
Bondarenko, O. (2006), “Kirovohrad trial”, Ukrainska Pravda, 18 October 
(retrieved from http://pravda.com.ua/news/2006/10/18/49224 
.htm).  
Glavred (online) (2006), “Mikhail Brodsky: ‘I am the party’s doctor: I will 
cure the BYT – I give you my word’”, 19 October (retrieved from 
http://www.glavred.info/print.php?article=/archive/2006/10/19/1
12637-5.html) (in Russian).  
Kloth, H.M. (2006), “Eastern Europe in Crisis: Democrats Versus Dictators”, 
Spiegel Online International, 21 February (retrieved from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,402135,00.html).  
Maidan Alliance (2006), Usvidomlenn’a vyboru 2006: Interaktyvne 
spivsatvlenn’a interesiv vybortsiv ta obits’anok politychnykh syl. 
[Conscious Choice 2006: An interactive comparative study of the 
voters’ interests and promises of the political forces], Halyts’ka 
Vydavnycha Spilka – 200 UV, Maidan Alliance.  
Matvienko, K. (2006), “Society does not need such [a] state”, Ukrainska 
Pravda, 19 October (retrieved from http://pravda.com.ua/news/ 
2006/10/19/49311.htm). 
156 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
Mykhailiv, S. (2006), “Unexpected soul-mates: European values in the 
mirror of elections”, Maidan Alliance, March (retrieved from 
http://maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1142845102.html). 
Unian News Agency (online) (2006), “Russia ready for talks to extend Black 
Sea Fleet’s stay in Crimea”, 25 October (retrieved from 
http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-170874.html).  
Yavorska, G. (2006), “Constructing European identity in Ukraine”, paper 
presented at the Colloque International et Pluridisciplinaire: Pour une 
Maison de l’Europe contemporaine, « L’Europe: utopie ou levier du 
changement », held in Paris on 16-17 June 2006.  
 
 | 157 
Ukraine’s Security 
The Interplay of Internal & External Factors 
James Sherr* 
The failures of the Orange interlude and the return to power of Viktor 
Yanukovych ought to draw attention to three long-standing features of 
Ukraine’s predicament: 
• Ukraine’s internal condition, not its foreign policy, is the main factor 
defining the ‘art of the possible’ in its external relationships. 
• Across all parts of the political spectrum, Ukraine’s emphatically 
modern preoccupations (statehood, nationhood and geopolitics) 
create a cognitive dissonance with the essentially post-modern 
outlook of the European Union and, to a lesser degree, NATO. 
• In the absence of external allies and internal strength, a ‘brotherly’ 
policy towards Russia will fail no less than an ‘anti-Russian’ policy. 
The Gordian knot 
For all its aura of dramatic change, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of ‘independent Ukraine’ merely completed a process of 
systemic mutation that had been underway since the time of the 
Brezhnevite stagnation. This process involved the transfer of real power 
from the structures of ‘command administration’ to the illicit and often 
criminal networks that had come to exercise de facto control over resources 
and their distribution. Because these networks were embedded in the very 
system they supposedly were subverting, the system’s subsequent ‘reform’ 
and ‘liberalisation’ became a process of mutual co-optation between those 
who ostensibly ran and those who in practice owned the country. The 
process of nomenklatura privatisation consummated and partially legalised 
                                                     
* James Sherr is a Fellow at the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy 
of the United Kingdom. The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either 
of Her Majesty’s Government or of the Ministry of Defence. 
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a process whereby bureaucratic power was transformed into financial 
power. The principal custodians of this power remained, as before, an 
inbred, collusive elite, unrepresentative of the wider society and, in ethos 
and practice, largely unaccountable to it. It is therefore perfectly fair to say 
that the Soviet system was destroyed by malign as well as positive forces – 
forces that not only consisted of its national and democratic opponents, but 
also some of its most privileged beneficiaries. 
Dominance of resources and Leninist habits of governance – the 
instinct for organisation, administrative intrusiveness, the politicisation of 
law, the techniques of divide and rule, the skills of informational struggle 
and, in all things, an obsessive regard for the question of power – partially 
explain how the pillars of the old regime took control of Ukraine’s 
‘revolution’ in 1990–91. They also explain the relationship between politics, 
business and crime that has become characteristic of Ukraine since that 
time. The country’s conflicted national identity, regional divisions, social 
fragmentation and the hollowing-out of civil society complete the 
explanation. In these respects, the 1990’s snapshots of Ukraine under 
Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma are not very different 
from that of Russia under President Boris Yeltsin. 
But with Russian President Vladimir Putin, it has become different in 
one key respect: Russia has become an effective actor. For the leaders of a 
country not simply ‘doomed’ to be a great power (pace Andrey Kozyrev), 
but (by the time of Mr Putin’s election in 2000) determined to be one, the 
national security implications of the Yeltsin system had become both 
obvious and intolerable. If in terms of diplomatic courtesy and 
international law the Russian Federation was a state, by the time of Mr 
Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 it bore more resemblance in operational terms 
to an arena upon which oligarchic interests competed for wealth and power 
– quite literally at Russia’s expense. The semi-privatisation of this state 
corrupted and decimated several traditional instruments of power (notably 
the armed forces and defence–industrial complex) while keeping newer, 
softer and more effective elements (energy, finance, trade and investment) 
unsubordinated to either the law or the state. The leitmotif of President 
Putin’s domestic agenda – the ‘restoration of the administrative vertical’ – 
represented a statist, authoritarian answer to notoriously Darwinian and 
anarchic conditions. It was just as much the prerequisite of an international 
agenda that included the partial re-subordination of former Soviet 
republics that had become juridically independent states. 
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The weakness of the state 
What is favourably commented upon in Ukraine – the absence of great 
power pretensions – somewhat explains a blatantly unfavourable fact: the 
failure of Ukraine’s state leadership to transform, or even meaningfully 
reform, the post-Soviet framework inherited in 1991. But this is a very 
partial explanation. The deeper explanation is less flattering, which is the 
absence of any state tradition in Ukraine, and with that, a political class 
schooled in traditions of public spiritedness and conditioned to assume 
responsibility for the country’s affairs. Despite an impressive exercise in 
state building, some astute crisis management (e.g. the peaceful 
demobilisation of the Soviet armed forces), highpoints of courage (e.g. 
nuclear disarmament) and, of more secular importance, the emergence of 
democratically-minded and Euro-Atlantic centres of opinion inside the 
state apparatus, the system and culture of power in Ukraine continue to 
weaken the state. The adaptation of a Sovietised political establishment to a 
‘market-driven’ process of collapse explains why many of Ukraine’s state 
institutions lack legitimacy and effectiveness:  
• For a start, they are not public institutions, in either their ethos or their 
modus operandi. Instead, they are more likely to function as personal 
fiefdoms with strong undercurrents of struggle between subcultures 
and financially-driven, clan-based interests. The template of 
Ukraine’s culture of power – collusive, self-referential, unaccountable 
(and opaque) to outsiders, motivated by subjective interests and 
restrained only by equal or greater power – is, like all templates, a 
simplification of the situation. It is nonetheless based on reality and 
the lesson of the Orange Revolution is that this culture remains 
strong. What is weak in Ukraine is the culture of authority, more 
specifically the expectation that power will be confined to legally 
recognised persons and used for legitimate and openly avowed 
purposes. 
• Institutional growth has not been accompanied by 
institutionalisation, i.e. the process whereby rules not only establish 
authority and a basis for action, but also checks on authority, 
mechanisms of internal oversight and a normative framework that 
outlasts the tenure of office holders. Ukraine’s administrative staffs 
have lacked a tradition of political neutrality and have never enjoyed 
the safeguards that preserve it. They are not civil servants as in the 
Western model. They are state functionaries still largely schooled in 
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the habits of Soviet bureaucracy, notably servility, rigid adherence to 
the most petty regulation, lack of regard for the opinions and feelings 
of subordinates, complete dependence on instructions, the incapacity 
to make decisions independently and a total lack of interest in the 
effect of their actions on ordinary citizens. At times, these 
functionaries exhibit the characteristics of their worst Western 
counterparts, including evasion, concealment, duplicity, ‘working to 
rule’ and disdain for ideas ‘not invented here’. Yet there is no 
incentive to cultivate the attributes that Western civil servants also 
exhibit, such as professional pride, standards of rightful conduct, 
initiative, teamwork and an ethos of public responsibility. This 
culture of inertia, obduracy and submissiveness explains why, pace 
Anatoliy Hrytsenko, “high and middle level authorities come and go, 
producing no system, no continuity and no results in the long-term”.1 
It also explains why Ukraine’s state bodies are poor agents of change. 
• During the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras, the legal order, once verbally 
defined by Françoise Thom as a “system of codified arbitrariness”, 
was a charter of harassment for every power in the land. It created a 
universe of petty offences, withdrew two rights for every right given, 
taxed before there was money to tax, nullified contracts at the drop of 
a hat and left everyone confused about what was permitted and what 
was forbidden. For those who were well connected (or able to pay), it 
was entirely negotiable. For everyone else, it was intolerable. The 
principal antidotes of kriyshi (shelters) by way of shadow structures 
or ‘arrangements’ with the authorities lay well outside the law. Is it 
any wonder that the system of law and the system of crime became 
closely related or that judges found themselves practically 
defenceless? Since 1991, there has been a continual process of ‘legal 
reform’ in Ukraine and some of it has actually made things better. But 
it has not changed these core realities, and those who had hoped that 
the Orange Revolution would usher in a different type of enterprise 
have been largely disappointed. 
                                                     
1 See A. Grytsenko [Hrytsenko], Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System 
Emerging from Chaos, Harmonie Paper 1, Centre for European Security Studies, 
Groningen, the Netherlands, 1997, p. 1.  
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The state of affairs outlined above has definite national security 
implications: 
• A rent-seeking local government and bureaucracy that do not allow 
legal entrepreneurship to flourish will not establish the conditions of 
fairness and trust that enable taxes to be paid and essential services 
(armed forces, police and bureaucracy itself) to be adequately funded 
by the state. 
• Those who live in dread of kompromat (incriminating information) are 
equally likely to live in dread of transparency, i.e. the ability to know 
what decisions are taken, where they are taken, by whom they are 
taken and why – in other words, the ability to reveal what has been 
kept hidden. These habits of concealment make it very difficult to 
ensure that resources are allocated as intended, to identify and curb 
the role of intermediaries between buyer and seller, and to establish 
who owns Ukrainian enterprises along with the connection between 
these owners, official structures and foreign countries. Without the 
mechanisms and data that produce transparency, it is also 
exceedingly difficult to discern which actors, domestic and foreign, 
influence the strategic direction of the economy and state.  
• Those who treat information as a form of power rather than a public 
good will not only be dysfunctional administrators, they will also 
hinder the timely sharing of information with those better able to 
assess it and utilise it than themselves. Defence against today’s 
unconventional threats depends upon mid-level and subunit 
competence, the delegation of authority and, above all, the horizontal 
(‘joined up’) integration of agencies, branches and departments. 
Nevertheless, the method, well understood in the British Army, of 
communicating ‘one level up, one level down, one level to the left 
and one level to the right’ is suspect to an administrative and security 
culture that reveres the ‘administrative vertical’, which in practice 
institutionalises distrust. 
• Those whose business model is built upon deal-making and collusion 
with the state will not be able to advance integration into the 
competitive, rules-based EU system even if they wish to do so. The 
prevalence of this model leaves Ukraine, by default, significantly 
dependent on the former USSR and gives Russian economic actors an 
inbuilt advantage in the Ukrainian economic environment. It is 
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partially for this reason – as well as the more obvious factors of 
language, history and the sympathies of much of the population – 
that Russia remains a powerful internal factor in Ukraine and not only 
a subject of international relations. 
No one of consequence expected these realities to vanish after 
President Viktor Yushchenko’s victory, but those who fought for it 
expected them to be addressed. In the event, Mr Yushchenko showed an 
entirely haphazard appreciation of the importance of institutions. He 
appointed some key figures (like Minister of Defence Anatoliy Hrytsenko) 
who have made a substantial difference and others (like Minister of Interior 
Yuriy Lutsenko) who have tried to do so with mixed results. More 
notoriously, he also appointed close personal associates (Petro Poroshenko, 
ex-Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) and 
Oleksandr Tretyakov, Head of the Office of the President) who engaged in 
a destructive spree of empire-building. By way of explanation, there is no 
need to add to what already has been said about Mr Yushchenko and a 
large proportion of the Orange elite: “[F]or all their repugnance towards 
the culture of power in Ukraine…[they are also] part of it”.2 
The question then arising is how, without transforming these 
realities, it will be possible to address glaring security problems, 
particularly: 
• Ukraine’s energy dependency and security. Even by the dubious 
standards of Russia’s state-dominated energy complex, Ukraine’s is 
less well managed and more opaque. Unlike the former, which 
according to the official Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to 
2020, is an “instrument for the conduct of internal and external 
policy” that “to a large extent determines [Russia’s] geopolitical 
influence”,3 it is far from clear that the structure and policies of 
                                                     
2 See J. Sherr, “Ukraine’s Scissors: Between Internal Weakness and External 
Dependence”, Russie.Nei.Visions n. 9, Institute français des relations internationals, 
Paris, March 2006, pp. 9-10. 
3 The Energeticheskaya strategiya Russisskoy Federatsii do 2020 states “Russia disposes 
of significant reserves of energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy 
complex, which constitutes a base for the development of the economy as well as 
an instrument of internal and foreign policy. The role of the country in world 
energy markets to a significant extent determines its geopolitical influence.” 
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Ukraine’s energy sector promote Ukraine’s national interests. Even if 
it were not plain before, the RosUkrEnergo saga – which unfolded 
outside the machinery of the cabinet and the NSDC – demonstrates 
that it undermines these interests. By now, only the most polite could 
claim that there is a meaningful connection between rhetorical 
commitments to diminishing dependency and adopting EU 
standards and the de facto energy policy of the state.  
• Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. The ingredients of Ukrainian state 
weakness in Crimea – an almost endemic criminality, a Russian-
dominated business sector, the abysmally regulated Russian naval 
presence, the increasingly provocative activity of Russian-financed 
NGOs and ‘civic’ groups and a potential (if still largely mythical) 
catalogue of ethnic and linguistic disputes – create a brew potent 
enough to resist the antidotes that Kyiv is so far able and willing to 
administer. Until the state meaningfully and constructively exercises 
its authority, too much will depend upon Russia, including Russians 
who might be tempted to sharpen all these interfaces until Ukraine 
bows to the reality of limited sovereignty. The presence of the Black 
Sea Fleet cannot be divorced from this context. As a purely military 
formation bound by an agreed, transparent (i.e. published) status-of-
forces agreement, its deployment might not arouse serious 
controversy, and it is for this reason that NATO has declined on 
principle to characterise the basing of the fleet as an obstacle to 
Ukraine’s ultimate membership. The fleet is not a purely military 
formation, however. It is also a commercial structure with a 
permissive set of prerogatives over an ill-defined inventory of 
property and facilities; it possesses a powerful and potentially malign 
intelligence component and, rather like Gazprom, it has been used as 
an instrument of economic and political leverage. Therefore, on these 
terms, the Black Sea Fleet is bound to serve as a reminder of 
Ukraine’s weakness and a source of tension. 
The security sector: A key variable 
In any country, the security sector plays a pivotal role in establishing what 
the legal and political orders mean in practice. Like other post-communist 
countries, Ukraine inherited a defence and security sector terribly unsuited 
to its new circumstances. In their present, half-reformed state, the security 
services hinder the transformation of the country. 
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Yet the demands and pressures of reform vary considerably. The 
roles of the armed forces are to defend state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, insulate the country from external conflicts and, in the worst case, 
defend the country against external opponents. In short, they are not a 
component of internal political struggle. But the military and civilian 
components of the other structures (not to say the militsia) are on the 
cutting edge of the relationships between the state and society and between 
the law and criminality, and hence they are subject to all of the strains and 
distortions in these relationships. This difference alone is enough to explain 
why the armed forces in the Kuchma era were reasonably well trusted by 
society, while the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) were somewhat 
trusted and the Ministry of Interior (MVS) and ordinary police (militsia) 
were not trusted at all. 
This difference might also suggest that the demands of defence 
reform are easier to meet than those of the security sector are and that the 
urgency of meeting them is less. For four reasons, however, that would be a 
hasty conclusion to draw. First, measured by its property and assets, the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) is one of the largest commercial enterprises in 
the country and is capable of behaving like one unless its matériel is 
carefully inventoried, its personnel properly motivated and a strict system 
of internal controls put in place. Anyone attempting to introduce and 
enforce such controls will have to contend with the power of those who 
have benefited from their absence, as the current Minister, Anatoliy 
Hrytsenko, knows. These interests harassed him when Petro Poroshenko 
was in charge of the NSDC, and now that Mr Yanukovych has returned to 
the premiership, they might destroy him. Second, the post-Soviet surplus in 
bases and facilities, toxic fuels, weaponry and ordnance – and the pilferage 
of budgetary funds for demolition, storage and safety – is a security 
problem in its own right, as well as a colossal environmental one. Third, 
with the exception of the police, the MOD is the largest employer of 
persons equipped with arms and trained to use them. The peril lies not in 
coup-making (for which there is no tradition in Ukraine) but in freelance 
activity by servicemen demobilised and officers retired without retraining 
and resettlement into civilian accommodation and jobs. Finally, the 
MOD/armed forces is the second largest item in the state budget, and the 
budget will need to be larger if the reforms and force reductions in the state 
programme are to be realised. In a presidential system, such as that which 
existed until January 2006, these budgetary needs make the MOD/armed 
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forces dependent on a supportive and authoritative president. In today’s 
system – a quasi-parliamentary republic of ‘people’s deputies’ who are also 
multi-millionaires, tempered only by a cabinet of ministers who resemble a 
board of directors – they are likely to find that there are quid pro quos for 
money. 
The risk today is that these quid pro quos will damage a system that 
not only has put controls in place and brought transparency to the armed 
forces, but which at long last is also bringing resources into balance, 
training regimes, career structures and the roles and commitments of the 
armed services. With inevitable mistakes, the team surrounding Mr 
Hrytsenko has been ‘destroying the army’, as its critics allege; yet with 
remarkable astuteness and care, it has also been creating a new one. Mr 
Hrytsenko describes his role as ‘doing MAP’ (NATO’s Membership Action 
Plan), whether or not NATO or his own government remain interested in it. 
The post-Kuchma record of the security sector is more problematic. 
Even more so are the challenges they face. If a militsioner is paid a wage 
inconsistent with life, he will cheat rather than die. If the state cannot afford 
to fund the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SBU, the border protection 
service, the state customs service and the tax police, someone else will. 
These facts should define and discipline expectations. The expectations of 
Mr Yushchenko’s newly appointed Minister of Interior, Yuriy Lutsenko, 
were very decent, but were they disciplined? Like most democrats, his 
priority was to eliminate corruption in Ukraine. Unlike most, he actually 
tried to do so, and by October 2005 he had secured 5,000 resignations from 
the MVS, dismissed 2,000 other officers and servicemen and placed 400 
under judicial investigation. Still, if it is not possible to eliminate corruption 
in the UK or in Belgium, how can it be possible in Ukraine? What is 
possible, and surely urgent, is to eliminate the necessity for corruption in 
Ukraine: to reduce it to a matter of choice. But that will not be 
accomplished by dismissals and resignations alone. Neither will it be 
accomplished solely by money. Money will not overcome the harm caused 
by misguided policies, incoherent security concepts, poor motivation and 
flawed programmes. What is needed is a systematic effort to create skills 
and capabilities that are fit for purpose, to bring manpower and resources 
into balance, to rekindle an ethos of professionalism and give the 
professional a system of career development that expands his/her horizons 
and prospects. The MOD’s efforts in this direction are arduous; the MVS’s 
efforts questionable. 
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Ukraine’s Strategic Security 
Crossroads passed, bumpy road ahead 
or an optimistic view? 
Arkady Moshes* 
Banal as it is, the key to Ukraine’s strategic security is the continuation of 
the process of internal reforms. With Russian influence in Ukraine 
decreasing rather than increasing over time and the channels of interaction 
between Ukraine and the West firmly established, it is the outcome of 
transformation at home that will determine the long-term future of the 
country. Today’s Ukraine is stable and secure to a degree that very few 
observers would have dared predicted at the beginning of independence or 
even at the turn of this century. But if further progress in reforms is not 
achieved, the country may find itself unable to cope with future security 
challenges, both internal and external, whereas the temptation to exploit 
Ukraine’s de facto limited economic sovereignty will affect the thinking and 
behaviour of outside players, Russia above all. 
From pluralism to democracy or not yet? 
A really strategic question that should be asked at the very start of this 
analysis is whether Ukraine is able to complete the democratic 
transformation and, if so, whether it is currently moving in the right or 
wrong direction. It appears to this author that a cautiously optimistic 
argument can be made. 
First, in sharp contrast with many other post-Soviet states, Ukraine 
became (and remains) a pluralist state. For Ukraine, with its huge regional 
differences, pluralism and the multi-layer compromise among elites that it 
implies was perhaps the only way to remain a single country. Later on, a 
polycentric political system emerged to become a major characteristic of the 
                                                     
* Arkady Moshes is a Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute for International 
Relations, Helsinki. 
QUID UKRAINE’S STRATEGIC SECURITY? | 167 
 
country. The idea that one group of people could successfully attempt to 
monopolise all the power in the country would have looked as equally 
inconceivable in the days when former President Leonid Kuchma fought 
the parliamentary opposition while refereeing the disputes of oligarchic 
groupings as amidst the height of the euphoria surrounding the Orange 
Revolution. This polycentrism of decision-making is very far from a classic 
separation of powers, but it creates a certain system of checks and balances 
and fosters tolerance towards different thinking and diverging interests. It 
impedes the chances of a fast breakthrough on reforms, yet serves as a 
safeguard against destabilisation of the situation and trends to the reverse. 
After the 2006 parliamentary elections, power was once again 
redistributed, but remained polycentric. Although it is not easy to dismiss 
concerns as regards the implications of transferring control over Ukraine’s 
economic course into the hands of Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions – 
the backbone of the current governmental coalition, with its assertive cadre 
policy and notorious power appetites – other players possess strong 
instruments as well. President Viktor Yushchenko can use his veto, which 
the parliament will not be able to override without the support of pro-
presidential forces. He has clear constitutional prerogatives in external 
policy and directly appoints the foreign minister as well as the ministers of 
the so-called ‘power bloc’. The current presidential staff combines 
traditional national democrats and individuals linked with the powerful 
Industrial Union of Donbass, an eastern Ukrainian competitor to the Party 
of Regions, and this fact can be interpreted as further evidence of the 
impossibility of one group being able to dominate even regionally. The 
speaker of the parliament, Socialist leader Olexander Moroz, also has his 
bureaucratic means of interference in the power struggle. And the list of 
persons whose positions should be reckoned with can be extended. If the 
Party of Regions fails to understand this fundamental rule of Ukraine’s 
politics and tries to accumulate too much power, it will meet consolidated 
resistance and may lose everything. 
The constitutional reform that entered into force in January 2006 adds 
to the same logic. Briefly put, the reform redrew the balance of power in the 
country in favour of the parliament and made Ukraine a parliamentary–
presidential republic, which brought Ukraine closer to Central European 
political models and, again, further differentiated it from Russia or Belarus. 
Ukraine has developed a certain culture of opposition. Opposition in 
Ukraine is not suppressed or ostracised, but plays a recognised political 
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role. And while sometimes the fortunes of those who make up its economic 
power base may be as opaque in terms of origin those of the authorities’ 
supporters, they are not usually persecuted through the law enforcement 
system – for better or worse. After the opposition came to power in 2004 
and again in 2006, the position of being in opposition can less than ever be 
viewed as a political failure, but rather as a comfortable niche and even a 
springboard for future electoral success. 
Ukraine has a tradition of a relatively independent judiciary. Without 
exaggerating the depth of this independence, it is worth remembering that 
both before and after the Orange Revolution some court rulings indeed put 
effective brakes on the actions of the executive. The fact that the transfer of 
power in 2004 was made within the confines of the existing law and not the 
‘logic of the revolution’ further raised the value of legal procedures. At the 
moment Ukraine’s highest legal authorities, the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court, are headed by independent figures, a situation that 
provides hope for impartiality and compliance with the law. 
Free, competing and high quality media are struggling to attain the 
status of a real fourth power. There are no forbidden issues, nor are there 
politicians who can feel insulated or immune from criticism. In big cities at 
least, there is an experience of powerful civic activism. 
Ukraine’s pluralism is coupled with the acceptance, although not 
necessarily universal preference, of elections as a mechanism that 
legitimises power. The 2006 elections were found to be fair and free by 
international observers. Whether this will be a rule in the future remains to 
be seen, but reliance on strategies aimed at winning the vote rather than 
manipulating the count may have set an important precedent. 
Finally, the 2006 elections showed that the majority of the population 
remained supportive of the pro-reform choice and that the motivation that 
had driven the Orange Revolution was not lost. The combined support of 
the forces that once belonged to the pro-Yushchenko Power to the People 
coalition fell just a bit short of the 52% that Mr Yushchenko had garnered in 
December 2004, notwithstanding the fact that his own party only obtained 
14%. 
All these factors are cited here to support the assumption made above 
that Ukraine has a fairly good chance to go forward and that there is no 
easy way to undo the changes that the Orange Revolution introduced or 
consolidated. But it is no less evident that today’s Ukraine is solely an 
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electoral democracy – where people can indeed elect their future leaders – 
and not yet a full democracy, where their leaders conduct policies based on 
the people’s interests and expectations and where voters can also affect the 
behaviour of the leadership during the term. 
The situation may be suspended in this way for a rather long period. 
In these circumstances, Ukraine will be exposed to a number of political 
risks that could be grouped into three categories. The first one deals with 
the weakness of Ukraine’s institutions and the low quality of governance. 
In a way, this is the flip side of polycentrism. Rather than finding a balance 
that would allow the branches of power and other powerful actors to work 
in concert, participants in the political process may concentrate on blocking 
each other’s moves regardless of the national interests. Cohabitation 
between the president and the prime minister – names as such are not 
important here – in the new system will be extremely difficult at times, 
negatively affecting the performance of the executive power. If they are not 
willing to take the risk of early elections, those in power may agree not to 
rock the boat just to keep what they have, which may lead to stagnation at 
best. Meanwhile, the opposition may be tempted to exploit populist 
slogans rather than to work hard at improving laws and putting together a 
professional shadow government. Since the constitutional reform entered 
into force before all the necessary legal norms were harmonised or even 
adopted, legal collisions are inevitable. In particular, the activities of local 
authorities (governors and local officials) could be paralysed soon, as it is 
not clear whether in the parliamentary–presidential republic governors 
should still be appointed by the president, nor is it clear whether these 
appointed officials could be affiliated with the opposition. 
The second major challenge involves the lack of transparency of the 
decision-making process and corruption. Already the Orange 
administration has been unable to answer many questions raised in this 
regard, particularly after January 2006, in which it signed a very strange 
agreement that entrusted a Swiss intermediary company with the task of 
ensuring Ukraine’s gas supply. Obviously (and unfortunately), after the 
change of government it would not be realistic to expect rapid 
improvement. The fact that it was normal for observers to presume that 
Olexander Moroz (once the instigator of the ‘tapegate’ scandal and a 
champion of honesty in politics) could have been paid a bribe for 
withdrawing from the coalition talks with the Orange parties and joining 
Mr Yanukovych is indicative. Indeed, it may be more telling about the 
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situation than the ratings of Transparency International, which rank 
Ukraine among the second hundred of states studied. 
The third risk is the possibility of abusing the sensitivities of 
Ukraine’s de facto multicultural society and exploiting its regional 
differences. This risk does not mean that there is any likelihood of a split or 
secession in Ukraine.1 Regional elites in the east of the country see the 
prospects of coming to power in Kyiv, taking part in governing the whole 
country and using the instruments of sovereignty to protect their own 
interests vis-à-vis Russia as very lucrative. Therefore, they are very unlikely 
to instigate a separatist movement. But they are building their power base 
around the idea of a special relationship with Russia, something that 
postpones the emergence of the Ukrainian political nation. Mr 
Yanukovych’s return to power in this context may have a sobering effect. 
Moreover, if the possibilities open up for his cooperation with President 
Yushchenko, if the education and language policies of the new government 
display continuity and if at the same time it cannot be denied that the east 
is represented in the decision-making process, an incentive for rethinking 
may finally arrive. 
Ukraine–Russia: Is there a reversal? 
The Orange Revolution did a lot to free Ukraine – and Ukraine’s image in 
the world – of a ‘little brother’ complex, as the Yushchenko administration 
did not seek Moscow’s approval on domestic, bilateral or wider 
international issues. Mr Yanukovych, in turn, was uncritically labelled a 
pro-Russian politician, despite the fact that during his first term the 
government pushed the legislation on Ukraine’s future accession to NATO, 
negotiated the EU–Ukraine Action Plan, stood firm during the Tuzla crisis 
over the undelimited border in the Strait of Kerch and preserved full 
control over Ukraine’s gas transport system. So, when Mr Yanukovych 
became Prime Minister again, there was neither a shortage of concerns in 
the Western media nor a shortage of euphoria in Russian officialdom. 
                                                     
1 The only hypothetical exception here could be Crimea. In the long-distant future, 
if the demographic situation changes further in favour of the Tatar population, and 
if only this ethnic group at the same time finds itself receptive to the ideas of 
radical Islamism, secessionist claims on its side cannot be ruled out. 
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Yet these reactions may have been erroneous and short-lived. So far, 
Russian–Ukrainian relations have not been qualitatively different from 
what they were before March 2006. The centrifugal drift between Russia 
and Ukraine goes on. It is doubtful that the new government will be willing 
or able to stop it. And it is even more doubtful that Russia will regain the 
capacity it once had to project influence internally and externally on 
Ukraine. 
First, Russia has lost a decisive role in Ukrainian domestic politics. 
After Russia’s ineffective interference in the presidential elections in 2004, 
Moscow’s support or lack thereof is no longer a critical factor. It can be seen 
as symbolic that Mr Yanukovych’s victorious 2006 campaign was not run 
by Kremlin spin-doctors, but by American political consultants. Russia, no 
doubt, still matters in Ukrainian politics as both a theme and a player. It 
can work through individual politicians. It possesses financial and media 
resources. But parties that place ‘pro-Russianness’ at the centre of their 
political platforms are marginalised and are left outside parliament. 
The Declaration of National Unity (Universal), with which President 
Yushchenko conditioned his consent to propose Viktor Yanukovych to the 
parliament for confirmation, is an interesting document to analyse in this 
context. Incredibly, it does not mention the name ‘Russia’ at all. Not 
overestimating the significance of papers in the Ukrainian context, this 
omission should still be treated as remarkable, as the EU, NATO and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) are dealt with in the text of the 
document. If Russia was left out of the document on purpose, after 
negotiations it is probably time to re-examine the real depth of the pro-
Russian sentiment in the eastern regions, since presumably their top 
representatives do not see any problem in such a big concession. If Russia 
were ‘forgotten’ intuitively, this would be even more telling. The issue of 
joining the Single Economic Space (SES) with Russia is addressed, but only 
to repeat that Ukraine would be ready to participate in the free trade zone 
and not in the customs union. Furthermore, it adds that the WTO rules 
would be applied to Ukraine’s entry into the SES, which is a clear 
indication of where the priorities of the new government lie. 
Second, the return of the privileged energy treatment of Ukraine by 
Russia is practically excluded. ‘Privileged’ in this context does not equate to 
‘lowest in the region’, but rather means the low prices in absolute terms to 
which Ukraine was addicted. Now it looks as though the gas price that 
Ukraine will have to pay in 2007 will be nearly triple that in 2005, having 
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reached $130 for 1,000 cubic metres (m3). This author argued earlier that the 
gas price increase in January 2006, i.e. before the elections, had revealed 
that Moscow had slim expectations regarding whether Mr Yanukovych’s 
success could lead to the restoration of the old model of cheap gas in 
exchange for formal political loyalty. And now Moscow sees little reason to 
drop the policy aimed at maximising economic gains. The major economic 
incentive for Ukraine to align itself with Russia or even to pay ritual lip 
service to it therefore quickly erodes. Another problem for Moscow is that 
the Ukrainian economy digested the doubling of the gas price, from $50 to 
$95 dollars for 1,000 m3 in 2006, with surprising ease. As a textbook case of 
diplomacy, the situation in which the threat of sanction works more 
effectively as an instrument than sanction itself found further confirmation 
in practice. Ukraine’s elites are now less concerned with further price rises 
– even $160 is seen as acceptable by some analysts – and are less inclined to 
consider concessions than before. Furthermore, it was announced in 
October 2006 that Ukraine would no longer buy gas originating in Russia, 
but only import Central Asian gas going through Russia. If these plans 
materialise, the essence of the relations will change. Instead of a seller–
buyer relationship, the two countries will be transit partners, which will 
give Ukraine more freedom of manoeuvre. 
That being said, Ukraine’s energy security concerns and problems are 
not to be downplayed. Moscow’s new gas policy is likely to be more 
painful for Ukraine exactly for the reason that it cannot be met by political 
declarations and promises. Russia seeks tangible benefits in general, not 
just words, and in particular control over Ukrainian pipelines and the 
internal energy market. Nevertheless, the ability of Ukraine to resist the 
pressure is stronger today than ever. As Kyiv learned from experience last 
winter, a transit state has huge leverage over a supplier. Given the 
problems between Russia and Belarus on the same issue of control over the 
pipelines, a strategic alliance between Kyiv and Minsk is quite feasible, 
while at present the tactic of playing these two countries against each other 
on the transit issue is not. The increasing contradictions between Russia 
and Europe in the energy sphere make it impossible for the former to 
persuade consumers to put all the blame on Ukraine if problems emerge 
and gain their sympathies. Also, it would be wrong to think that Ukrainian 
business leaders in the east do not understand that a weakening of 
Ukraine’s economic or political sovereignty would directly affect their 
interests. Deals between Moscow and these elites are possible (and taking 
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into account a generally corrupt environment in Ukraine such deals can be 
potentially dangerous), but there are also serious structural limitations as to 
how much they will be willing to negotiate. 
Third, all the traditional controversies are still on the bilateral agenda. 
Mutual trade protectionism, the border issues, the status of the Russian 
language in Ukraine, grey areas in regulations concerning the Russian 
military presence in Crimea and other problems have to be dealt with. And 
if Russia grows more persistent – as happened with the statement by the 
Russian foreign ministry on the language issue in September 2006, 
apparently made to remind Mr Yanukovych about his unfulfilled promises 
– and thus potentially able to complicate the Mr Yanukovych’s relationship 
with the electorate, the restoration of confidence between Moscow and 
Kyiv will grow less likely. 
Finally, on many occasions the new government has confirmed the 
priority it gives to the Euro-Atlantic choice. The fact that Mr Yanukovych 
refused to submit Ukraine’s application to join NATO’s Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) is, of course, a serious revision of the previous line and 
cannot be ignored; but nor should an underestimation be made of the 
continuous statements that treat Russia as an important, but not an equally 
important partner for Ukraine as Europe. 
The appearance of Russian–Ukrainian relations may look less 
conflicted. Today Moscow can be less concerned about the challenges 
posed by Ukraine than it was in early 2005. It is clear that there will be no 
noticeable spillover effect of the Orange Revolution domestically, and that 
the new frontiers of Europe will not be re-drawn along the Russian–
Ukrainian border anytime soon. Ukraine, it seems, has postponed the 
NATO option, whereas the EU refuses to discuss even a hypothetical 
possibility of Ukraine’s membership in the Union. Also, Moscow now 
seems to realise that the politicians capable of coming to power in Ukraine 
are destined to be much more pro-Ukrainian than previously thought; 
others just do not have a chance. Therefore, for the lack of better partners, it 
will have to offer Mr Yanukovych more than it offered Mr Yushchenko and 
claim normalisation. Kyiv, in turn, will most likely not push forward 
initiatives that provoke Russia’s anxiety, such as the Community of 
Democratic Choice or a re-launched version of the regional organisation 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). Yet this will only be 
the façade. There is no way to return to the status quo of the Leonid 
Kuchma days. 
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Ukraine and the West: Change or continuity? 
The decision of Prime Minister Yanukovych that Ukraine should not for the 
moment seek to join NATO’s MAP, post hoc formally supported by the 
parliament, is often interpreted as a U-turn in Kyiv’s foreign policy. But to 
what extent is it really? 
The strategic goals of accession to the EU and NATO have not been 
abandoned and the corresponding provisions of the national legislation 
remain in force. In Mr Yanukovych’s own words, pronounced during his 
trip to Brussels, Ukraine will cooperate with NATO on the basis of the 
intensified membership dialogue and this cooperation will include 
Ukraine’s participation in NATO operations in different regions of the 
world. 
So far, the words have not diverged from reality. On the very same 
day that Mr Yanukovych was confirmed as the head of government, the 
Verkhovna Rada [parliament] adopted the legislation necessary to allow 
military exercises in Ukraine with the participation of NATO countries, 
which the previous parliament had failed to do. There are no signs that 
Kyiv is preparing to renounce its solidarity with EU positions on hot issues 
in the neighbouring post-Soviet states. Ukraine joined EU statements on 
Belarus in July 2006 (as regards the conviction of the former presidential 
candidate Alexander Kozulin) and, more importantly, on the non-
recognition of the independence referendum in Transnistria in September. 
The tightened controls on the border with Transnistria (a breakaway entity 
of Moldova) introduced in March remain intact. 
The momentum in bureaucratic interaction, particularly in 
Ukrainian–EU relations, does not have to disappear. Implementation of the 
Action Plan – as well as the yearly target plans of cooperation with NATO 
– can continue and the new framework treaty that should replace the 
expiring Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is to be negotiated. 
Contingent on Ukraine’s WTO entry, the EU is also ready to negotiate a 
free trade agreement with Ukraine, which could be a major step on the way 
to Ukraine’s de facto integration with Europe. At the EU–Ukrainian summit 
in October 2006, the parties initialled the visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements. In the latter agreement the EU chose to treat Ukraine less 
favourably than Russia (Russia will have up to three years to re-admit 
nationals and even third-country nationals who illegally migrate from 
Russia to the EU after a similar treaty will enter into force, whereas Ukraine 
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will have to do so after only a two-year delay). Although this is a worrying 
sign in many respects, it is still possible to assume that bureaucratic inertia 
will push the relationship forward. 
In view of all this, there is no need to dramatise the pause in 
Ukraine’s movement towards NATO membership (and to be fair, NATO 
itself does not). Some may regret that Ukraine lost the chance to gain a new 
quality in its relations with the alliance and to attain a new foreign policy 
status as a candidate country and predict that this move will have a de-
mobilising effect on the reforms in the country. Yet others can argue that in 
principle, most of the measures can be taken outside the MAP and that Mr 
Yanukovych’s decision is less in conflict with reality than NATO 
romanticism.  
From a sociological perspective, it is well established that an 
accession referendum at the moment would be doomed to failure, while 
taking the decision to join the alliance against the known will of the people 
would be undemocratic and potentially destabilising. Unlike EU 
membership, the NATO option is supported only by a minority of the 
political class; in Ukraine there is not a ruling coalition (or even a 
hypothetical one) that would be unanimously in favour of it. Ukraine needs 
a dual-membership prospect, for both the EU and NATO. Unless this is 
secured, joining NATO only makes limited sense, as Ukraine would be at 
risk of ending up included in the Western security zone, but not in the 
prosperity zone. To campaign for such a dual prospect is difficult, 
particularly when concerns are strong in the eastern regions that entry into 
NATO may ruin relations with Russia. 
In the short run, progress in Ukraine’s relations with the West will 
primarily depend on the outcome of the tug of war between the prime 
minister and the president and the actual ability of the latter to guide 
Ukraine’s foreign policy, which is his constitutional prerogative. In the 
longer run, it will again depend on the results of the country’s internal 
transformation. If it is successful in making an internal transition, Ukraine 
will be a much better partner for the West regardless of whether or not it 
becomes a member of the EU or NATO. 
Conclusions 
To ensure Ukraine’s strategic security, its Western partners should do their 
best to promote its internal reforms. Now that expectations of a quick 
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breakthrough both inside and outside the country have been replaced by 
frustration and scepticism, it is more important than ever to sustain the 
efforts of engagement within Ukraine and to support its case 
internationally. Ukraine is also a country of strategic opportunities and 
importance, because if it is successful in its transition Ukraine will be able 
to serve as a positive example for Russia and the whole region. 
The transfer of transition expertise to Ukraine should continue. 
Promoting pluralism and the rule of law, fighting corruption, fostering new 
elites and other requirements of transformation remain important goals. 
These goals are far from having been reached. 
A reform scoreboard should be the major criteria against which 
Ukrainian policy should be judged as opposed to geopolitical rhetoric or, 
worse, Western expectations. In this regard, it is time to stop dividing 
Ukrainian politicians into those who are pro-Russian or pro-Western. After 
15 years of independence, such demarcations are often inaccurate (as 
politicians tend to follow the own agendas) as well as being politically 
detrimental. Arguably, Western preferences in favour of re-building the 
Orange coalition after the 2006 elections, voiced loudly and based on 
concerns about the ‘pro-Russian’ stance of Mr Yanukovych, protracted the 
stalemate. Eventually these factors contributed to the emergence of the 
present government, the composition of which is more problematic for the 
cause of reform than that which could have been achieved if Mr 
Yushchenko had immediately opted for a ‘big’ coalition with Mr 
Yanukovych. 
Instead, it is advisable to tackle Ukraine by means of a conditionality 
policy. The leadership in Kyiv should be fully aware of what it may or may 
not receive in the case of implementation of or non-compliance with certain 
agreements. The EU role here will be crucial, of course, as it can offer 
incentives that no other player can – those both immediate and, ideally, 
when the situation allows, the mega-incentive of a membership prospect, 
which has proven to be the most successful instrument of transformation in 
the post-socialist world so far. 
What the West can do without delay is help Ukraine to address its 
energy concerns and promote reforms in the energy sector. Only once it is 
energy efficient and able to pay the real price for what it consumes will the 
country be fully sovereign. Even in the short term, the Ukrainian economy 
would benefit greatly from the introduction of energy-saving technologies, 
the means for which could partly come from the West. In the longer term, 
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the EU and Ukraine clearly share a common interest in building a new 
infrastructure for the transit of Caspian energy. 
Such actions are easier said than done; nevertheless, the incentives to 
transform should reach the micro level of Ukraine’s society. Average 
citizens should have reasons to believe that if their country implements 
reforms, there will be a positive effect on their lives, as for example a more 
professional and less corrupt law enforcement system can indeed be a pass 
to visa-free travel to Europe. If the stakes are personalised, and the West 
can assist in this process, with its revived tradition of civic activism 
Ukraine will have a good chance. 
 
 178 |  
Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy 
after the Collapse of the  
Orange Coalition 
F. Stephen Larrabee* 
The election of Viktor Yushchenko as president of Ukraine in December 
2004 was an important turning point in Ukraine’s political evolution. With 
his election, Ukraine appeared to have unequivocally embarked on a 
course of Euro-Atlantic integration. In the months afterwards, President 
Yushchenko stressed that his two top foreign policy priorities were 
obtaining European Union and NATO membership. Relations with the 
United States were given new impetus during his trip to Washington in 
April 2005, where he and President George W. Bush outlined a 
comprehensive agenda for improving bilateral relations. 
Today, two years later, Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation is much 
less clear. The Orange coalition has collapsed – a victim of personal 
animosities and petty political ambitions. The current governing coalition is 
headed by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, Mr Yushchenko’s rival in 
the 2004 presidential elections and a man whom a year ago many observers 
had written off as politically dead. In addition to Mr Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions, the coalition includes the Communist and Socialist Parties, both of 
which oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. 
The collapse of the Orange coalition and Mr Yanukovych’s return to 
power raise several critical questions about Ukraine’s political future. First, 
will Ukraine continue to pursue a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration – 
including seeking membership in NATO? Second, will Russian influence 
over Ukraine’s internal and external policies increase? Finally, how should 
the US and its European allies respond to these changes? 
 
                                                     
* F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Corporate Chair in European Security at the Rand 
Corporation. 
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Foreign policy and the internal struggle for power 
At present, Ukrainian foreign policy is in limbo. Two parallel Ukrainian 
foreign policies exist: the foreign policy of President Yushchenko and Our 
Ukraine, which is aimed at integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, and 
the policy of Prime Minister Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, which 
resembles the ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy pursued by former President 
Leonid Kuchma. Which of these two policies ultimately prevails will 
heavily depend on the evolution of the internal balance of power between 
Messrs Yushchenko and Yanukovych. 
Under the amended 2006 constitution the president has responsibility 
for foreign and security policy. The president nominates the foreign 
minister, defence minister and head of the security service, the secretary of 
the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) and the prosecutor. But 
they must be approved by the Verkhovna Rada [parliament], in which the 
Party of Regions has the most seats. The remaining cabinet posts are 
nominated by the prime minister. Thus, President Yushchenko will have to 
build an internal consensus for his policies and obtain Prime Minister 
Yanukovych’s cooperation if he wants his policies implemented. 
The Declaration of National Unity (Universal), signed by President 
Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych and the leaders of the 
Communist Party, Socialist Party and Our Ukraine on 3 August 2006 sets 
the basic framework and priorities for Ukraine’s future foreign policy. It 
puts strong emphasis on Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. The Universal is a political accord, however, and not a legally 
binding document. Its implementation will ultimately depend on the 
balance of power between Mr Yushchenko and Mr Yanukovych.  
Mr Yanukovych has already begun to challenge the president’s 
authority to define Ukraine’s foreign policy. During his trip to Brussels in 
mid-September 2006, Mr Yanukovych sought to set the contours – and 
limits – of Ukraine’s policy towards NATO, declaring that Ukraine was not 
prepared to embark on a Membership Action Plan (MAP) and calling for a 
pause in Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership.1 In so doing, Mr 
                                                     
1 See P. Finn, “Ukraine’s Yanukovych Halts NATO Entry Talks”, Washington Post, 
15 September 2006; see also D. Dombey & R. Olearchyk, “Yanukovych puts Kyiv’s 
NATO plans on hold”, Financial Times, 15 September 2006. 
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Yanukovych not only highlighted his differences with Mr Yushchenko on 
policy towards NATO but also openly challenged the president’s 
constitutional role in defining Ukraine’s foreign policy.  
Since becoming Prime Minister, Mr Yanukovych has taken several 
steps to strengthen his influence over foreign policy. One of his first moves 
was to appoint Anatoliy Orel as a Foreign Policy Adviser. Mr Orel had 
previously served as Chief Foreign Policy Adviser to President Kuchma; he 
is well known for his pro-Russian views and ties to the Russian security 
services. During his tenure under Mr Kuchma, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was little more than a transmission belt for implementing decisions 
of the presidential administration.  
Several of Mr Yanukovych’s other appointments also give reason for 
concern – particularly those of Andriy Kluev as Deputy Prime Minister and 
Mykola Azarov (former First Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Tax 
Administration under President Kuchma) as First Deputy Prime Minister. 
Their appointments could presage a return to a Soviet-style centralisation 
of power. As architects of President Kuchma’s administrative system, both 
men turned state and public institutions into tools of presidential power.2 
In another move with important implications for foreign policy, Mr 
Yanukovych eliminated the Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration, chaired by Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, which had 
coordinated the policy of the ministries implementing cooperation with 
NATO and the EU. This committee had allowed the minister of foreign 
affairs to influence domestic policy related to European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. This function will now be performed by a Committee on Legal, 
Defence and European Integration, which will be chaired by Mr 
Yanukovych. 
In short, Mr Yanukovych seems intent on nibbling away at Mr 
Yushchenko’s authority and exploiting ambiguities in existing legislation to 
aggrandise his power at the president’s expense. Mr Yushchenko will have 
to fight to preserve his right to define Ukraine’s foreign policy. If he is not 
vigilant, he could find his ability to influence foreign policy significantly 
eroded. 
                                                     
2 See J. Sherr, “Ukraine: Prospects and Risks”, Action Report Ukraine, No. 780, 25 
October 2006, p. 6. 
QUID UKRAINE’S STRATEGIC SECURITY? | 181 
 
In an effort to protect his prerogatives in foreign policy, Mr 
Yushchenko has sought to strengthen the presidential apparatus. He 
appointed former Economics Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk as one of his two 
first deputies and Oleksandr Chalyi, a former Deputy Foreign Minister and 
Vice president of the Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD), as one of three 
deputies. Both men are closely associated with the ISD, as is Vitaliy 
Hayduk, the recently appointed head of the NSDC. Their appointment, 
together with that of Mr Hayduk, provides an important counterweight to 
the pro-Russian orientation of Mr Yanukovych’s economic policy. It also 
represents an important political realignment. Instead of tapping figures 
from Western Ukraine, his traditional area of support, the president has 
turned for help to officials from Eastern Ukraine, Mr Yanukovych’s base 
and an area where Mr Yushchenko has not traditionally had strong 
political support.  
Yet, Our Ukraine’s decision on 19 October to withdraw its ministers 
from the government and join the opposition may reduce President 
Yushchenko’s leverage.3 Two close Yushchenko allies, Foreign Minister 
Borys Tarasyuk, who represents the People’s Union of Ukraine, and 
Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who is not a member of any political party, remain in 
the cabinet. But they are likely to find themselves increasingly isolated and 
may also resign or be forced out, further reducing the Mr Yushchenko’s 
ability to influence foreign and defence policy.4 
Over time, the president risks becoming more marginalised as de facto 
power gravitates to the prime minister. President Yushchenko will be able 
to use his veto power to block certain initiatives, but he is unlikely to be 
                                                     
3 It is not clear whether the decision to go into opposition is final. The decision was 
announced by the Our Ukraine leader Roman Bezsmertny in parliament on 17 
October. At the Our Ukraine’s congress on 21 October, however, Mr Yushchenko 
expressed disagreement with the decision and argued for a continuation of 
coalition talks with Mr Yanukovych. It is possible that Our Ukraine could split, 
with one faction joining Yulia Tymoshenko in opposition and another faction 
remaining part of the coalition. There is also talk that President Yushchenko may 
form a new party backed by the ISD. 
4 Significantly, Messrs Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko, both strong proponents of 
Ukraine’s membership in NATO, did not accompany Mr Yanukovych on his trip 
to Brussels in mid-September 2006. 
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able to provide strong and effective leadership on foreign policy – 
something he failed to do even when his power was unchallenged. There is 
thus a danger that he will become a figurehead with little real power to 
affect policy.  
The role of the National Security and Defence Council 
The role played by the NSDC – and whether it serves as an effective 
coordination and decision-making body – will be an important factor 
shaping Ukrainian foreign and security policy in the future. Under the 
Ukrainian constitution, the NSDC is supposed to act as the mechanism for 
coordinating national security and defence policy. During President 
Kuchma’s first term, when it was headed by Volodymyr Horbulin, the 
NSDC was an important policy actor until Mr Horbulin fell out of favour 
with Mr Kuchma. 
Nevertheless, the NSDC has been largely ineffective during President 
Yushchenko’s tenure. He has tended to regard the NSDC as a sinecure to 
pay off political debts rather than using it as a mechanism for coordinating 
foreign and security policy. Petro Poroshenko, the first head of the NSDC 
under Mr Yushchenko, had no experience in security and defence matters. 
He made no effort to restructure the NSDC in order to make it an effective 
instrument for managing and coordinating security and defence policy. 
Instead, he used the NSDC as a means to undermine Yulia Tymoshenko, 
whom he hoped to replace as prime minister. The result was a 
dysfunctional system for decision-making on national security, increased 
internal dissension and growing policy incoherence. Mr Poroshenko’s 
successor, Anatoliy Kinakh, a former Prime Minister, also lacked 
experience in the defence and security domain. He acted more as a 
caretaker than an innovative policy thinker or manager. 
It is unclear what role the NSDC will play in the new period of 
cohabitation. Mr Yushchenko appears to envisage the NSDC acting as a 
sort of advisory body to the president, but with expanded powers in 
economic and social policy and some decision-making capacity. The new 
Secretary of the NSDC, Vitaliy Hayduk, the former head of the ISD, again 
lacks experience in the security field. His appointment suggests that Mr 
Yushchenko may try to use the NSDC as a vehicle to exert some influence 
over economic and social policy – areas for which Mr Yanukovych is 
primarily responsible. This move could exacerbate the internal struggle for 
power.  
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NATO 
The collapse of the Orange coalition has cast the NATO issue in a new 
light. Before the fall of the Orange alliance there was a possibility that 
Ukraine might be offered a NATO MAP at the Riga summit in November 
2006. This move is now highly unlikely. Most NATO members are opposed 
to granting Ukraine a MAP at Riga. They want to wait and see how the 
Yanukovych government performs before making any decision about the 
MAP. 
This consequence fits well with Mr Yanukovych’s ‘go slow’ strategy 
as outlined in Brussels. He insisted that NATO membership is premature 
because it lacks widespread political support and that before a final 
decision is made the issue of NATO membership should be submitted to a 
referendum. This stance essentially kicks the issue off the political agenda 
for the near future, given that if a referendum were held soon, NATO 
membership would not receive sufficient political support. 
Any future decision about Ukrainian membership in NATO will 
strongly depend on Ukraine’s performance, not only in terms of 
implementing military reforms but also in carrying out political and 
economic reforms. Indeed, Ukraine’s performance in the latter two areas is 
likely to be more important than the former. NATO member states will 
want to be assured that Ukraine is seriously committed to the basic values 
of the alliance and not just its military aspects. 
The level of public support for membership will also be an important 
factor. Today only about 15-20% of the population supports Ukraine’s 
membership in NATO. These figures are lower than was the case for most 
new members from Eastern Europe when they joined the alliance. Support, 
moreover, varies depending on the region. It is considerably higher in 
Western and Central Ukraine than in the heavily Russified areas of 
Southern and Eastern Ukraine. Still, a large percentage of the population – 
as much as 40-45% in the western regions – has no opinion about NATO 
membership. Much of this segment of the public could be mobilised to 
support Ukraine’s joining the alliance if the Ukrainian government 
conducted an effective campaign to educate the public about NATO. 
The Eastern European experience is instructive in this regard. Public 
support for NATO membership was low in several of the Eastern European 
countries that eventually achieved membership – particularly Bulgaria, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. After the leaderships in these countries launched 
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successful campaigns to raise public awareness about NATO, they were 
able to increase public support substantially by the time these countries 
received membership invitations. The same thing could occur in Ukraine if 
the Ukrainian leadership embarks on a concerted effort to inform the 
Ukrainian public better about NATO. 
The European Union 
In contrast to NATO, there is a much greater consensus in Ukraine about 
EU membership. All the major parties, with the exception of the 
Communist party, favour Ukrainian membership in the EU. Public support 
for Ukraine becoming part of the EU is also much higher than it is for 
joining NATO.5 
Under President Kuchma, Ukrainian leaders continually sought to 
persuade the EU to give Ukraine a prospect for EU membership. But the 
EU refused to do so, arguing that such a move was premature. The Political 
and Cooperation Agreement, which expires in 2007, calls for closer 
relations in a number of areas but does not contain the possibility of 
membership.  
The EU’s attitude did not fundamentally change after the Orange 
Revolution.6 Ukraine was included in the EU’s European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which was designed to foster closer ties to neighbouring countries 
on the EU’s periphery. While the Action Plan approved by the EU–Ukraine 
Council in February 2005 lays the basis for the EU’s relationship with 
Ukraine until 2008, it does not extend a prospect for membership.  
Ukrainian officials hope that negotiations on an association 
agreement that contains a possibility for membership can begin soon after 
the expiration of the Action Plan in 2008. The EU, however, continues to 
consider Ukrainian membership premature. EU officials argue that Ukraine 
has a lot of work to do before it can be considered for accession. Ukraine’s 
                                                     
5 See TNS Sofres, Europeans and the Accession of Ukraine to the European Union: Wave 
2, Main Conclusions, TNS Sofres, Montrouge, France, November 2005; for more 
information, see also the website of the International Network for Ukraine in the 
EU (retrieved from http://www.yes-ukraine.org/en/survey/november.html).  
6 See T. Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, 
No. 3, summer, 2006, pp. 89-108. 
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concern with membership is seen as distracting from the primary task – the 
implementation of a coherent reform programme.  
Many EU member states are worried about the EU’s absorption 
capacity and the dangers of taking on new commitments before it has 
digested the recent round of enlargement. A sense of enlargement fatigue 
had already been palpable before the French and Dutch referenda in May–
June 2004. The referenda reinforced the anti-enlargement mood. Bulgaria 
and Romania are expected to be admitted in January 2007, but after that 
there is likely to be ‘pause’ in the process of enlargement while the EU 
seeks to sort out its internal priorities and adjust to new circumstances. 
The EU hopes to string out a series of small rewards – market 
economy status, relaxation of visa restrictions, expanded educational 
opportunities, etc. – to encourage Ukraine to move forward with reform 
without committing itself to offering Ukraine EU membership. The 
problem with this approach is that membership is the ‘golden carrot’. It 
provides an incentive for countries to implement painful reforms. It also 
provides important cover for governments to justify to their publics the 
sacrifices that must be made to implement the reforms. Without the 
prospect of EU membership – even in the distant future – Ukrainian 
governments may be reluctant to pay the social and political costs involved 
in carrying out the type of restructuring and reform that is needed. 
Moreover, the EU’s approach is likely to reinforce the impression that 
Ukraine is in a geo-political grey zone. Together with a weakening of 
Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership, this could encourage Russia to 
step up its pressure on Ukraine to reorient its policy towards Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In particular, Russia could 
be tempted to exploit Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy as a lever to 
pressure Kyiv to weaken its ties to the West.  
Relations with Russia 
Besides NATO, relations with Russia are likely to spark the most 
controversy and to be marked by the deepest differences. President 
Yushchenko has by no means pursued an anti-Russian policy; indeed, he 
has recognised the importance of good relations with Russia and sought to 
keep them on an even keel. Nevertheless, his top priority has been to 
further Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. By contrast, it 
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can be anticipated that Mr Yanukovych will give higher priority to 
Ukraine’s relations with Russia, especially economic ones. 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy – especially natural gas – 
provides Russia with considerable leverage in dealing with Ukraine. 
Moscow is likely to use the gas issue to pressure Ukraine to adopt policies 
more in line with Russian interests, especially regarding NATO 
membership. On 24 October 2006, Russia agreed to supply Ukraine with 
natural gas for $130 per 1,000 cubic metres (m3) in 2007. This price is nearly 
50% more than the price Ukraine is currently paying under the agreement 
signed on 5 January 2006 but much less than the $230-240 per 1,000 m3 
Russia charges European countries. 
Yet it is unclear what concessions – if any – Ukraine made in order to 
obtain the $130 price. Russian sources have suggested that the $130 figure 
was part of a package deal in return for which Russia demanded that 
Ukraine make several concessions. The most important was that Ukraine 
would agree to hold a referendum on NATO membership in the near 
future.7 Given current popular opinion in Ukraine at the moment – some 
60% of the population currently opposes NATO membership – the results 
of a referendum would almost certainly be negative, thus ending talk of 
Ukraine becoming a member of NATO in the near future. 
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov also suggested that Ukraine 
and Russia synchronise their entries into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) – a move explicitly rejected by Oleksandr Chalyi, Deputy Head of 
the Presidential Secretariat. Ukraine is slightly ahead of Russia in its 
preparations to enter the WTO and has little incentive to synchronise its 
entry with Russia’s. If Ukraine joined the WTO first, it could possibly 
influence the terms of Russia’s entry, thus increasing its bargaining 
leverage with Moscow. 
President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the stationing of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea beyond the 2017 deadline agreed upon in 
the Russian–Ukrainian accord signed in l997 should also be seen in this 
context.8 The offer came out of the blue and caught many Ukrainian 
                                                     
7 See the Russian online daily Kommersant, 20 October 2006. 
8 Mr Putin made the offer in his annual phone-in dialogue with Russian citizens, 
televised on 25 October 2006. See V. Socor, “Putin Offers Ukraine ‘Protection’ for 
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officials by surprise. It takes on particular significance because the Russian 
media have suggested that an extension of the accord is one of the 
concessions that Russia is demanding for supplying Ukraine natural gas at 
the relatively low price of $130 per 1,000 m3. 
Although President Putin strongly backed Mr Yanukovych in the 
2004 presidential election in Ukraine, it would be a mistake to see Mr 
Yanukovych or the Party of Regions as ‘pro-Russian’. Eastern Ukraine, the 
stronghold of the Party of Regions, shares a cultural and linguistic affinity 
with Russia. But that does not mean that the party will slavishly obey 
Moscow’s beck and call. Mr Yanukovych is likely to show greater interest 
in participating in the CIS Single Economic Space than Mr Yushchenko, yet 
he is likely to balk at further integration into a free trade zone, customs 
union or monetary zone, as Moscow wishes. He is also unlikely to be 
willing to transfer Ukraine’s gas pipelines to Russia, as Belarus did, in 
return for low gas prices. Such a deal would be seen by large parts of the 
Ukrainian population as compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
independence. 
The Polish connection 
The collapse of the Orange coalition will have an impact on Ukraine’s 
relations with Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Historically, relations 
between Ukraine and Poland have been marked by considerable tension. 
Over the last decade and a half, however, the two countries have succeeded 
in overcoming past antagonisms and developing remarkably cordial 
relations. Poland has become the most outspoken advocate of Ukraine’s 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
Indeed, a new strategic alliance has begun to emerge in recent years 
between the two countries. Former Polish President Alexander 
Kwasniewski played a critical role in brokering the roundtable that defused 
the crisis in Ukraine in November–December 2004, ultimately leading to 
Mr Yushchenko’s election as president. Without Mr Kwasniewski’s 
mediation, the crisis might have escalated out of control and ended in 
bloodshed. Moreover, as a result of Mr Kwasniewski’s personal initiative, 
                                                                                                                                       
Extending Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Presence”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 
200, 30 October 2006. 
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Javier Solana, the High Representative for the EU’s common foreign and 
security policy, became directly involved in the negotiations, giving them a 
broader European character. 
Maintaining this strong strategic relationship is likely to be more 
difficult over the next few years. Polish support for Mr Yushchenko in the 
2004 presidential elections may make it harder for Warsaw to develop close 
ties to Mr Yanukovych’s government. Prime Minister Yanukovych is likely 
to maintain the current direction of the Odessa–Brody pipeline carrying 
Russian oil north rather than reversing its direction so oil could be piped to 
Western Europe. 
The Black Sea region 
Ukraine’s policy towards the Black Sea region may also witness some 
changes. Under the Orange coalition, Black Sea security received high 
priority. Mr Yushchenko sought to revitalise GUAM – a regional group 
composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova – and transform it 
into a serious regional organisation. At the GUAM summit in Chisinau in 
April 2005, Mr Yushchenko proposed that the group be transformed from 
an informal group to a formal regional organisation with its own office, 
secretariat and plan of activities.  
President Yushchenko also sought to build a strong strategic 
partnership with Georgia. During President Mikhail Saakashvili’s visit to 
Kyiv in March 2005, the two leaders issued a joint declaration stating they 
would support each other’s aspirations to join NATO and the EU. In 
August 2005, they also launched a joint initiative calling for the creation of 
a Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), which was designed to forge a 
common front among democratic states in the region. The initiative 
provoked irritation in Moscow. 
The Black Sea will probably remain an important Ukrainian policy 
priority. Nevertheless, Mr Yanukovych and the Party of Regions are likely 
to be more sensitive to Russian concerns and put less emphasis on 
democratisation – a key priority during the first year under Mr Yushchenko 
– and more emphasis on economic cooperation, especially in the energy 
field. The CDC, with its strong focus on democratisation, is also liable to 
less emphasis, as are relations with Georgia, especially if Russian–Georgian 
relations remain tense. 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
To address a most difficult question, we benefited from presentations by 
Julian Lindley-French (Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich 
and Defence Academy of the UK), Andrei Zagorski (MGIMO-University, 
Moscow) and Peter Berger (New America Foundation and John Hopkins 
University). These were complemented by written and oral contributions 
from Hekmat Karzai (CASE National Security Institute, Kabul) and Ismail 
Khan (The Dawn Group of Newspapers, Peshawar). 
Before the experts delivered their oral presentations, the chairman 
put three questions to them: 
• Can a NATO-led operation (even one in which the European Union 
would be doing the ‘civilian’ work) succeed or is internationalisation 
(‘de-Westernisation’) a prerequisite for success and if so, under what 
entities? 
• Can a form of stability be established without the incorporation of 
Pashtun concerns (an issue much discussed in Julian Lindley-French’s 
paper)? 
• Is the status quo (as opposed to either a successful outcome or 
outright failure) anyone’s preferred option? 
After a severe critique of European policy (characterised by the 
failure of strategic imagination) and American attitudes (notably the ‘not 
invented here’ syndrome), Julian Lindley-French made several points: 
• The West as a group has the resources to succeed but wider and 
deeper engagement is necessary, and this entails de-Westernisation. 
All 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) need to be 
multilateralised. There must be no “hiding places”. 
• The West has to remind all and sundry that it is not in Afghanistan 
out of altruism – its vital security interests are at stake. There would 
                                                     
* Francois Heisbourg is a Senior Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche 
Stratégique in Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
AFGHANISTAN: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? | 191 
 
be major consequences regionally and globally if the Afghanistan 
venture were to end in division and failure. This outcome would spell 
the end of NATO and of the EU as a defence organisation. The 
potential is high for estrangement between the United States and the 
United Kingdom (and a handful of other countries) on one hand and 
most of the continental powers on the other. Furthermore, Euro-
isolationism is a real risk. He reminded us inter alia that vision 
without a strategy is delusion and a strategy without commitment is 
deceit. 
Andrei Zagorski had been asked to focus on the lessons from the long 
period of Soviet presence (from 1975 onwards) and military intervention 
(from the end of 1979 to 1989) in Afghanistan. The first lesson he drew was 
“If you don’t believe in a mission, don’t get into it”. The Soviets had few 
illusions about their ability to transform Afghan society and yet that is 
what they tried to do. The second lesson is to avoid saying, “You can’t 
afford to fail”. This idea can lead to overcommitment in trying to 
implement an impossible mission. 
Lesson number three is that the amount of material and human 
assistance counts, but less so than its quality: indeed, the greater the 
assistance, the less its quality and the more the people, the less their 
average quality. Lesson number four is to not set “perfect” goals such as 
transforming a society – learn instead how to work with imperfect partners 
in developing broad ownership of the mission. 
Peter Berger noted some of the basic differences between the West’s 
involvement and that of the former Soviet Union (“We didn’t kill 1.5 
million people and drive out 5 million Afghans”). He remarked that the 
West has the ability to “surge” but that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are back. 
There is widespread perception of the weakness (and the ongoing 
weakening) of the Karzai presidency, notwithstanding his initial 55% 
electoral success, partly across ethnic lines. Without the drug economy, 
there would not be much left: there is an absolute need to subsidise other 
produce. Above and beyond initial US mistakes (under-resourced 
operations, not allowing the International Security Assistance Force out of 
Kabul and letting the drug economy develop), current aid policies are 
largely failing in the face of local absorption limits and the recycling of 
much of the aid back into Western pockets. 
 
192 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
There has been a successful amnesty programme, however, with a 
low recidivism rate. Conversely, in the tribal areas of Pakistan, neither 
militarisation nor appeasement has worked. Much could be gained by 
focusing on specific mosques and clerics. 
In his response, Hekmat Karzai stressed that aid should have been 
greater than it has been (after all, 80% of Afghan infrastructure has been 
destroyed) and more directly handled by the Afghan government. He 
considered that most Afghans still support the Western intervention. The 
Taliban campaign has been largely aimed against education, with 160 
schools destroyed by them in 2006. In reacting to the paper by Julian 
Lindley-French, he expressed broad agreement, but with the significant 
reservation that the Taliban resurgence is not a consequence of Pashtun 
grievances. Vis-à-vis Andrei Zagorski’s lessons from the former Soviet 
Union, he noted that the Soviets simply did not understand the local scene 
and that the same situation is being repeated now – yet the population is 
the centre of gravity. He concurred with the lesson that there is no success 
in trying to create a society in one’s image. One of the lessons of the Soviet 
presence is that it placed too much emphasis on the capital and the major 
towns; the Soviets never secured the rural areas. The same mistake is being 
made by many of the PRTs. 
In his response, Ismail Khan made clear that both the Pashtun and 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency are major factors and that not 
too much should be made of the absence of an explicit discussion thereof in 
his paper. He dwelled on the pendulum swings between militarisation and 
engagement in both North and South Waziristan, noting that the local 
tribes, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, tend to side with the group that is 
seen as winning. He argued that the approach taken in the case of the Musa 
Qala agreement is necessary, because no development could occur without 
a degree of stability and security; notably, the Taliban were not happy with 
the Musa Qala agreement between the UK forces and the local leaders. He 
made the point that peace in Afghanistan could mean trouble in Pakistan, 
because their militants from the tribal areas could turn their guns on 
Pakistan rather than become involved in Afghanistan. (This important 
contention provoked, in the subsequent discussion, a remark about the 
dangers of beggar-thy-neighbour policies.) In his view there hardly exists a 
Pakistani strategy; furthermore, the recent spate of suicide bombings in 
Pakistan sends a message to Islamabad that it should not try to stop cross-
border infiltration ahead of the spring offensive. Overall, as an institution, 
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the Inter-Services Intelligence agency is now targeting the Taliban. He 
argued that the presence of 80,000 Pakistani troops in 167 border posts 
should be enough to patrol the boundary but a blind eye is sometimes 
turned out of fear of reprisals against isolated posts. 
In the opening round of discussions, the question of Iran’s policy was 
posed, while an EU official noted that Afghan drugs are now having a 
corrupting and damaging effect in the fragile states and populations of 
Central Asia. Given that some 10,000 tonnes of chemical precursors are 
being imported into Afghanistan for drug processing, such substances 
should be tracked. On the question of capabilities, Julian Lindley-French 
was queried by a military analyst about the possibility of squaring the 
admonition that the West needs to increase its effort with the observation 
that we already face a capabilities crunch. 
In response, Hekmat Karzai remarked on Iran’s great activity on all 
fronts (commerce, aid and intelligence), noting that the Iranians are now 
waiting for the West’s next move. On drugs, he reminded us that if we do 
not deal with drugs, drugs will deal with us. Physical eradication is largely 
a waste of time; the real issue is the generation of alternate resources. On 
capabilities, he assumed that NATO’s attention span could hardly be 
expected to last more than a decade. 
Julian Lindley-French suggested that it should be possible to engage 
the Iranians on a specific track concerning Afghanistan. Moving to India’s 
involvement (Hekmat Karzai having observed that India is still seen as 
exercising a major positive influence), he considered that it is playing a 
game that could be called “What happens after the West is gone?”, in other 
words, thinking in terms of future relations with Islamabad. On drugs, he 
reiterated the view that alternate crops have to be subsidised. He also 
suggested that there should be some form of de facto autonomy for the 
Pashtun on both sides of the border, while respecting the Durand line, 
holding that the Pashtun are key to the security situation. On capabilities, 
he stressed that conflict and reconstruction must be viewed not as 
sequential but as simultaneous; this requires a doctrinal shift and a 
harmonisation of civil–military capabilities among NATO, the EU, the UN 
and the regional players. Finally, he indicated that US–UK relations 
concerning Afghanistan have suffered as a result of US action against the 
Musa Qala agreement. 
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Ismail Khan held that for the Taliban, religious motivation is of the 
essence rather than a sense of Pashtun identity. 
Peter Berger remarked that Iran has done nothing basically wrong in 
Afghanistan; moreover, Iran is on the receiving end of the drug problem. 
He agreed that poppy eradication would not help, as it will send more 
people into the arms of the Taliban. Substitutes and subsidies are the 
answer, whereas at present we are spending more money on eradication 
than paying farmers to stop growing drugs. 
Andrei Zagorski stressed that although Tehran has no reason to bring 
the Taliban back, it will be tempting for Iran to hurt the West in 
Afghanistan. Concerning the penetration of rural regions, he argued that it 
is neither necessary nor desirable, since it is a source of trouble; instead, 
what you need is a strong interface. 
In a second round of questions, an Indian official disagreed with the 
proposition that Delhi is playing a waiting game and highlighted the $750 
million of Indian assistance. A German analyst raised the issue of those 
Western allies who do not want to go south; he indicated that the Afghan 
government wants the Germans to stay in the north. A Dutch analyst 
wondered how one could channel more aid through the Afghan 
government given its weak structure. An EU official underscored the fact 
that the EU alone had made a seven-year commitment in Afghanistan. He 
noted that there were many calls for “Afghanistisation”, but like the 
previous participant, he too wondered how one could do that outside of 
Kabul. He noted the great difficulty of building up the rule of law on the 
basis of three legal systems (traditional rules, Sharia law and Western 
norms). 
A Pakistani official pointed out that Pakistan deserves gratitude, 
since it had made possible the overthrow of the Taliban after having hosted 
over 4 million refugees. More than 700 Pakistani soldiers had been killed in 
the Waziristan operation. Some 35,000 Afghans are crossing the Afghan 
border legally on a daily basis. 
A NATO official remarked that the process is actually worse than the 
content: we have great trouble in going beyond a piecemeal ad hoc 
approach. 
A defence analyst expressed interest in the effectiveness of actual and 
potential measures aimed at controlling the Afghan border and the 
chairman asked our guests for their views on a contact group format for 
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dealing with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a question was put by the CEPS 
representative concerning ‘Greater Afghanistan’: Who wants it and is it 
serious? 
Ismail Khan noted that 74% of the population of the North-West 
Frontier Province of Pakistan speak Pashtun while the 3.5 million 
inhabitants of the seven tribal areas are mostly Pashtun (of which 700,000 
live outside of the government unit in South Waziristan). Nevertheless, 
“Pashtunistan” is a nationalism that has been diluted with economic 
improvement in Pakistan (the North-West Frontier Province comes 
immediately after the Punjab in terms of economic prosperity). 
Hekmat Karzai remarked that there is a massive brain drain in 
Afghanistan from the government to the aid agencies, a process that 
weakens the government. While expressing gratitude for the support 
Pakistan’s people provided while he was a refugee, he noted that Afghan–
Pakistani relations tend to mimic Indo–Pakistani relations, despite the fact 
that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are Muslim countries. He viewed the 
revival of the grand loya jirga for the Pashtun on both sides of the border as 
a positive step. 
Peter Berger raised the issue of the legalisation of growing poppies 
for medicinal purposes. He agreed that Pakistan had been instrumental in 
the fall of the Taliban – but that it had also contributed to their rise. 
Andrei Zagorski did not take kindly to the notion of mining the 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (to prevent militants from 
crossing); setting aside other considerations this has never worked. On the 
overall situation, he considered that we needed to define what would be a 
satisfactory outcome. 
Julian Lindley-French stressed that if we fail in Afghanistan, the 
strategic situation for India and Pakistan would worsen, particularly for 
Pakistan. He repeated the serious effect German reticence was having on 
UK–German relations. And in conclusion, he supported the idea of creating 
a contact group. 
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‘Afghanistan-lite’: The Crunch 
Julian Lindley-French* 
Introduction 
Afghanistan is at a crunch point. Put simply, either the 37 countries 
currently engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan through the UN-
mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) recognise and 
stand up to the enormity of the challenge (and the opportunity) or the 
West’s signature mission will fail at the start of the new strategic age. Those 
are the stakes. In other words, Afghanistan is about so much more than 
Afghanistan. Today, there are not enough resources, in spite of the $10 
billion pledged by donors. And, even at 35,000 strong, there are not enough 
forces (helicopters or troops). The Afghan people, who have a tradition of 
backing those most likely to prevail, have lost or are losing faith in the 
West. It is a set of failing circumstances that must be changed and changed 
rapidly if the defeatism that is beginning to predominate in the West is not 
to spread. 
Such defeatism is in fact a paradox because given cohesion and 
political will the West could actually generate the power and effect so 
required. Indeed, the West today is the richest, most powerful grouping the 
world has ever known but for reasons best known to its leaders, it is 
attempting to change the very nature of security governance with at least 
one metaphorical arm tied behind its collective back. Ultimately, it is not 
the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Pashtun who are threatening the West with 
failure, complex though the situation in Afghanistan may be. Rather, it is 
the refusal of political leaders in the West to recognise the importance of 
success, the full implications of failure and invest accordingly. Moreover, it 
is failure that is leading inexorably to the coalescence of Taliban, al-Qaeda 
and Pashtun interests, something that would have been unthinkable when 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on 7 October 2001.  
                                                     
* Julian Lindley-French is a Senior Scholar, Centre for Applied Policy, Munich and 
a Senior Associate Fellow, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. 
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The core message of this analysis is therefore simple: now is the time 
to re-double the effort, not reduce it. If the West is not to lose Afghanistan, 
and with it much of its strategic leadership credibility, then the petty 
infighting and double-speak of the past three years must end. This is an age 
of strategic change in desperate need of grand stability. Furthermore, the 
successful governance of such change must necessarily be founded on 
security architecture with the enlightened West as its cornerstone. 
Consequently, Afghanistan will help to define not just the age, but also the 
role of the West therein. Therefore, the shortsighted and self-defeating 
factional game playing in the West that places marginal advantage before 
strategic effect must end. It is doing incalculable damage, not just to the 
future of Afghanistan, but also to the future of Europeans and North 
Americans alike in a world more dangerous by the day. Make no mistake, 
if the West is forced out of Afghanistan and the Karzai regime in Kabul 
evaporates, like that of the Najibullah regime before it, then the message to 
friends and foe alike will be clear – given time, given effort and given 
resolve, the West will always be forced out. No one said it would be easy, 
but mission impossible? Only if the West chooses to make it so. 
This analysis looks at the situation in Afghanistan on four levels – the 
grand strategic, the regional–strategic, the Afghan national and the 
military–operational. It then concludes with a brief agenda for the future. 
History has been hard on Afghanistan but the West today is neither the 
America of 1970s Vietnam nor the Soviet Union of 1980s Afghanistan. It is 
time the West got on with the job of doing what it takes to make 
Afghanistan work. There can be no ‘Afghanistan-lite’. 
The new great game – The grand strategic crunch  
Afghanistan-lite represents a collective failure of strategic imagination in 
the West. In addition, Afghanistan has become the place where the over-
militarised American war on terror has come face to face with the over-
civilianised and locally focused anachronism of contemporary European 
peacekeeping. Consequently, both elements are forced to apply what they 
have, in pursuit of what they must do in a place notoriously unforgiving on 
those who fail to comprehend the relationship between strategic impact 
and the dark side of globalisation.  
This failure of strategic imagination is founded upon several factors: 
first, an American oversimplification of what is required to generate effect 
in a place where the borders drawn by 19th century Europeans have little or 
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no meaning to the people on the ground. Second, there is a collective 
psychosis about the influence of history, particularly in Europe, that makes 
its re-living all the more likely. Third, there is a lack of consensus over the 
role of Afghanistan in the sense of grand stability. This is partly because of 
poor American strategic leadership since 2001, and partly because too 
many Europeans put doing the least possible there before doing what must 
be done to render the place stable. Fourth, it is a consequence of the 
inversion of the natural order through a profound confusion over values 
and interests, which has placed democracy before stability and conflated 
the two. Fifth, there is a simple lack of cash to outbid the Taliban for the 
support of the Pashtun.  
As a result, nothing like the resources have been invested in 
Afghanistan that its grand strategic importance demands and nothing like 
the political cohesion is being generated that is vital to success. Current 
operations in Afghanistan take place in a region that is not only becoming 
the centre of gravity of world security but also where many of the actors 
thereabouts are themselves emerging as grand strategic players. They are 
all watching and waiting to understand the extent or otherwise of Western 
resolve and will draw conclusions accordingly as to whether the West is to 
be supported or not. Iran, flanked on either border by Western forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, is gauging not only the collective resolve of the West 
but also whether such an entity retains any wider meaning, given Tehran’s 
own regional ambitions. Russia, still smarting over its ‘defeat’ in the cold 
war, still obsessed by NATO and still conscious of the support the West 
gave to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, seems willing to do 
little to pave the way for success. China, emerging on the world stage, 
notes with interest the inner-game of Western politics and concludes that 
when push comes to shove European support for American strategic 
leadership is to say the very least lukewarm as far as matters Asian are 
concerned. India, conscious of China’s growing influence and all too aware 
of the implications of Western failure in the North-West Frontier for 
disputed Jammu and Kashmir waits and watches to see if the new strategic 
partnership with the West will be one worth having. The West today may 
be more idea than place, but is it one that new powers still see as credible in 
a new world? Like it or not, Afghanistan will do much to answer that 
question. Thus, the utility, bona fides and credibility of the West must be 
demonstrated to states, people and those of faith alike and it will take much 
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time and great effort to do so. That begs two questions: Has the West got 
the stomach for it? Is the West up to it? 
Equally, those in Europe who think that the West in any case no 
longer exists and propose simply withdrawing from Afghanistan need to 
think long and hard. The British went into Afghanistan in the late 19th 
century partly to obstruct Russian ambitions for a warm sea port, but also 
because of the instability of the North-West Frontier and the pressure it 
was placing on British India. The Soviets went into Afghanistan in 1979 
mainly because of concerns over the growing influence of radical Islam in 
its southern republics. In other words, Afghanistan has long been a 
crossroads of influence and a theatre for strategic and regional change. 
Indeed, that is part of Afghanistan’s tragedy. Today, the very nature of 
globalisation means that ‘black holes’ of security are not simply lost to 
civilised order. Connectivity and disorder are strange bedfellows but in this 
world, illegal activity can rapidly make them so. As a consequence, such 
places very quickly become the epicentres of strategic crime, where 
business in illegal commodities are at their most intense, be it hard drugs, 
small arms or weapons of mass destruction.  
Therefore, contemporary security policy is more often than not about 
hard choices in hard places like Afghanistan. Withdrawal is not an option 
because unmolested strategic crime and systemic terrorism will chase the 
West back to its own back streets. Again, like it or not, pulling out of 
Afghanistan will greatly exacerbate ‘blowback’, not least because in this 
age the democratisation of mass destruction, which is the dark side of 
globalisation, means that anyone can get anything given time, 
determination and freedom from the pressure of positive power. Thus, the 
only ‘option’ is to stay and make the benefits of legality outweigh what is 
by Western standards the benefits of illegality across the broad spectrum of 
criminal effect. 
That is a message that resonates across the great belt of instability, 
which has its buckle in Afghanistan. For the broader Middle East, the 
regimes there and those who seek to overturn them, the loss of Afghanistan 
will have a strategic eloquence that will resonate far and wide. Why? 
Because unlike Iraq the West is engaged in Afghanistan as the legitimate 
West and if it loses there then the whole concept of the West as the 
cornerstone security power in the new grand strategic architecture will be 
dealt the most searing of blows. What price Europe’s and North America’s 
vital resources then?  
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And yet, the sheer economic power of the West means it is doomed to 
retain the leadership mantle. The East might be emerging, but the West is 
not declining. It is another paradox of this strange strategic age that there is 
as yet no Newtonian balance between growth and decline. China and India 
may collectively represent 30% of global gross domestic product by 2020 
but today North America and Western Europe together represent some 
70% of it. Even the most pessimistic of economic assumptions suggest that 
by 2020 North America and Western Europe will still be the dominant 
economic, political and strategic grouping in the world. This view makes 
the West’s half-hearted attempts in Afghanistan at first glance so puzzling. 
The West has invested nothing like the resources in pursuit of success that 
it could. The reason for this is far more than the lingering discord over Iraq, 
which continues to pollute the mission in Afghanistan. It is more than the 
collective weakness or absence of European strategic vision. It is rather to 
do with the very incertitude back home in the West that the likes of al-
Qaeda seek to create. The West is profoundly split about the balance to be 
struck between projection and protection. Thus, what passes for ‘strategy’ 
has become focused on the delusion of millions (particularly in Europe) 
that they are not engaged in a war. It is also about the maintenance of that 
delusion by breaking the link between the provision of security and its cost. 
It is about governments having to end the strategic vacation and telling 
people that taxes will have to be increased. It is about the defeat of the long 
term by the short term. It is about the absence of leadership.  
Tragically, the popular security delusion has broken the essential link 
between much of Western society and the young men and women who act 
on their behalf in places like Afghanistan. That is why one sees the 
emergence of military ghettoes across the West full of soldiers and their 
families under the most intense pressure, detached from a society that 
understands little of what they do and cares even less.  
Afghanistan is a grand strategic crunch. It is time to face up to that 
reality and act, organise and invest accordingly.  
Rescuing the state – The regional strategic crunch 
Afghanistan is not so much a state as a space in which the interest of 
players is played out. There are many players – states and non-states alike. 
Indeed, the end-state of the West’s involvement has much to do with 
rescuing the state in Central and South Asia. Afghanistan is thus the pith of 
the regional–strategic game over order and hierarchy in the region. Sadly, 
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for many of the actors engaged there the game is increasingly about what 
happens after the West has gone. In its most pressing form, this regional–
strategic game concerns the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan as states. 
Without doubt, there can be no solution to Afghanistan without a 
permanent settlement in Pakistan and herein lies the essential dilemma. 
Islamabad is in an invidious position, trapped between its external 
relations with the West and others, such as India and China, and its 
internal cocktail of secularism, fundamentalism and tribalism.  
Therefore, if the West is to prove itself a credible, long-term, strategic 
security stabiliser it must be equally credible in its commitments to both 
Kabul and Islamabad. Much of the credibility of the West in the region and 
the wider Islamic world will be founded on the role it plays in resolving the 
Pakistan–Afghanistan–Pashtun triangle. Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat 
Aziz was right during a visit to NATO on 30 January 2007 when he said, 
“Pakistan is committed to a strong, stable Afghanistan. The one country 
that will benefit most, after Afghanistan itself, will be Pakistan.” At the 
very least the West must convince those senior Pakistanis equivocal about 
the West’s role in Afghanistan that Pakistan’s best hope for such an 
outcome is full support for the OEF and ISAF and the wider, 
comprehensive security approach the West is trying to foster. Moreover, 
winning Pakistan could over time help to persuade many in the Islamic 
world, wherever they may be, that latter-day grand stability missions led 
by the West are not the latest iteration of some crusading/imperialist 
impulse. At the very least, there needs to be a stronger Islamic flavour to 
current operations in Afghanistan in spite of the presence of Albanians, 
Azeris and Turks in the ISAF. 
Equally, significant parts of the Islamic world are in some form of 
devotional civil war and this conflict undermines the very states, such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which by definition of being states owe their 
origins to the organisation of power and society by the West. Thus, there is 
a continuum between geo-politics, state security and stability, and human 
security, which finds its centre of gravity and its crisis point in that region. 
Certainly, the strategic continuum should be central to the strategic 
narrative that the West has proved so poor at telling be it to those at home 
or to those whom it seeks to assist. The message is a simple one: while the 
West is committed to a stable state structure, it does not and will not seek 
to influence the creed of any state. At the same time, the West will confront 
all forms of extremism that threaten order. That is why a regional–strategic 
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solution is so pressing. The possibility of the Pakistani nuclear programme 
falling into extremist Islamist hands with a jihadist agenda cannot be 
discounted. Such a possibility is clearly linked to the ability of such 
elements to operate and organise almost with impunity in Waziristan and 
across the northern areas, and thus the strengthening of the Pakistani state 
is as much an essential interest of the West as the strengthening of the 
Afghan state.  
While the West must help strengthen both the Pakistani and Afghan 
states, it must also grasp the pivotal importance of a Pashtun settlement. 
Finding a solution to the Pashtun dilemma on both sides of the border is in 
many ways the crux of the entire mission. The easing of the dilemma will 
require sacrifices. It will entail the ending of efforts by those in Kabul who 
dream of a ‘Greater Afghanistan’ and the neutering of those elements in 
Pakistani intelligence who believe that the ambitions of India (rightly or 
wrongly) in Afghanistan and the north-west territories must be countered, 
even if that means implicitly or explicitly supporting the Taliban in its 
struggle against ‘foreigners’. Changing that dynamic will only be achieved 
if the West demonstrates once and for all that the ‘after the West has gone’ 
game is not an option.  
Indeed, only through the easing of the Pashtun dilemma will the re-
separation of Taliban, al-Qaeda and Pashtun interests likely be achieved, 
which is crucial. A not insignificant part of the dilemma stems from the 
Durand line, which separates south-east Afghanistan from north-west 
Pakistan. Drawn by a British imperial official in 1893, it denies the Pashtun 
an effective homeland. But that was then and this is now. An ideal 
approach would be to carve out a new homeland from the areas of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan for the Pashtun. Yet such a ‘solution’ would clearly offend 
both Islamabad and Kabul to the point of rupture in their relations with the 
West. At the same time, both capitals must understand that there is a price 
for the continued support of both capitals by the West and surely the offer 
of de facto autonomy for a Pashtun homeland could be one such instrument. 
This approach would shift the interests of Pashtun leaders back to 
supporting both states and the West and thus break the link with the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, who still operate across the ‘border’ with impunity 
and apparently total alacrity, especially since the Waziristan Accords of 5 
September 2006.  
Radical though such a solution may be, it is necessary that this kind 
of lateral thinking be at least put on the table, because a regional–strategic 
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solution is essential to success and that will only take place if the old 
imperial band-aid is replaced with something more reflective of the reality 
on the ground. The first step is thus to generate solidarity through a 
common appreciation of the problem, particularly among the all-important 
intelligence communities (which are so much more and in some cases can 
be players in their own right). Albeit modest, such hopes received a 
significant boost with the creation of the Afghan, ISAF, Pakistan 
Intelligence Centre in Kabul. It is a start. The rescuing of the state will 
require a re-arranging of relationships over time that will need to be 
smoothed, of course, by the expeditious use of large amounts of Western 
aid and support. With a new spring offensive by the Taliban in the offing 
this kind of lateral thinking is an imperative.  
Making Afghanistan work – The national crunch 
The Afghan people, especially those in the south and east, have suffered 
long and hard. It is not surprising that they are suspicious of the promises 
of foreigners. They have heard and seen it all before and it can be expected 
that have little trust for outsiders. Creating an Afghanistan that can and 
will improve the lot of its people is no easy task. That has traditionally been 
the role of the clan or tribe rather than the state, although there have been 
periods when the state has functioned to more or less effect. The model so 
chosen has been to try to embrace those with power by bringing them 
within the framework of legitimate government. The complexities of that 
approach have been evident since the establishment of the loya jirga [grand 
council] in 2003 and through national and regional elections. Nevertheless, 
some success has been realised. In what the British would recognise as a 
classically colonial method of governance, this has meant buying off 
warlords and tribal chiefs and attempting to bring them into government. 
Strangely, the West has failed to buy the people as well, which in the 
overall scheme of things would represent a modest investment. 
Still, such an approach has its weaknesses and it can only be justified 
if there is a parallel strengthening of regional government and governance. 
The paradox is that while it is critical that such controversial figures as 
General Rashid Dostum, General Atta Mohammed and either Gul Agha 
Sherzai or Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf (or both) are brought into government 
their bitter rivalry and past warlordism has prevented the establishment of 
a better balance in central government. Thus, the complexity faced by the 
West in Afghanistan is compounded by the very solution sought. That is 
204 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
Afghanistan. Its complexity is reinforced in the crucial south and east by 
the role of the mainly Uzbek and Tajik Northern Alliance, which aided the 
American-led coalition back in 2001. So many of the Afghan people have 
become disillusioned by so many ‘familiar’ and unwelcome faces re-
appearing in and around the government – elections or no elections. This 
disillusionment will take time to dissipate. 
There is no easy solution. It will of course take time to change the 
dynamic of leadership in Afghanistan and there are certain power realities 
that cannot be avoided. Frankly, for the foreseeable future the price – and 
there will be a price – of buying stability will be high. Far greater efforts 
will be needed to improve the behaviour of those with tainted pasts, render 
transparent their current dealings and provide confidence, as well as 
alternative sources of income to poppy production. According to the UN, 
Afghanistan produced 92% of the world’s opium in 2006, some 30% more 
than the market can bear and which is up some 500% since 2002. Only 6 of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are now drug-free. However one looks at it, the 
ISAF has overseen the re-emergence of the world’s largest narco-economy. 
The very real question is whether the West has the will to make the 
investment that could wean farmers and tribes off such produce and the 
will to stand firm against those in government and beyond with 
connections to it. That is a big question.  
Clearly, any ‘solution’ to this conundrum is not going to happen now 
or next year but requires an enormous security investment over many 
years, 90% of which will need to be civilian in nature. At the very least five 
parallel tracks must be pursued. First is the further strengthening in the 
short to medium term of the institutions of state, with specific reference to 
re-building the judicial system, police and the Afghan National Army. 
Second is the progressive involvement of regional partners also keen on a 
stable Afghanistan in a practical reconstruction role that creates a new, 
legitimate ‘single’ market in the region. Third is the progressive 
civilianisation of the West’s presence in Afghanistan linked to an economic 
plan for the further restructuring of the Afghan economy. Then over time, 
one objective must be the de-Westernisation of both the mission and the 
presence. Fourth, justice must be seen to be done. It is important that 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is apprehended as soon as possible and brought to 
justice for the range of attacks he has instigated. It is even more important 
that the rampant corruption is weeded out and seen to be so. Fifth, 
Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb aid must be markedly improved. 
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Ultimately, central to the Afghan conundrum is the reconstitution of 
viable local administration. As indicated above it is requisite to the long-
term stability of Afghanistan and at least as important as a strong 
government in Kabul. There will be setbacks but the British and the UN are 
right to see initiatives to strengthen regional and local government and 
governance as crucial. Washington needs to support such efforts and avoid 
the ‘not invented here’ attitude that too often undermines the efforts of 
coalition partners, particularly as it relates to the Musa Qala agreement 
(and its like) with the Pashtun. Ethnically dominant in the south and east of 
the country, they represent a deeply tribal society that is split into many 
different clan-based groupings. They are long used to arguing over 
everything: the distribution of money, drugs, guns, access to education, 
water and business (legal and illegal). Nonetheless, a form of order does 
assert itself with the right incentives. The Pashtun by and large feel that the 
2005 elections to the National Assembly did not further their interests (and 
it is tribal interests that matter) and have regrettably thus returned to more 
traditional tactics such as violence and intimidation. This basic dynamic 
has enabled the Taliban to reconstitute and given al-Qaeda the space and 
protection to begin to restore some form of command structure. There will 
always be a complex mix of tribe, religion and money that dictates 
relationships but history suggests that such a reality should not prevent 
efforts to do business with dominant groupings, such as the Alozia tribe. It 
might also help if more effort was put into curbing demand for heroin in 
the West.  
The bottom line is this: one cannot ultimately be effective in a place 
such as Afghanistan without also being legitimate. That works two ways. 
First, the transfer of authority for the construction of civil society must be 
handed over to the UN as soon as possible. Second, the ongoing building of 
trust with tribal elders and moderate mullahs must continue. It must be in 
their interests to change. If that means buying such influence for a time 
then so be it. However one cuts it the key to this is an awful lot of Western 
money. Hopefully, such a project in time can involve the money of the 
newly rich, such as China and India, and the classically rich such as Japan. 
The ‘Afghanistan/London Compact’ was a beginning but much more is 
needed, because while Afghanistan is a test for the West, it is also a test for 
the whole system of institutionalised security governance that all the big 
powers claim to support. 
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If such a global approach and effort is not adopted, then for all the 
Stage 4 expansion of the ISAF and the work of the 25 provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRTs), NATO’s mission and by extension that of the 
West will come down to the open-ended protection of a little-loved and 
unrepresentative government in and around Kabul. If that is the case then 
Afghanistan is not working. 
Filling the security space – The capability–capacity crunch 
NATO forces are doing an admirable job in many parts of Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, Western forces in Afghanistan face a capability–capacity 
crunch. Indeed, armed forces designed to create the security space are 
rarely capable of filling it over time, intensity and distance. Without 
wishing to underestimate the difficulty of their role in such a place, the 
search-and-destroy forces attached to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
have a reasonably clear mandate and mission. Unfortunately, Afghanistan, 
as so often in the past, is exposing the weaknesses and contradictions of 
Western military planning over the last 15 years. It may well be the case 
now that respective missions of counter-terrorism, stabilisation and 
reconstruction are becoming mutually counterproductive. Re-building one 
day then ‘unbuilding’ or even ‘non-building’ when the military have 
created the security space the next hardly demonstrates the shared sense of 
mission that is demanded by such complex places and a comprehensive 
approach to a strategic and security impact. The plain fact is that the forces 
in Afghanistan are organised to mask weakness, not to generate effect. 
The European concept of peacekeeping, encapsulated in the 1992 
Petersberg tasks of rescue and humanitarian missions, and the role of 
combat troops in peacemaking belong to a different time and a different 
place. Within the context of Afghanistan, they are hopelessly anachronistic 
as is the mindset that underpins them. The refusal of many European allies 
to support their British, Dutch and Canadian partners in robust counter-
insurgency operations in the Helmand and Uruzgan provinces is only 
partly owing to political weakness. Afghanistan has exposed the sham of 
force planning in a host of European states that possess neither the 
numbers nor the quality to sustain operations in such a place if organised 
in such a shambolic way. Consequently, NATO faces the most profound 
crisis of capacity given the forces needed for adequate stabilisation and 
reconstruction missions. Although 35,000 might sound like a formidable 
force the ratios required to undertake effective operations in a place like 
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Afghanistan demands a far greater force. Moreover, the differences in the 
quality of the equipment, training and doctrine of the personnel available 
to NATO commanders are striking; together these differences compound 
the capability–capacity crunch markedly. 
The capacity crunch has also been compounded by capability-led 
force transformation. Under American leadership, NATO forces have been 
invited to become more professional, to be more effective, more mobile and 
more lethal. For most NATO nations, however, that has led to a hard choice 
having to be made between such capabilities and the capacity needed to 
sustain stabilisation and reconstruction missions. Some states are trying to 
find a way to resolve this dilemma through a comprehensive approach to 
security, or what NATO calls Comprehensive Planning and Action (CPA). 
Much of it is predicated on the belief that reconstruction comes after 
conflict and stabilisation. Yet as Afghanistan is so clearly demonstrating, 
one reconstructs during conflict and stabilisation, not after it. 
Reconstruction is in many ways the essential process that bridges conflict 
and stabilisation. 
These tensions have led to a virtual breakdown of alliance solidarity, 
which could have profound implications for both NATO and European 
Union security and defence. Indeed, those Europeans who talk about 
Afghanistan presaging the demise of NATO had better clear their woolly 
minds, for such a failure would also put an end to any hope of effective and 
relevant European defence. Put simply, trust among allies is being lost day 
by day and will take a long time to recover. In the context of Afghanistan it 
is evident that while states such as the US and UK will continue to 
endeavour to energise chains of command within the OEF and ISAF they 
will also look for non-European partners who over time can be better 
trusted and perhaps have a better grasp of the significance of current 
change than many Europeans. Make no mistake, relations between the US, 
the UK, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands on one hand, and France, 
Germany and Italy et al. on the other are being sorely tested by 
Afghanistan. Given the lessons learned, a country such as the UK now has 
little or no choice BUT to look for alternative partners the world over who 
will likely be more willing to support British forces in dangerous places at 
dangerous moments.  
The situation comes down to this: those Europeans who refuse 
military support to their allies at crunch points had better understand that 
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they have crossed an important threshold and they are no longer seen as 
indispensable allies by the Americans and British.  
Nor is this simply an exclusively European problem. For all its many 
faults the Musa Qala agreement with tribal elders led to a ceasefire with 
local Taliban forces commanded by the late Mullah Ghaffour, which held 
for some four months. What is more, it opened up a possible similar 
agreement for the northern Helmand town of Nawzad as part of a process 
of a UN- and British-led counter-radicalisation that the US either does not 
understand or does not want to understand. These are important early 
steps towards trying to change the political dynamics on the ground. The 
US was wrong to brief so heavily against it. What this situation 
demonstrates again is that too much of the energy being expended in 
Afghanistan is lost trying to forge an effective strategy between the over-
militarised (stick) Americans and the over-civilianised (carrot) Europeans, 
with the British, Dutch and Canadians too often forced to be the meat in the 
sandwich. Hence a further 800 British troops were dispatched to southern 
Afghanistan. At the very least, any state that sends its troops to 
Afghanistan must make an unequivocal commitment to do whatever is 
needed, wherever it is so required to achieve the necessary effect.  
Above all there is an urgent need for a lessons-learned debate within 
the West about the role of coercion, stabilisation and reconstruction in 
places where the West seems neither welcomed or wanted yet which are 
vital to Western interests. Given the prevailing environment the alternative 
is that the West, or at least the US, simply retreats into a punishment 
strategy. Certainly, the very real danger exists that those who 
misunderstand Afghanistan and its importance will permit what is a 
crucial debate over the nature of engagement to be hijacked by those who 
have no strategic concept at all. If the danger of ‘losing’ the West’s armed 
forces down a black hole of Afghan stabilisation and reconstruction efforts 
is deemed greater than the need to establish a stabilisation and 
reconstruction ‘shop window’, then the crunch will grind this operation 
down. If that really is the case then the West should stop its own strategic 
pretence. It should also stop pretending to the Afghan people that the West 
is in for the long haul and committed to the improvement of their lives. If 
that is the case then the West should get out now. Then, at least, the 
Afghans can sort it out in a traditionally Afghan way, and the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda can return to their core business.  
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Nothing dramatic will happen in the short term but the damage is 
being done. Undoubtedly, a continued lack of support or endless 
disingenuous quibbling over rules of engagement will ultimately result in 
the re-nationalisation of security and defence in Europe and the forming of 
new partnerships. This is what is at stake…and this is a tipping point. 
Afghanistan-lite: The crunch 
To reiterate, Afghanistan is at crunch point. Afghanistan-lite is not 
working. Decisions taken over the next few months will decide whether the 
West is serious about giving Afghanistan a stability that has only ever been 
known fleetingly or whether it begins the process of disengagement. Over 
the next year, NATO and OEF forces will face repeated attacks by the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda. Moreover, after a series of crushing losses at the 
hands of NATO forces the Taliban will doubtless resort to terrorism and 
other forms of asymmetric warfare. If things go horribly wrong, the 
Pashtun elders could throw their lot in with NATO’s adversaries. Together 
these circumstances are truly going to be a pivotal point in the struggle for 
Afghanistan.  
At the very least, the West’s Afghanistan agenda should be informed 
by the issues that are at stake and what is needed to widen and deepen its 
impact in this crucible of strategic effort, as set out below. 
The grand strategic agenda. It is imperative that a new great game is 
avoided. A contact group comprising the West, China, India, Pakistan, 
Russia and, if possible Iran, would expand ownership of the solution and 
the legitimacy of the engagement. The UN has a key role to play in 
legitimising such a group but the West under American leadership must 
widen the partnership.  
The regional strategic agenda. Afghanistan’s future is not simply to be 
found within its borders. The whole region needs a new economic 
grouping underpinned by the West, Russia, India and China, which 
includes the likes of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Iran to help develop a model for regional economic 
interaction. Such group interaction will help to introduce the benefits of 
regional dynamism and in time turn Afghanistan from being a victim of 
change into a beneficiary.  
The national agenda. In solving the problem of the Pashtun, at the very 
least the challenge of Afghanistan will be eased, if not that of the wider 
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region. It is evident that trying to create a strong central government in 
Kabul and then extending its writ to places such as Kandahar is not 
working. Rather, much greater consideration needs to be given to an 
autonomous, self-administered Pashtun region that is overseen by a joint 
Afghan–Pakistani commission. It is essential that a new relationship be 
established on both sides of the border between the 28 million Pashtun in 
Pakistan and the 12.5 million Pashtun in Afghanistan, Islamabad and 
Kabul. 
The military–operational agenda. The new US commander of the ISAF, 
General Dan McNeill, needs:  
a) a strategic reserve that he can deploy to any part of the country at any 
time should the situation so require it. The Taliban (and al-Qaeda) 
must understand that they will be struck and struck hard when they 
make incursions or break agreements such as that forged in Musa 
Qala;  
b) a unity of command covering all the forces in Afghanistan. That 
includes merging the ISAF and OEF; and  
c) the organisation of all forces and commands on a multinational basis 
so that the PRTs cannot become an excuse for national contingents to 
‘hide’.  
Finally, General McNeill will also have to curb his erstwhile lust for 
air power (earning him the nickname ‘bomber’) and prove adept at the 
balance between the comprehensive approach and counter-insurgency 
operations. Above all, he must be given the people and the tools to do the 
job. A good start would be the creation of one force, committed to one end 
with all the allies willing and able to share the burden of effect. 
At this crunch point for Afghanistan, only time will tell if the West 
has the vision, the commitment and the will to invest the resources that 
only it can. If not, then the crunch will doom not only the Afghan people to 
servitude and misery, but any pretence the West has for the governance of 
peaceful change on this troubled planet. Some places forgive mediocrity; 
Afghanistan is no such place. No one said it would be easy but those are 
the stakes. 
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Lessons from Soviet Experiences 
of Socialist Modernisation 
in Afghanistan (1978–89) 
Andrei Zagorski* 
The Soviet Afghanistan policy in 1978–89 (from the April 1978 coup 
organised by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA to the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989) went through several phases. At each 
stage, a comprehensive set of policy tools was applied by Moscow in order 
to assist the PDPA in a socialist kind of modernisation by political, military, 
economic, social and ideological means. The emphasis in applying those 
tools was ever-changing, depending on the objectives and the lessons 
learned by the Soviet leadership during this period. 
The coup took Moscow by surprise, but it quickly embraced the 
‘April revolution’ and engaged in a large-scale Sovietisation experiment. 
This experiment failed, leaving behind significant fallout. Although one 
could argue that the attempt to implant Soviet practices forcibly in 
Afghanistan was doomed to fail, the experience gathered during those 
years has broader relevance. While Soviet or socialist in nature, it reveals 
features in common with many other attempts at the accelerated 
modernisation of a poor country with a traditional society. 
At the start of the 1978 coup, the Soviet leadership did not believe in 
the feasibility of a socialist experiment in what it described as a backward 
feudal country with incapable leadership. Afghanistan was not considered 
ripe for a socialist transformation as it found itself among the poorest 
countries in the world dominated by a rural population engaged in an 
agrarian economy. Nevertheless, acting within the context of the cold war, 
once the PDPA took over Kabul, Moscow signalled its readiness to support 
the new regime, underpinned by the belief that the Soviet Union could not 
afford to lose Afghanistan to the ‘enemy’. Once this doctrine took hold, it 
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triggered a chain of fatal decisions that eventually led the Soviet Union to 
invade the country in December 1979. 
The focus on preserving a weak, unpopular regime and the 
identification of the Afghan army as the single most important institution 
for keeping the government in power implied the pre-eminence of military 
means in Moscow’s policy. All the governments in Afghanistan between 
1978 and 1992 were comfortable with this policy as they did not rely on 
domestic support and sought a powerful external actor to compensate for 
their weakness. Nevertheless, Soviet policy was not restricted to just 
providing military assistance to Kabul. It applied a complex mix of policy 
instruments, such as financial and technical assistance, economic 
development and institution- and capacity-building, including the training 
of personnel within the country and abroad. 
This paper focuses on the non-military aspects of Moscow’s 
reconstruction and modernisation policy against the background of 
developments in Afghanistan in 1978–89. After a brief summary of Soviet 
assistance to Afghanistan prior to the 1978 coup, it discusses Moscow’s 
agenda for Afghanistan in 1978–79, before the invasion. During this phase, 
the Soviet Union concentrated on capacity-building and technical 
assistance in the expectation that this would help to avoid direct 
intervention. The third section summarises Soviet policy between 1980 and 
1986, after its invasion of Afghanistan. This period is characterised by the 
heavy reliance of the Karmal government on Moscow and by the regime’s 
failure to ensure domestic political support, particularly in rural areas. The 
fourth section looks at the Soviet exit strategy in 1986–89, which went 
hand-in-hand with the attempt to achieve a domestic and international 
political settlement to allow a face-saving pullout of Soviet troops. The 
concluding section presents some generalisations about Soviet experiences 
with Afghanistan. 
1. Soviet assistance to Afghanistan prior to the 1978 coup 
Afghanistan had been a Soviet client state since 1919 but was increasingly 
so after World War II. Moscow regularly provided the country with 
financial assistance, supplied it with arms and trained its officers. It helped 
to develop the country’s infrastructure, which included telegraph and radio 
communications, the construction of roads and pipelines and the 
modernisation of airports. These projects were concentrated in the north of 
the country, which helped to connect Afghanistan with the Soviet Union. 
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Especially after World War II, Moscow engaged in economic development 
in Afghanistan, assisting with the building of electric plants and irrigation 
systems, raw materials extraction (oil, gas and copper), as well as the 
development of the social infrastructure, such as educational facilities. By 
1955, the Soviet Union was the leading country providing foreign 
assistance to Afghanistan. 
Special importance was given to equipping the Afghan army with 
Soviet (Warsaw Pact) weapons systems and to training the officer corps in 
both the Soviet Union and in the country itself. In 1977, the Soviet Union 
had 350 technical and military advisers in Afghanistan. In the period 1956–
78, 3,000 Afghan officers (air force, air defence, artillery, medical personnel 
and others) were trained in the Soviet Union. An even larger number of 
them were trained in different Warsaw Pact countries. As a result, the 
Soviet Union was not just providing assistance but also directly training the 
new armed forces of Afghanistan. The programme was ambitious and 
foresaw the introduction of new weapons systems and new types of forces, 
namely special forces. Many officers were indoctrinated during their 
education in the Soviet Union and were considered important Soviet 
resources in the country, although the authorities in Kabul did not trust 
them and hesitated in promoting them to senior positions. For this reason 
among others the PDPA and notably its radical wing developed strong 
roots in the army. By 1978, its 5,000 officer members represented roughly 
one-third of the entire membership of the party. 
Afghanistan did not appear to Soviet officials as a terra incognita. 
Moscow had gathered long experience in assisting the country, although no 
single attempt at modernisation, from the 1920s onwards, had succeeded. 
Both Islamic and leftist opposition to the regularly changing governments 
in Kabul had grown considerably in the country before the 1978 coup. 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, two prominent leaders 
of the armed resistance to the PDPA regime, had both recruited their 
supporters from the Muslim youth movement that had been established in 
the late 1960s, which had grown almost in parallel to the national 
democratic youth movement led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the official 
leader of the 1978 coup. 
 
 
214 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
2. Technical assistance and capacity-building for the Taraki 
regime 
After taking over in Kabul in April 1978, the PDPA regime declared a 
policy of ‘socialist’ transformation of the country. It sought to win political 
and social support through the quick implementation of a series of reforms 
not entirely new to Afghanistan. These included, inter alia, the accelerated 
pursuit of land reform by distributing confiscated land among peasants. It 
put an emphasis on providing education to the predominantly illiterate 
population. The government intended to expand the state sector in the 
economy by developing industries. It also promoted the idea of women’s 
emancipation and particularly that of increasing women’s literacy. The 
government promised to ensure the equality of all peoples residing in the 
country. Mr Taraki (who served as President from May 1978 to September 
1979) verbally committed himself to Islam and the neutral status of the 
country. 
At the same time, the regime developed ambitious plans for building 
state institutions. Given that local specialists had left the state 
administration en masse after the coup, the PDPA sought to compensate 
their exodus by importing expertise and know-how from the Soviet Union. 
This move resulted in the large-scale experiment of Sovietisation. 
2.1 The toolbox of the Soviet policy 
Following the request from Kabul, the Soviet Union launched a massive 
effort to provide technical assistance by seconding hundreds of advisers to 
the government in Kabul. A group of senior advisers from the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) consulted the PDPA leadership on all 
relevant policy issues and specifically on the build-up of the PDPA party 
itself. Soviet advisers were seconded to all ministries. Each minister was 
provided with at least two advisers who worked on decisions to be taken 
and consulted with the ministers. Soviet advisers were tasked with 
building the security service, intelligence, social organisations and mass 
media. Particular importance was attached to restructuring the Afghan 
armed forces along the lines of the Soviet model. Priority was also given to 
modernisation and increased mobility. Advisers were seconded down to 
the regiment level. Political officers were introduced in the army in order to 
ensure its loyalty. 
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By the end of 1979, 1,500 Soviet advisers had been seconded to the 
civil agencies of Afghanistan, with 3,500 to 4,000 military personnel and 
technical experts working in the armed forces of the country. Their general 
assignment was to transfer Soviet know-how in their respective areas by 
assisting the administration in decision-making and in the organisation of 
practical work. The more specific mandate of the advisers’ teams included 
four main objectives, to 
• consolidate and broaden political and social support for the PDPA; 
• increase the influence of the PDPA in the army; 
• create social organisations with broad membership (youth, women’s 
and labour organisations); and 
• set up the structures of the central government. 
In the government domain, the emphasis was put on seconding 
Soviet staff to central government. There were almost no advisers seconded 
to provincial administrations, which were left on their own. 
The Soviet Union took over the burden of economic assistance to 
Afghanistan, which steadily grew with demands from Kabul. It included, 
among other things: 
• the supply of energy sources, especially petroleum products. Moscow 
compensated the interrupted supply from Iran and covered 62% of 
Afghanistan’s annual consumption; 
• the provision of long-term credit on beneficial conditions; 
• coverage of 80% of the costs of agreed projects worth some $450 
million annually, totalling almost $2.3 billion appropriated over a 
period of five years; 
• the costs of Afghanistan’s imports of consumption goods worth $250 
million a year; 
• food supplies; and 
• training in the Soviet Union for students and military personnel. 
Moscow also massively increased the amount of military assistance 
(arms transfers) to the Kabul government. 
2.2 The effect 
While the Soviet Union was providing intensive technical and material 
assistance to the Taraki government, the political ownership of the process 
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largely remained with Kabul. The Taraki regime revealed little competence or 
comprehension of the developments in the provinces. Most importantly, 
the government displayed little ability or willingness to learn from those 
developments and improve its performance. All appointments were made 
on the basis of the political, tribal or clan affiliations of the candidates. 
Competence was not an issue at all. The inner strife between the two 
factions (Khalq and Parcham) of the PDPA paralysed the government, 
which had never managed to reach out to the provinces and had further 
isolated itself. At the same time, the majority of the Soviet advisers not only 
proved to have little knowledge themselves but also failed to appreciate the 
real situation in Afghanistan. Their advice was predominantly dogmatic 
and often exacerbated the failures of the government in Kabul. 
As a result, the top-down reforms did not increase the popularity of 
the government. Instead, they triggered a flow of refugees and opposition. 
It is characteristic, however, that it was not specifically the introduction of 
Soviet practices but largely changes towards social modernisation that alienated 
the initially rather indifferent population. Notably land reform provoked 
strong resistance in the rural areas. Peasants, en masse, refused to take land 
from the landlords whom they had traditionally seen as a buffer and a 
source of protection from the central government. The majority of 
provinces did not even think of introducing the reform. In July 1979, Kabul 
was forced to stop its implementation programme. Previously, the first 
major crisis that had shaken the Kabul government and alarmed Moscow 
concerned another issue, being the upheaval in Herat in March 1979 that 
had begun with a protest against women’s education. 
In addition, Kabul messed up its relations with the Muslim clerics 
who led the protest and resistance. It failed to deliver on the promise to 
ensure the equality of peoples. On the contrary, Hafizullah Amin, the 
mastermind behind the 1978 coup and Kabul’s policies in 1978 and 1979 
(serving as Prime Minister in the Taraki government before succeeding as 
President), pursued the policy of further ‘Pashtunisation’ of the country. 
The government in Kabul responded to the political strife within the 
party, the resistance to reforms and the mounting opposition by increasing 
the repressive nature of the regime. It not only sought to force through top-
down reforms but also began to use military force intensively against the 
opposition. These tactics increased the isolation of the government and 
weakened support for it, which led to its loss of the army as an instrument 
of its policy. The number of deserters grew sharply. By the end of 1979, the 
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army had shrunk from 90,000 to 40,000 and had lost half of the officers. The 
government units often changed sides and joined the opposition. Units 
loyal to different factions in the PDPA repeatedly fought each other. The 
regime no longer trusted the army and sought to escape the collapse by 
Soviet military intervention. 
2.3 Moscow’s response 
The Soviet leadership was aware of the danger of military intervention as it 
saw the Kabul regime increasingly being isolated and realised that 
intervention would result in fighting against the population. Therefore, 
Moscow’s response was threefold. It urged President Taraki to change his 
policies. Moscow was also prepared to increase the support given to the 
regime significantly and considered assistance to raise the combat 
readiness of Afghanistan’s armed forces dramatically. 
Kabul was urged in particular to 
• broaden its social and political support by establishing a united front 
that brought together different strata of Afghan society. Such a front 
was viewed as a tool for political education and engaging the 
population; 
• restore the unity of the PDPA and reintegrate the Parcham faction 
into the government. Moscow went as far as to advise Kabul to 
include the moderate Islamic opposition in the political consultations 
and even in the government; 
• stop repression and torture, and abide by the legal norms; 
• consolidate and strengthen the army; 
• end the practice of government appointments based on loyalty to the 
Taraki (Khalq) faction;  
• establish control along the borders with Pakistan and Iran in order to 
prevent insurgency; 
• seek an arrangement with Pakistan; and 
• combat the armed resistance on its own. 
Moscow was prepared to increase significantly its financial, economic, 
military, ideological and technical assistance to help Kabul meet those 
ends. In April 1979, in a memorandum to the Politburo, the KGB Chief Yuri 
Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defence Minister Dimitri  
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Ustinov and the head of the CPSU Central Committee for the International 
Department Boris Ponomarev laid out what was to become the Soviet 
policy: 
• continued political support for Kabul; 
• increased arms supplies, financial and economic assistance; 
• the training of personnel; 
• support for establishing a system of political education; 
• the intensification of visits and exchanges at various levels; 
• political and diplomatic measures to curb external interference; and 
• briefings to other socialist countries about the measures to be taken. 
Yet few believed that this policy would work. In another 
memorandum of late June 1979, the same senior group on Afghanistan 
questioned the effectiveness of providing further support to Kabul. It 
described the army as the single most important instrument that could 
alleviate the situation. Hence, the emphasis was put on increasing the 
capacity of the armed forces to combat the insurgence. A large group of 
senior Soviet military staff inspected Kabul’s army in August 1979 in order 
to assess its needs and recommend policies to improve its performance 
substantially. 
3. The invasion 
Moscow’s strategy to increase the capacity of the Afghan armed forces was 
never properly tested, although there were signs that it was unlikely to 
work. From September 1979 onwards, any larger operation of the army was 
conducted only with the approval of the Soviet military advisers. The latter 
worked on raising the army’s readiness and took over the planning of 
operations. Although the Soviet military registered some improvements in 
autumn 1979, this effect began vanishing by the end of the year. 
The strategy was not given time to be tested because of the coup in 
Kabul in September, which resulted in the murder of President Taraki and 
the takeover by Mr Amin (who served as President from September to 
December 1979). Few in Moscow would have expected President Amin to 
follow the political advice given and be able to consolidate the regime. 
Particularly the KGB was convinced that no arrangement with Mr Amin 
would help and that only his replacement could save the regime. The 
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Soviet Union was prepared to intervene militarily in order to remove 
President Amin and install a more cooperative leader, doing so in 
December 1979. 
3.1 Moscow’s objectives and tools 
The political agenda for Afghanistan was set in Moscow only after the 
invasion, in January 1980, and was similar to what the Kremlin had wanted 
from the late President Taraki. In succeeding Mr Amin as President, Babrak 
Karmal (the leader of the PDPA’s Parcham faction), was expected to 
• consistently pursue the policy of restoring the overall unity of the 
PDPA; 
• form a broad alliance of ‘leftist and democratic’ organisations under 
the leadership of the PDPA and reach out to young persons, 
especially students; 
• negotiate with key tribes the terms necessary for ceasing the 
resistance; 
• collaborate with moderate Islamic clerics in order to isolate 
‘reactionary’ ones; and 
• develop cooperative relations with the Shiites. 
The Soviet contingent dispatched to the country included 50,000 
military personnel, 2,000 civil personnel and 1,000 KGB officers. This 
contingent was not only supposed to take control of important facilities and 
communications, but also to cultivate civil services, such as medical 
assistance to the population, and build schools, hospitals and repair roads. 
It was further tasked with establishing a system of political education 
around the PDPA in order to raise a new political elite in the country that 
would be committed to the socialist option. 
The strengthening of political education and propaganda was given 
high priority. Moscow provided additional staff for the Kabul bureau of the 
press agency Novosti, who were to help their Afghan counterparts prepare 
materials for printed media and disseminate printed matter and films. The 
Soviet measures included support for Afghan journalists. The focus was on 
the younger generation. Ideological cadres of the PDPA were trained at the 
Academy of Social Sciences under the PDPA Central Committee. Moscow 
finally shipped to Kabul the radio station that had been promised to the 
late President Taraki. 
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3.2 The effect 
President Karmal was more responsive to the advice given, yet at the same 
time he was perceived as a very weak leader. He began by promising a 
radical change in policy. A new constitution was adopted. The red banner 
of the rival Khalq faction was replaced by a green, black and red one. Some 
15,000 political prisoners were released. Decrees were issued to reverse the 
property confiscations that had taken place under the late President Amin. 
Wages and officers’ salaries were raised. Peasants were provided with 
seeds, fertilisers and credit. Prices for agricultural products were increased. 
The intentions to admit other ‘progressive patriotic parties’ and to hold free 
elections were declared. 
Kabul signalled a policy of reconciliation with Islam by readmitting 
religious symbols, although steps in that direction largely reproduced the 
rigid Soviet model. A department for religious affairs was established 
under the Council of Ministers and then transformed into a ministry at a 
later stage. In Kabul, 20 new mosques were constructed and 800 were 
repaired. The institute of field mullahs was introduced in the army, which 
partially helped to improve the morale of the troops. State funding was 
given to newly established religious institutions for the purposes of 
‘explaining the goals of the April revolution’. State funding was also 
available for pilgrims. 
The key project President Karmal was supposed to work on was the 
establishment of a united national front to increase acceptance of the 
regime. A conference of Afghan ‘national and patriotic forces’ was 
established in 1980, which later became a national front in 1981 and 
included the PDPA, trade unions, the PDPA youth organisation, the 
Women’s Union, and the Union of Writers and Journalists. Those 
organisations represented 2% of the Afghan population. By 1983, President 
Karmal had succeeded in increasing the membership of the PDPA from 
80,000 to 100,000. 
Despite some changes, the regime largely failed to meet the 
benchmarks set by the Soviet Union. The national front failed to find 
anchorage in the provinces. President Karmal sought to substitute it by 
reviving the traditional institution of the loya jirga – a grand council of the 
seniors of the local tribes. Kabul never risked holding ‘free elections’. And 
in 1981, it publicly admitted the failure of the land reform. 
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The record on consolidating the army was ambiguous. By 1981, the 
number of servicemen had further dropped to some 25,000. Following 
pressure from Soviet advisers, Kabul reduced the age of the draft from 22 
to 20, drafted reservists under the age of 35 for a second term and extended 
the length of military service to three years. These steps enabled the army 
to grow to 130,000 but did not help to improve its morale. The army 
continuously avoided engaging in fighting. 
Meanwhile, inner strife within the party continued. The PDPA and 
particularly its leadership remained isolated from society. The perpetual 
practice of politically biased appointments resulted in a further 
deterioration of the administration’s competence at all levels. The initiation 
of negotiations with Pakistan and Iran failed, as Islamabad insisted on the 
formation of a government with free elections. 
The more President Karmal failed to meet the benchmarks, the more 
repressive his regime became. Furthermore, Mr Karmal consistently 
pursued the policy of transferring burdens and responsibilities to the Soviet 
representatives. He largely succeeded in doing so. As a result, it was 
particularly the Soviet troops who were not only directly involved in 
warfare but who also took over the main burden of it from the summer of 
1980. 
3.3 Moscow’s response 
The Soviet Union grew increasingly disappointed with developments in 
Afghanistan and especially the performance of the leadership of the PDPA. 
Tension developed between Moscow and Kabul. As dangerous 
developments became more apparent, the Soviet leadership sought to 
respond by increasing weapons and food supplies, and by accelerating 
the training of Afghan officers. Yet it also became clear to Moscow that 
this strategy was not working out. The more resources were invested, the 
less was the effect of Moscow’s policy. 
The Kremlin gradually came to realise that continuing the war was 
not a viable option. In 1985, the commander of the 40th army, the operative 
group of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff assessed the situation 
as hopeless and urged pulling out of Afghanistan. The option of improving 
the capacity of the PDPA regime to the extent that it would be able to 
master the problems on its own was no longer considered realistic. 
Previously, in 1982, Yuri Andropov, by then General Secretary of the CPSU 
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Central Committee, had sought to explore the possibility of a political 
solution that was to be negotiated with Pakistan, but he had not been 
prepared to negotiate a regime change in Kabul. Even this limited attempt 
to change Soviet policy expired at the moment when Mr Andropov passed 
away in 1984. A thorough review of Soviet policy in Afghanistan was not 
initiated until 1985, under President Mikhail Gorbachev. 
4. The policy of national reconciliation 
The Gorbachev years are less instructive for the purposes of this paper. At 
this juncture, Soviet policy was no longer about the modernisation or 
reconstruction of the country but rather about identifying the best possible 
exit strategy. As President Karmal vehemently opposed the idea of a Soviet 
pullout, Moscow embarked on another change of leadership in Kabul, 
replacing Mr Karmal with Mohammed Najibullah, who took over as 
President in November 1986. 
Moscow pushed a policy of ‘national reconciliation’, which 
abandoned the concept of political monopoly on the part of the PDPA and 
admitted the possibility of transforming the regime by embracing the idea 
of a coalition government that included the opposition. This shift was the 
beginning of a gradual dismantling of the socialist experiment in 
Afghanistan. 
Despite some positive steps from that policy during 1987, not a single 
relevant resistance group engaged with Kabul. The opposition prepared for 
a decisive power struggle after the pullout of Soviet troops. In January 
1989, it announced the creation of its own interim government in 
Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The United States insisted on the resignation of the 
PDPA. Pakistan insisted on the introduction of an Islamic regime and 
demanded the creation of an interim government in which the opposition 
was to comprise the majority. The Peshawar alliance would only agree to 
the establishment of an interim government for the purpose of monitoring 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops, provided it was led by Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood. President Najibullah was not ready 
to give in to the Peshawar alliance’s demand for a majority. Moscow began 
to explore the possibility of inviting the former king, Zahir Shah, to return 
from abroad and lead national reconciliation efforts. 
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Meanwhile, the single most important question was how long 
President Najibullah would be able to remain in Kabul after the Soviet 
pullout. Experts in neither the West nor the Soviet Union gave him more 
than three to four months. 
Therefore, Moscow’s exit strategy was focused on the means to 
extend the lifespan of the Kabul regime. The main component of this policy 
was establishing excessive reserves of weapons, ammunition and food 
prior to the Soviet withdrawal and sustaining these supplies thereafter. 
Moscow agreed to transfer weapons systems that were more sophisticated 
to Afghanistan. It continued to supply Kabul heavily with weapons and 
food throughout 1989 and 1990. Moscow intensified the training of Afghan 
officers, maintained a group of senior military advisers to the government 
and agreed to retain Soviet technicians in Afghanistan to assist in repairing 
military equipment. It also pledged to assist Kabul in establishing contacts 
with the opposition residing in Pakistan, Iran and Western Europe. 
Because of the massive economic and military support, the regime 
kept going longer than expected. Nevertheless, in September 1991, the 
Soviet Union and the US reached an agreement to cease weapons supplies 
to Afghanistan from 1 January 1992. From that point, the Najibullah regime 
survived only four more months. 
Conclusions 
The Soviet leadership became hostage to the idea first set out in 1979 that 
by no means could it afford to lose Afghanistan. That view triggered a fatal 
dynamic of conflict escalation, leaving little room for reconsidering and 
amending Moscow’s policy objectives to enable them to become more 
realistic. 
The Soviet knowledge of Afghanistan was rather superficial and the 
reality on the ground could not be comprehended through a pre-set 
template. The readiness of the Afghan population to embrace social change 
was not to the extent that Soviet leaders had assumed. And the 
assumptions made about the ability to mobilise wider political support for 
social change in the country’s Islamic society proved wrong as well. So too 
did the assumption that land reform could induce such support. 
The rejection of policy emanating from the Kabul government grew 
as a consequence of the heavy external presence – of both advisers and 
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troops. The long record of friendly relations between Afghanistan and the 
Soviet Union was unable to alleviate the friction. 
Moscow saw technical assistance and military intervention merely as 
technical tools to strengthen the government in Kabul and stabilise the 
situation. Despite a dramatic increase in the amount of assistance provided, 
the situation did not improve – indeed, it worsened. The gap between the 
amount of assistance given and the effect achieved constantly rose. The 
dramatic growth in the number of Soviet advisers dispatched to the 
country did not make a difference. The advisers did not register any 
significant progress in achieving the benchmarks set by Moscow. 
The majority of Soviet advisers had little knowledge of the country. 
They proved rather incompetent and failed to provide Moscow with 
appropriate feedback. Yet Soviet discourse remained highly indoctrinated, 
thus preventing both Moscow and Kabul from sharing ownership of the 
process with the different political and social forces in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, there was little or no coordination of activities among the 
groups of advisers. Representatives of various agencies developed 
different, even diverging views of the objectives to be achieved. 
The PDPA proved to be a weak and incompetent partner. At the 
same time, either Moscow had limited leverage over Kabul (during 1978–
79) or Kabul demonstrated responsiveness (after 1980) but was unable or 
unwilling to follow the direction Moscow recommended. The regime 
remained isolated and failed to reach out to the provinces. 
The Soviet Union largely failed in capacity-building as regards both 
central and local government. As a result, Moscow allowed Kabul largely 
to transfer the burden and the responsibility for the unpopular policy onto 
Soviet advisers and troops. 
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Afghanistan 2007: Problems, 
Opportunities and Possible Solutions 
Peter Bergen* 
The year 2007 will likely be a ‘make or break’ year for Afghanistan, for the 
international efforts there, and conversely, for the efforts of the Taliban and 
their al-Qaeda allies to turn the country back into a failed state.  
Afghanistan today looks something like Iraq did in the summer of 
2003 with a growing insurgency in terms of the exponentially rising use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the deployment of suicide 
bombers, the decline of reconstruction efforts because of security concerns 
and a descent into chaotic violence in substantial portions of the country. 
Add to this the sad fact that the United States-led occupation of 
Afghanistan has coincided with the country becoming the world’s premier 
source of heroin. 
There are, however, some key differences between Afghanistan and 
Iraq: Afghans have already suffered through more than 20 years of war and 
they are tired of conflict; in addition, the Taliban remain deeply unpopular 
and the American and NATO military presence is welcomed by the vast 
majority of Afghans. 
And so, 2007 represents a real opportunity to put the country back on 
course. Afghanistan will, of course, never become Belgium, but it does have 
a chance to succeed, as long as success is defined realistically: Afghanistan 
is likely to be a fragile, poor, weak state for the foreseeable future, but one 
where security can be significantly improved, allowing for the emergence 
of a more open society and a more vibrant economy.  
This paper is divided into three sections. The first part analyses 
Afghanistan’s problems. The second section of the paper addresses 
potential opportunities that exist for the country and the third section 
examines some possible solutions to Afghanistan’s problems. 
                                                     
* Peter Bergen is a Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation and an 
Adjunct Professor in the South Asia department of the School of Advanced 
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.  
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1. The problems 
1.1 The return of the Taliban 
NATO and the US military are now battling the Taliban on a scale not 
witnessed since 2001 when the war against the Taliban began. When this 
author travelled in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, the Taliban threat had 
receded into little more than a nuisance. But now the movement has 
regrouped and rearmed. Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander, gave 
an interview to al-Jazeera in the past year in which he made an 
illuminating observation about the scale of the insurgency. Mr Dadullah 
put Taliban forces at some 12,000 fighters – larger than the estimate 
informally conveyed by a US military official of between 7,000 and 10,000, 
yet a number that could have some validity given the numerous part-time 
Taliban farmer/fighters. Bolstered by a compliant Pakistani government, 
hefty cash inflows from the drug trade and a population disillusioned by 
battered infrastructure and lacklustre reconstruction efforts, the Taliban are 
back. 
In the past year, this author travelled to Afghanistan four times, 
meeting with government officials and ordinary Afghans. On two 
occasions, the journeys involved embedding with American soldiers of the 
10th Mountain Division fighting the Taliban in the east and south of the 
country and on one travelling with a NATO delegation and interviewing 
key American military officers to get a sense of the seriousness of the 
renewed Taliban insurgency. The impression gathered was that while the 
Taliban may not yet constitute a major strategic threat to the Karzai 
government, it has become a serious tactical challenge for both US troops 
and NATO soldiers. 
A hundred miles to the south of Kabul, for instance, the Taliban have 
appeared in force in nearly half the districts of the Ghazni province, which 
sits astride the most important road in the country, between Kabul and the 
southern city of Kandahar. It is today considered suicidal for non-Afghans 
to drive along that road without security. In southern Afghanistan, 
reconstruction has ground to halt and foreigners can only move around 
safely if they are embedded with the military or have substantial private 
security. Around Kandahar itself this past summer, fierce battles raged 
between the Taliban and NATO forces, with the latter encountering much 
stiffer resistance than they had anticipated. As put by a former senior 
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Afghan cabinet member in September 2006, “If international forces leave, 
the Taliban will take over in one hour”.  
Why did the Taliban come back?  
First, key mistakes were made by the Bush administration in the first years 
of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan, owing to a variety of ideological 
idée fixes that included a dislike of ‘nation building’, an aversion to reliance 
on international forces and a preoccupation with Iraq as a supposed centre 
of world terrorism. That meant that Afghanistan was short-changed on a 
number of levels. The initial deployment of international troops was the 
lowest per capita commitment of peacekeepers to any post-conflict 
environment since World War II. The Pentagon also initially blocked efforts 
by soldiers of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol 
outside Kabul and to extend a security umbrella to other parts of the 
country until August 2003. These early errors helped pave the way for the 
resurgence of the Taliban. 
Second, Afghanistan’s ballooning drug trade has succeeded in 
expanding the Taliban ranks. It is no coincidence that opium and heroin 
production, which now is equivalent to one-third (36%) of Afghanistan’s 
licit economy spiked at the same time that the Taliban staged a comeback. 
A US military official remarked that charities and individual donations 
from the Middle East are also boosting the Taliban’s coffers. These twin 
revenue streams – drug money and Middle East contributions – allow the 
Taliban to pay their fighters $100 or more a month, which compares 
favourably to the $70 salary of an Afghan police officer. Whatever the 
source, the Taliban can draw upon significant resources, at least by Afghan 
standards. One US military raid on a Taliban safe house in 2006 recovered 
$900,000 in cash. 
A third key to the resurgence of the Taliban can be summarised in 
one word: Pakistan. The Pakistani government has proven unwilling or 
incapable (or both) of clamping down on the religious militia, despite the 
fact that the headquarters of the Taliban and its key allies are located in 
Pakistan. According to a senior US military official, not a single senior 
Taliban leader has been arrested or killed in Pakistan since 2001 – nor have 
any of the top leaders of the militias headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and 
Jalaluddin Haqqani, who are fighting US forces alongside the Taliban. For 
example, Amir Haqqani, the leader of the Taliban in the central province of 
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Zabul, “never comes across the border” from Pakistan into Afghanistan, as 
noted by a US military official based in Zabul.  
US military officials hold that the Taliban’s most important 
leadership council, the Quetta Shura, is based in the capital of Pakistan’s 
Balochistan Province; the important Peshawar Shura is headquartered in 
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province. In addition, Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar operates in the tribal areas of Dir and Bajur. Jalaluddin Haqqani 
is based in Waziristan and al-Qaeda has a presence in both Waziristan and 
Chitral – all Pakistani regions that border Afghanistan. A senior US 
military official observed that the Pakistanis have taken “no decisive action 
on their border” to deal with the Taliban. In view of Pakistan’s upcoming 
2007 presidential election, it can be inferred that the Pakistani government 
is doing even less than in the past because the Musharraf government is 
aware of how unpopular military action against the Taliban is in their 
border regions with Afghanistan. 
It should be noted, however, that the Taliban has released videotapes 
over the past year in which they attack the Musharraf government as an 
‘infidel’ government because of its cooperation with the US in the war on 
terrorism. Moreover, the Taliban has attacked Pakistani government posts 
on the Afghan–Pakistani border. One such attack killed six soldiers of the 
Tochi Scouts in January 2006, an attack that the Taliban’s new propaganda 
arm, Ummat studios, recorded on video and distributed to jihadist 
websites. The Pakistani government also denies it is providing a safe haven 
for the Taliban leadership.  
An explanation for the seeming dichotomy between the fact that US 
intelligence and military officials universally share the view that the 
Taliban is headquartered in Pakistan and the Pakistani government’s denial 
of this is that the Musharraf government does not completely control its 
own territory or security agencies. Under this line of thinking the Inter-
Services Intelligence, the Pakistani military intelligence agency, at some 
levels continues to tolerate or maintain links with Taliban leaders. Many 
members of the Taliban grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan and they are 
very familiar with the country. In addition, an alliance of Pakistani 
religious political parties broadly sympathetic to the Taliban, the Muttahida 
Majlis-e-Amal (or MMA), controls both the North-West Frontier Province 
and, to some degree, Balochistan, the regions where the Taliban are 
presently headquartered. 
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A fourth reason for the Taliban’s recent resurgence is that it has 
increasingly morphed tactically and ideologically with al-Qaeda, which 
itself is experiencing a comeback along the Afghan–Pakistani border. The 
story of al-Qaeda’s renaissance begins with its eviction from Afghanistan in 
late 2001. Unfortunately, the group did not disintegrate – it merely moved 
across the border to the tribal regions of western Pakistan, where today it 
operates a network of training camps. A former American intelligence 
official stationed in Pakistan held that there are currently more than 2,000 
“foreign fighters” in the region. The camps are relatively modest in size. 
“People want to see barracks. [In fact,] the camps use dry riverbeds for 
shooting and are housed in compounds for 20 people, where they are 
taught callisthenics and bomb-making”, explained a senior American 
military intelligence official. Taliban and al-Qaeda videotapes released in 
2006 on jihadist websites also demonstrate that the camps in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas are training new recruits. 
Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Pakistan was noted by Dame Eliza 
Mannigham-Buller, the head of the UK’s domestic intelligence service MI5, 
who in a rare pubic statement in November said, “We are aware of 
numerous plots to kill people and damage our economy…thirty that we 
know of. These plots often have linked back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and 
through these links al-Qaeda gives guidance and training to its largely 
British foot soldiers here on an extensive and growing scale.” Similarly, the 
plot by a group of British citizens to blow up as many as 10 American 
passenger jets with liquid explosives, uncovered in the UK last August, 
was “directed by al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan”, according to the 
Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieut. General Michael D. 
Maples in his recent testimony to the US Senate Intelligence Committee. 
The Taliban’s strengthening influence 
The Taliban were a provincial bunch when they held power in 
Afghanistan, but in the past couple of years, they have increasingly 
identified themselves as part of the global jihadist movement, their rhetoric 
full of references to Iraq and Palestine in a manner that mirrors Osama bin 
Laden’s public statements. Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban commander, gave 
an interview to CBS News in December 2006 in which he outlined how the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda cooperate: “Osama bin Laden, thank God, is alive 
and in good health. We are in contact with his top aides and sharing plans 
and operations with each other.” Indeed, a senior American military 
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intelligence official observed, “trying to separate Taliban and al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan serves no purpose. It’s like picking grey hairs out of your head.”  
Suicide attacks, IEDs and the beheadings of hostages – all techniques 
al-Qaeda perfected in Iraq – are being employed by the Taliban to 
strengthen their influence in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. 
Hekmat Karzai, an Afghan national security expert, points out that suicide 
bombings were virtually unknown in Afghanistan until 2005, when there 
were 21 such attacks.1 According to the US military, there were 139 suicide 
attacks in 2006. This exponentially rising number of suicide attacks is 
mirrored by other grim statistics – IED attacks in Afghanistan more than 
doubled from 783 in 2005 to 1,677 in 2006, and the number of ‘direct’ 
attacks by insurgents using weapons against international forces tripled 
from 1,558 to 4,542 during the same period. The year 2006 also saw a record 
number of 98 US military and 93 NATO deaths. At least 1,000 Afghan 
civilians died last year in clashes between the Taliban and the coalition; 100 
of those deaths were the result of US or NATO actions, as reported by 
Human Rights Watch. 
Just as suicide bombings in Iraq have had an enormous strategic 
impact – from pushing the UN out of the country to helping spark a civil 
war – such attacks might also plunge Afghanistan into chaos. Already, 
suicide attacks and the Taliban resurgence have made much of southern 
Afghanistan a ‘no-go’ area for both foreigners and any reconstruction 
efforts. Luckily, for the moment the suicide attackers in Afghanistan have 
not been nearly as deadly their counterparts in Iraq. As one US military 
official commented, almost all of the Taliban’s suicide bombers are 
“Pashtun country guys from Pakistan”, with little effective training. 
1.2 The drug economy 
That Afghanistan has a large drug economy is well known. Poppy 
cultivation for opium in Afghanistan grew by 60% last year and it is widely 
acknowledged that the Taliban resurgence is being fuelled by the profits of 
this opium trade. Afghanistan is the source of an astonishing 92% of the 
world’s heroin supply. 
                                                     
1 This finding is reported in Hekmat Karzai’s analysis in this ESF Working Paper. 
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Nevertheless, four fundamental propositions must be understood 
about the drug economy in Afghanistan: first, abruptly ending it would put 
millions of people out of work and impoverish millions more, as the only 
really functional part of the economy is poppy and opium production. 
Second, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and many 
rural Afghans have very few options to make money other than to engage 
in poppy-growing. Third, Afghan support for poppy cultivation is on the 
upswing – 40% now call it acceptable if there is no other way to earn a 
living, with two out of three Afghans living in the south-west saying it is 
acceptable, the region where much of the poppy is grown. And so ending 
the drug economy is simply not going to happen anytime in the foreseeable 
future. Fourth, and most importantly from an American and NATO 
national security perspective, drug policy in Afghanistan as it is presently 
constructed is helping the Taliban to thrive as they benefit from the trade. 
Bizarrely, our drug policy helps to fund our enemies. (Possible solutions to 
this problem can be found below.) 
1.3 Weakness of the Afghan state – A result of the lacklustre 
reconstruction efforts, corruption, weakness of the police and 
failures of Afghan governance 
The outgoing commander of US troops in Afghanistan, Lieut. General Karl 
Eikenberry, has drawn a clear link between reconstruction and violence: 
“Wherever the roads end, that’s where the Taliban starts”. Certainly, 
Afghanistan needs much more reconstruction. The key road from Kabul to 
Kandahar – a nightmarish 17-hour slalom course when taken under the 
Taliban regime and now a smoother 7-hour drive – remains the only large-
scale reconstruction project completed in the country since the US-led 
invasion. Kabul residents have access to electricity only four to six hours a 
day, if they have electricity at all. Along with endemic corruption and the 
common perception that the billions of dollars of promised aid has mostly 
lined the pockets of non-governmental organisations, the infrastructure gap 
feeds resentment among ordinary Afghans, some of whom may be tempted 
to throw in their lot with the Taliban. 
Some of the failures in Afghanistan are, of course, the responsibility 
of Afghans. Warlords such as Gul Agha Sherzai in Kandahar were given 
high political office. President Hamid Karzai’s staff is widely viewed as  
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weak and inexperienced, although Mr Karzai has recently replaced his 
chief of staff. Highly competent ministers such as Foreign Minister Dr 
Abdullah and the finance minister Ashraf Ghani have been forced out of 
the government for no discernible good reason. There is little true 
representation of Pashtun political interests in parliament because 
President Karzai appears to distrust political parties. 
2. Opportunities 
There have been successes since the fall of the Taliban – as many as 5 
million refugees have returned to Afghanistan from neighbouring Pakistan 
and Iran. Refugees do not return to places they do not see as having a 
future. Presidential and parliamentary elections have occurred with a high 
degree of participation by Afghan voters. Millions of boys and girls are 
back in school and the Afghan army has developed into a somewhat 
functional organisation. Afghanistan has also developed something of an 
independent press, with private television stations such as Tolo TV 
springing up. 
An ABC News/BBC poll released in December 2006 shows that 
despite the disappointments that Afghans have felt about inadequate 
reconstruction and declining security on a wide range of key issues, they 
have positive attitudes. It is classic counter-insurgency doctrine that the 
centre of gravity in a conflict is the people. And the Afghan people, unlike 
the Iraqis, have positive feelings about the US-led occupation, their own 
government and their lives. The conclusions of the ABC/BBC poll are 
worth quoting in some detail: 
Sixty-eight percent approve of [President] Karzai’s work – down from 
83 percent last year, but still a level most national leaders would envy. 
Fifty-nine percent think the parliament is working for the benefit of 
the Afghan people – down from 77 percent, but still far better than 
Americans’ ratings of the U.S. Congress…Big majorities continue to 
call the U.S.-led invasion a good thing for their country (88 percent), 
to express a favourable opinion of the United States (74 percent) and 
to prefer the current Afghan government to Taliban rule (88 percent). 
Indeed eight in 10 Afghans support the presence of U.S., British and 
other international forces on their soil; that compares with five percent 
support for Taliban fighters…Fifty-five percent of Afghans still say 
the country’s going in the right direction, but that’s down sharply 
from 77 percent last year. Whatever the problems, 74 percent  
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say their living conditions today are better now than they were under 
the Taliban. That rating, however, is 11 points lower now than it was a 
year ago.2 
These poll results, which are very similar to another poll taken in 
December 2006 by World Public Opinion.org through their Program on 
International Policy Attitudes, demonstrate that there remains strong 
support for the Afghan central government and US/NATO efforts in 
Afghanistan. Two other interesting points to note: according to both the 
ABC/BBC poll and that of World Public Opinion.org, no other Muslim 
nation appears to have a more negative view of Osama bin Laden. Both 
polls found that nine out of ten Afghans had a negative view of al-Qaeda’s 
leader. Similarly, nine out of ten Afghans say there is no justification for 
suicide bombings. 
3. Solutions 
3.1 On the drug trade 
The current counter-narcotics strategy that favours poppy eradication is by 
all accounts a failure. This is the conclusion of a range of sources, from 
Afghan experts to narco-terrorism specialists to the reports by the US 
Government Accountability Office and the United Nations Office of Drug 
Control (both of which were published recently).  
Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at 
Harvard, has researched counter-narcotics strategies in Columbia, Peru, 
Lebanon, Turkey and Afghanistan and found that terrorists and insurgents 
do not simply use the drug trade as a financial resource, but also draw 
substantial political gains and legitimacy from drug-trafficking. 
Consequently, an ‘eradication first’ policy is not only bound to fail – the 
crops will simply shift and appear elsewhere – but it will also foment a 
backlash among that segment of the local population that has developed 
ties to the belligerents through the narco-economy. For instance, local 
populations could withhold human intelligence that could be critical to the 
campaign against the reinvigorated Taliban insurgency. Instead, the US 
                                                     
2 Derived from a nationwide ABC News/BBC World Service survey conducted by 
Charney Research of New York with fieldwork by the Afghan Centre for Social 
and Opinion Research in Kabul. 
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should focus on defeating the insurgents and concentrate their anti-
narcotics efforts on interdiction and money laundering. 
The administration’s new plan to begin chemical ground spraying – a 
plan the US has pressured the Afghan government into accepting and 
which is supposed to begin in the spring (although it may have already 
begun), is in fact nothing new at all. It is simply another version of the 
eradication first policy, which will only solidify alliances between farmers 
and the Taliban. A new strategy is called for. 
Instead of eradication, we need to begin splitting the fragile links 
between farmers/local populations and the Taliban by concentrating our 
efforts on building up viable alternative livelihoods in both farming and 
other sectors. This approach means providing seeds for crop substitution 
and a build-up of roadways to transport those crops to market. In the short 
term, while that infrastructure is being established crop substitution will 
only really work if Afghans can obtain roughly the same income that they 
receive from poppy production for whatever crops are substituted. This 
point suggests that the international community should consider subsidies 
for Afghan crops such as cotton, fruits and nuts similar to the subsidies that 
the US and the European Union pay for the products of many of their 
farmers. This plan would not come cheap, but if it could substantially 
reduce the drug economy, it would weaken the Taliban and make the 
country much more secure – which is a trade-off worth the costs involved.  
While the narco-economy is valued at around $3 billion, most of that 
flows out of Afghanistan and farmers only receive about $600 million of it. 
Meanwhile, in FY2005, the US allocated almost $800 million for the 
counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan, yet no more than 20% of that was 
targeted towards alternative livelihoods, and even that share was not spent 
in a coordinated fashion for national economic build-up. The US is clearly 
spending more money per year than the farmers make from opium and 
that money could be redirected towards subsidies for crop substitution. 
Another additional approach is to allow Afghanistan to enter into the 
legalised opiate trade for morphine used for pain relief, a trade that is 
presently dominated by countries such as India and Turkey. Despite some 
legitimate criticisms of this idea – principally how one would make sure 
that Afghan opium was only going into the legitimate market – one low-
risk strategy would be to allow the legalised opiate trade to debut as a pilot 
project on a small scale in a province with reasonable security and smaller-
scale opium production, thus allowing greater regulatory control. If this 
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strategy worked in one province, it could then be implemented in other 
provinces. And the crop-substitution approach and the legalised opiate-
trade approach are not ‘either/or’ solutions. Both could be implemented at 
the same time in different Afghan provinces. 
Congress could then amend the ‘80–20 law’ requiring US opiate 
manufacturers to purchase 80% of their opiate from India and Turkey 
(affording them a guaranteed market) to include Afghanistan. The latter is 
by far the most fragile democracy and economy of the three and the one in 
which the US has vital national security interests at stake, as the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda are substantially regrouping along the Afghan–Pakistani 
border. It is also worth noting that according to the UN, about 80% of the 
world’s population living in developing countries consumes only 6% of the 
morphine distributed worldwide, which suggests that there is a large 
untapped market for legal opiates. 
3.2 Rolling back the Taliban – More troops, better troops, fewer 
NATO caveats, a successful amnesty programme, more 
reconstruction, transforming the tribal belt in Pakistan and 
building up the Afghan police 
By all accounts, the spring of 2007 will be a bloody one. The present NATO 
strength of 33,250 is judged by NATO commanders to be insufficient by 
around 4,500 soldiers. The calls by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 
January 2007 for additional American troops to be sent to Afghanistan are 
to be welcomed as not only will those forces help fight the Taliban, they 
will also send a signal to regional players such as Pakistan that the US is in 
Afghanistan for the long haul. Around two years ago, the then Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US was planning to draw 
down its forces in Afghanistan. That sent precisely the wrong signal to the 
region. (For the moment, 3,200 US troops have had their tours extended by 
four months to cover the NATO shortfall.) 
One caveat about the call by Secretary Gates for more American 
troops is that it depends on which troops are eventually sent. According to 
Afghan officials, US Special Forces working with the Afghan National 
Army are the most effective soldiers to attack the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Similarly, NATO member states must increase their troop strength and 
reduce the number of ‘national caveats’ that prevent, say, the Germans 
from flying at night and other such caveats that hamper the effectiveness of 
NATO forces on the ground in Afghanistan. In December 2005, one senior 
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NATO commander said he had 14 pages of national caveats with which to 
contend. While the British, Canadians and Dutch fought bravely over the 
summer in southern Afghanistan, other NATO member states that are part 
of the coalition must do more to match their efforts. NATO is also severely 
hampered by the lack of air assets it is able to draw upon. 
An amnesty programme formally launched in 2005 by the Karzai 
government offers one promising approach to containing the Taliban 
threat. In Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul, in the spring of 2006 this 
author witnessed US forces release Mullah Abdul Ali Akundzada, who was 
accused of sheltering Taliban members and had been arrested near the site 
of an IED detonation. In a deal brokered by the Karzai government and the 
US military, Mr Akundzada was handed over to a group of about 30 
religious and tribal leaders, who publicly pledged that the released mullah 
would support the government. In an honour-based society such as 
Afghanistan, this programme is working well. According to both Afghan 
and US officials, only a handful of the more than 1,000 Taliban fighters 
taking advantage of the amnesty have gone back to fighting the 
government and coalition forces. 
Transforming Pakistan’s tribal belt is a critical national security 
interest of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and NATO countries, as that is 
where the Taliban has a safe haven and al-Qaeda is regrouping. Pakistan 
deployed at least 70,000 troops to the area in 2002, but they suffered 
hundreds of casualties and heavy-handed Pakistani tactics further 
alienated the population of the tribal areas. Over the past two years 
Pakistan has abandoned its ‘military first’ policy and started concluding 
peace agreements with militants in both South Waziristan and North 
Waziristan. Unfortunately, after the conclusion of the peace agreement in 
North Waziristan in early September 2006, there was a 300% rise in attacks 
from that region into Afghanistan according to the US military. And 
militants in Waziristan have since set up a parallel judicial system lynching 
and torturing civilians for infringements such as drinking, and 
documenting this on videotapes distributed by Ummat video, the Taliban’s 
propaganda arm. Much of what is going on in the tribal areas is opaque as 
the Pakistani government has prevented international journalists from 
travelling anywhere near these areas, and Pakistani journalists have been 
detained or even killed when they report on the tribal regions. 
This analysis is not the place to rehash the history of British and 
Pakistani rule in the tribal regions, which has certainly contributed to their 
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problems, but the present Pakistani policy that has wavered between the 
fist and appeasement has not worked well either. Pakistan has promised an 
aid package to the region of $150 million while the US may also be 
prepared to grant substantial aid. A quid pro quo for this American aid is 
that the Pakistani government should allow international journalists and 
other neutral observers to visit the tribal areas (and not only for dog-and-
pony shows organised by the Pakistani military). A further quid pro quo is 
that the Pakistani government should arrest Taliban leaders living in 
Pakistan, a policy that should be strongly endorsed by NATO countries 
such as Canada, the UK and the Netherlands, countries that bore the brunt 
of Taliban attacks in the summer of 2006. 
The US should also pressure Afghanistan to recognise the Durand 
line drawn by the British in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and 
the Raj. The fact that Afghanistan does not recognise this border aggravates 
tensions with Pakistan and helps the militants to move back and forth 
across the border. (Suggestions by Pakistan that they will mine the 1,500-
mile border to prevent militants crossing are both impractical and strongly 
opposed by Afghanistan, which has suffered thousands of civilian deaths 
and injuries from mines left over from the Soviet conflict and subsequent 
Afghan civil war.)  
Thus far, the US government has appropriated $27 billion for Iraqi 
reconstruction, but only $7 billion for Afghanistan – a country that is 
roughly the same size in population, a third larger geographically and 
utterly destroyed by two decades of war. Of the money appropriated, a 
State Department official has conveyed that only $2.5 billion has actually 
been spent, despite Afghanistan’s larger land mass and greater 
infrastructural needs. That works out to a paltry $20 per year per Afghan 
over the past five years. Without greater investments in roads, power and 
water resources throughout Afghanistan, the Taliban will surely prosper 
and continue to gain adherents.  
For that reason, the Bush administration calls for up to $10 billion in 
aid to Afghanistan, of which the $2 billion for reconstruction and $8 billion 
for building up the Afghan police and army are to be welcomed. One 
important caveat on the reconstruction aid is that much of that aid should 
be funnelled through the Afghan government rather than recycled to US 
contractors. According to Ann Jones, a writer who has worked in 
Afghanistan as an aid worker, unlike countries such as Sweden (typically 
incurring only 4% of its aid costs from “technical assistance”, which goes 
238 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
back home to Sweden), “eighty-six cents of every dollar of American aid is 
phantom aid”, ultimately lining American pockets rather than going 
directly to Afghans.3 For their part, Afghan government ministries must be 
more efficient at spending reconstruction money. Last year these ministries 
only spent 44% of the aid they were given. This year they are likely to 
spend 60%. 
It is also time for the US to institute a long-term mini-Marshall Plan 
for Afghanistan. In early 2006, the Afghan government published the 
Afghanistan development strategy, which estimated that $4 billion a year 
in aid for the next five years was needed to reconstruct the country. For this 
reason, the US should contribute at least half that sum every year for many 
years to come. Give the fact that the 9/11 attacks emerged from 
Afghanistan and cost the American economy at least $500 billion, aid for 
Afghanistan so that it does not to return to a failed state is a good 
investment. The US should commit itself to long-term reconstruction efforts 
in part to counter the Taliban, which is likely to be a threat for several years 
to come, but also because having overthrown the Taliban the US has 
responsibilities to Afghanistan. And a functioning, democratic Afghanistan 
will have a powerful demonstration effect on countries that surround 
Afghanistan such Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian republics, none of 
which are truly democratic states. 
American aid should be tied to an Afghan public employment 
scheme similar to the Works Progress Administration programme 
implemented in the US following the Great Depression. Afghanistan has a 
chronic unemployment problem with a 40% unemployment rate and a 
desperate need for roads, dams and the clearing of agricultural aqueducts 
destroyed by years of war. Much of the labour required for these projects 
does not require great skill and millions of Afghans should be set to work 
rebuilding their country as a quid pro quo for a real American Marshall 
Plan for the country.  
In short, there should be a military, diplomatic and reconstruction 
‘surge’ to Afghanistan, a country where such efforts have a fighting chance 
of real success. 
                                                     
3 See A. Jones, Kabul in Winter: Life without peace in Afghanistan, New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books, 2006, p. 267. 
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Strategic and Operational Measures to 
Curb the Growing Threat of Suicide 
Terrorism in Afghanistan 
Hekmat Karzai* 
Conflict has been a constant factor during the last three decades of Afghan 
history, but there was no record of suicide attacks until 9 September 2001, 
when two al-Qaeda members assassinated Commander Ahmad Shah 
Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance.  
After the coalition forces came to Afghanistan, the trend of suicide 
attacks started to emerge very slowly, with one attack in 2002, two in 2003 
and six in 2004 (Figure 1). From this point onwards, however, the pace 
changed. Learning from the effectiveness of the insurgents in Iraq and 
other places, the groups carried out 21 attacks in 2005, with the southern 
city of Kandahar and the capital Kabul being the primary targets (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Suicide attacks since 2001 
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Source: Data from the CAPS Violent Actors Project, Centre for  
Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul. 
                                                     
* Hekmat Karzai is Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Kabul. 
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Figure 2. Suicide attacks by province 
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In 2006, there were 118 suicide attacks (Figure 3), with the latest ones 
targeting political and religious figures including the former President and 
current Senate leader, Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi and the late 
Governor of Paktia, Hakim Taniwal. 
Figure 3. Suicide attacks carried out during 2006 
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As noted earlier, there are no records of suicide attacks taking place 
in Afghanistan prior to 9 September 2001. It is also true that the Afghan 
Mujahideen (freedom fighters) have no history of employing this tactic 
against the Russians; nor was it used by the Taliban or Northern Alliance 
against each other. Thus, a crucial question arises: Why did the Taliban, al-
Qaeda and others shift towards this tactic?  
There are several specific reasons why the Taliban and the foreign 
elements have decided that suicide terrorism is a useful tactic for 
Afghanistan.  
First, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have concluded that suicide bombing 
is more effective than other tactics in killing Afghan and coalition forces. 
This conclusion is a direct result of the success of such groups as Hamas in 
Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and various 
groups operating in Iraq. Suicide attacks allow insurgents to achieve 
maximum impact with minimal resources. Data show that when the 
insurgents fight US and coalition forces directly in Afghanistan, there is 
only a 5% probability of inflicting causalities. With suicide attacks, 
however, the chance of killing people increases several fold.  
Second, the Taliban and al-Qaeda believe that devastating suicide 
attacks instil fear in people’s hearts, leading people to believe that the 
government cannot protect them and thus further destabilising the 
authority of local government institutions. Consequently, the gap between 
the government and the population is slowly expanding.  
Third, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have successfully tapped into the 
expertise and training of the broader jihadist community. Militants have 
imparted knowledge on suicide tactics to Afghan groups through the 
internet and face-to-face exchanges, and these militants – with al-Qaeda’s 
assistance and recruitment from madrasahs in Pakistan – have supplied a 
steady stream of suicide bombers.  
Fourth, suicide attacks are extremely effective as an assassination 
tactic, particularly when there is substantial security around the target. 
Since 2006 the Taliban and al-Qaeda have begun to use suicide attackers as 
assassins targeting important personalities, including the late Governor of 
Paktia, Hakim Taniwal, the former Governor of Helmand, Mohammed 
Daoud and Pacha Khan Zadran, a member of the Afghan parliament.  
Finally yet importantly, suicide attacks have provided renewed 
visibility for the Taliban and their allies, which the guerrilla attacks were 
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failing to generate. Given their high casualty rates and high profile nature, 
every suicide attack conducted is reported in the regional and international 
media, providing greater exposure for the cause. 
The origin of the attackers 
At the outset, there was a major debate about the identity of the attackers. 
Afghans especially were under the assumption that the majority of the 
suicide bombers were foreigners and such a tactic was an imported 
product. Yet the data implicates two groups of individuals who are 
involved in the attacks. 
The first group of attackers who are indeed responsible for a 
significant number of attacks consists of men of foreign origins, who are 
influenced by the global ideological jihad against the West, most notably 
the US. They see Afghanistan as the second front of that jihad (the first 
being Iraq), which provides them an opportunity to face the enemy in 
battle. These individuals are profoundly inspired by the various radical 
clerics and even the Taliban, who are constantly preaching around the 
world and on the thousands of jihadist websites, with statements like 
“Afghanistan has been occupied by the crusaders and it is a personal 
obligation of the Muslims to fight against them”.1 Thus encouraged and 
motivated they come to Afghanistan with the ultimate goal of attaining the 
esteemed status of martyrdom and setting an example for the rest of the 
Muslim ummah. Many of them are from countries such as Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and Chechnya.  
A second, small group of attackers carrying out suicide attacks 
comprises Afghans.2 While Afghans believe it is neither culturally 
acceptable nor a characteristic tactic of the Afghan people, they ignore the 
fact that Afghan culture is no longer as isolated as it may have been in the 
                                                     
1 This quote by Mullah Dadullah is derived from his interview with Al Jazeera on 
14 February 2006. 
2 This assessment recognises that many of the bombers may originate from training 
camps in Pakistan. But the fact that they may come over the border does not 
necessarily make them Pakistani. An Afghan war orphan, having been educated 
and trained in a madrasah in Pakistan and perhaps having lived there for 15 years, 
who then returns to Afghanistan as a suicide bomber is still an Afghan irrespective 
of whether he still has any relatives or roots in Afghanistan. 
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past. At one point, a quarter of Afghanistan’s population of 25 million 
became refugees and a certain segment of that population attended 
madrasahs in Pakistan, where they were radicalised and immersed in 
extremist ideologies. The training continues today and there is no shortage 
of recruits from these madrasahs. 
Additionally, the relatively easy to access DVDs, VCDs and other 
forms of technology allows ideas to spread rapidly.3 Underlying all of this 
is the exposure of Afghans to al-Qaeda, which has spread its extremist 
global ideology to various groups. During their reign, from June 1996 to 
November 2001, al-Qaeda and the Taliban established a very close 
‘marriage of convenience’ wherein al-Qaeda supported and trained many 
Taliban cadres. Following the post-9/11 transformation of the Taliban from 
a conventional military force to an insurgent one, the effects of this training 
and indoctrination have become clear. 
Recommendations 
Afghanistan is not the first nation to face the threat of suicide attacks and is 
unlikely to be the last. Although dealing with the threat may be difficult for 
any state, it is not impossible, especially if operational and strategic 
measures are implemented.  
Operational measures 
• Most importantly, the Afghan government must enhance the capacity 
of its intelligence in order to disrupt the network that organises and 
supports such activities. Intelligence is the initial link in the chain of 
thwarting any terror attack, but is crucial for thwarting suicide attacks 
before these occur. As many researchers note, suicide attackers hardly 
ever work alone. There is always an underground infrastructure that 
provides the essential financial and material resources and arranges 
everything else, including target identification and the time and date 
                                                     
3 During the course of this research, the author found many DVDs and VCDs that 
depict suicide operations, the wills of martyrs and ideological sermons. The 
objective of most of them is straightforward – to inspire and motivate the 
particular segment of the population that is disillusioned with the coalition forces 
and the Afghan government to become involved in the jihad. 
244 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
of the attack. Thus, the “crucial requirement in this struggle is 
‘intelligence, intelligence, intelligence’”.4 
• Police training in particular should be enhanced to better deal with 
tactics and strategies. Currently, the Afghan National Police is given a 
couple of weeks of general training and nothing specific on threat 
assessment or analysis. The police should be taught two sets of skills: 
a) methods for engaging the local community in a friendly and 
professional manner, which can lead to information about anything 
unusual witnessed in the area; and b) advanced counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency techniques, so they are better able to deal 
with violent groups. Police should also be provided with the 
necessary resources to handle the threat efficiently.  
• The military, including both the coalition forces and the Afghans, 
have to stop using a heavy-handed approach, most notably the kind 
that results in the killing of innocent civilians. Instead, they must 
work with the communities and develop trust among one another. On 
countless occasions, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have exploited the 
behaviour of the coalition forces to expand their pool of recruitment 
for suicide attacks. Similarly, the force used in operations should be 
controlled because if one innocent civilian is killed, it takes a way the 
goodwill of an entire family, community and tribe. 
• The Afghan military has to familiarise itself with the Taliban’s modus 
operandi and analyse their pattern of attacks. Analysing the data, it is 
quite clear that the two main targets of suicide attacks are the 
southern city of Kandahar and the capital; accordingly, the security 
for both of these ‘hot spots’ must be increased with due diligence. 
Only by knowing the environment and protecting it will the military 
be able to anticipate future attacks.  
• The Afghan coalition force must improve human intelligence in 
certain areas, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan,  where the majority 
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda recruit. There are several madrasahs in 
Waziristan, located in the North-Western Frontier Province of 
                                                     
4 Quote derived from an interview with Dr Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the 
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 21 April 2006. 
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Pakistan, which have been known for spreading a radical ideology of 
hate and instigating jihad in Afghanistan. Gathering information 
about them and monitoring their activities can lead to further success.  
• The coalition forces and the Afghan security sector must share 
whatever operational intelligence or information they collect on 
specific threats with their partners for regional cooperation. Only 
with the support and cooperation of the regional partners can those 
attacks that might have been planned from the outside be successfully 
prevented.  
Strategic measures 
• The Afghan ulema [panel of religious authorities] must continue to 
oppose suicide bombing and issue fatwas to that effect. They should 
clearly explain that suicide bombing does not lead to an eternal life in 
paradise, nor the permission to see the face of Allah or the loving-
kindness of 72 houris [beautiful maidens] who will serve the suicide 
bomber in heaven. The ulema should not allow fatwas to be 
manipulated by the extremists for negative effects in either 
Afghanistan or the Muslim world.  
• The moderate religious leadership throughout Afghanistan should be 
empowered and given opportunities to spread their message of peace 
and tolerance on the centre stage. Importantly, counter-ideological 
measures should be used such that religious clerics are engaged in 
initiating dialogue first with the population and second with the 
militants as well as their sympathisers in order to dispel ideologically 
the notions of suicide being compatible with Islamic jurisprudence.  
• The international community must remain active in Afghanistan until 
it has developed its own institutions that can deal with matters of 
state security. Without continued assistance, Afghanistan’s fragile 
security institutions would crumble, repeating the history of the early 
1990s when the country was a hub of international terrorism and drug 
production. Moreover, it is vital that the organic capacity of the state 
security agencies is developed, so it does not appear to citizens as the 
mouthpiece of the West.  
• Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbours are critical to its long-term 
stability and as such the country must establish strong regional ties, 
whether in commerce and trade or in the transfer of knowledge. 
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Because of its landlocked status, Afghanistan must explore ways to 
develop its relations with its neighbours beyond basic diplomacy. The 
two most important neighbours are clearly Pakistan and Iran, and 
their support and assistance are essential in curbing the flow of 
terrorists from either the Middle East or Pakistan itself. In order to 
carry out attacks, terrorists must cross either of these two countries to 
enter Afghanistan.  
• It is imperative that strong but informal ties be forged with village 
communities that live along the Afghan–Pakistani border, as some of 
these have been known to be safe havens for the Taliban and al-
Qaeda operatives. The government must have an ‘overall plan’ to 
deal with these communities and provide them with necessary 
services such as education and health care. It is crucial that the plan 
includes goals that improve the living standards of the average 
villagers. Concepts such as ‘winning hearts and minds’ must be 
employed. The majority of the population resent the Taliban; they do 
not wish to go back to the draconian rule that was forced upon them 
when the Taliban were in power.  
Conclusions 
Looking at the experiences of other states such as the US, the UK and many 
others – it does not really matter how strong or capable the government 
and security sector is – no government has been able to fully immunise 
itself from suicide attacks carried out by a group or an insurgency 
movement. For sure, Afghanistan will mirror this pattern. Yet by drawing 
from best practice, while incorporating issues of cultural and religious 
sensitivity, a rational middle way towards preventing them may be 
achieved. 
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Afghanistan: Mission impossible? 
The Pakistani Perspective 
Ismail Khan* 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the 
Americans were caught off-guard and did not initially respond to it. So for 
a year and a half, interest in Afghanistan on the part of the United States 
remained limited, looking at the country as an extension or satellite of the 
Soviet Union. 
Towards the mid-1980s, however, the influx of Afghan refugees into 
Pakistan and Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation drew the US into 
the conflict. The US soon realised that it had no other option than to 
operate through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to support and 
finance the Afghan resistance. All the funding came through Pakistan and 
was in turn distributed among the various resistance groups. In a way, by 
using Pakistan as a surrogate, the Americans did not know which group 
was receiving how much of the money being pumped in to shore up the 
Afghan resistance to the Soviets.  
There was recognition that while it was clear that the war was 
winnable, such an outcome was possible only with Pakistan’s help.  
But by the time the Soviets were beginning to leave Afghanistan, 
Pakistan had developed in-depth knowledge and experience in organising 
a guerrilla war to defeat one of the best and well-trained armies in the 
world. The Pakistanis came to understand that in order to make the 
guerrilla war a success it was imperative to bring the most powerful or 
most influential man on board. This tactic spawned what came to be 
known as warlordism in Afghanistan, which meant that whatever 
semblance of governance there had been, it fell apart and was replaced by 
anarchy. 
                                                     
* Ismail Khan is an Editor of Dawn (North-West Frontier Province) for the Dawn 
Group of Newspapers, and a Stringer for the New York Times in Peshawar. 
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Anarchy spawned something worse: jihad for Islam, which became 
an overriding factor. The Arabs came over, led by the fiery Palestinian 
ideologue Sheik Abdullah Azzam, to use Afghanistan as a base and 
springboard for jihad. At the time, Pakistan and the so-called ‘free world’ 
led by the US were not very discerning about who came to help as long as 
they aided the cause – even Israel helped by supplying arms to the 
Mujahideen. 
The result was that the old system crumbled and no new system was 
put in place, which gave rise to the creation of small fiefdoms. There was 
total anarchy. The Arabs, who had come mostly from countries with 
dictatorial regimes, became outspoken and started to challenge their own 
governments. They had a stake in the anarchy, the power vacuum and the 
absence of centralised governance. 
The Taliban appeared on the horizon, initially supported by everyone 
among the war-weary Afghans. Pakistan had tired of supporting one group 
against the other and saw in the Taliban an opportunity to bring a friendly 
centralised government to its western borders. By promising to restore 
order, the Taliban did not have to use force. Wherever they went, they 
negotiated to seize control of districts, cities and eventually provinces as a 
way of gaining control of almost the entire country. And they succeeded in 
doing so without firing a single bullet, with the exception of the Shomali 
plain where they met stiff resistance from forces loyal to Ahmad Shah 
Masood. 
While the Taliban, who had come from religious seminaries with 
their own interpretations of puritanical Islam, decided to implement 
Islamic laws as they interpreted them, the West also made the diplomatic 
and political blunder of ostracising them instead of engaging them. This 
approach served to strengthen the Taliban – when the Taliban needed and 
looked for support it came from Osama bin Laden, who offered them a 
hand of friendship and cooperation. 
Al-Qaeda made Afghanistan its base, not because they loved the 
country but because they needed a launch pad to plan and execute attacks 
like those of 9/11. When the Americans decided to invade Afghanistan, 
they decided to do so yet again on their own, enlisting Pakistan’s support 
but without involving it, apparently owing to a lack of trust. Washington 
tried to prop up an English-speaking Afghan commander and former 
Police Chief of Kabul, Abdul Haq, known among his Afghan colleagues as 
‘Hollywood Haq’ for his theatrics in leading the resistance to rout the 
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Taliban. He was caught and executed by the Taliban while attempting to 
sneak into Afghanistan, by co-opting some Taliban commanders who had 
formerly been Mujahideen commanders and were up for sale. The plan fell 
through. 
His execution and tragic exit created a big void, soon filled by 
another English-speaking Pashtun, Hamid Karzai. The Americans 
established direct contact with former Mujahideen commanders, 
unleashing the Northern Alliance on the Taliban and supporting their 
forces with targeted bombings. The Taliban dissipated into the countryside. 
The US had electronic intelligence but no human intelligence on the 
ground. Its effort to gather good human intelligence was further impeded 
by not involving Pakistan. 
The Northern Alliance, helped by American B-52 bombers, walked 
triumphantly into Kabul and set up a transitional government. The Taliban 
were cowed and the people genuinely believed they would see the advent 
of a new era of development and security. 
That did not happen, however; money was too short and too slow to 
come and security was on a back burner. The US-led coalition repeated the 
same error that the Soviets had made when they had invaded Afghanistan, 
by fortifying important cities and towns but overlooking key security 
arrangements to secure the eastern and southern Pashtun belt, largely 
inhabiting the Pakistani–Afghan border. Other initial mistakes by US-led 
coalition forces – such as targeting civilians on wrong information 
provided by commanders to settle personal scores together with the 
inability to move into the countryside and carry out development work – 
created an environment ripe for the resurgence of the Taliban.  
The winds began to change. For ordinary Afghans the myth of 
American invincibility and technological superiority dissolved when six 
years after the invasion the US had been unable to catch any of the so-
called ‘high-value targets’ such as Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden or his 
deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Afghan Pashtun began to doubt the 
effectiveness and professionalism of the American forces, through the 
forces’ failure to: 
1) carry out widespread development; 
2) catch any of the high-value targets; 
3) provide security and introduce some semblance of governance; 
4) reduce corruption; 
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5) deter President Hamid Karzai’s appointment of and reliance upon 
former Mujahideen commanders, who were viewed as warlords by 
the common Afghans; 
6) take steps to alleviate the perception that the Pashtun were under-
represented in a government dominated by the Northern Alliance; 
and 
7) stem the fear of reprisal attacks from Taliban insurgents (especially 
around Kabul) and to provide security to prevent them. 
Because of these and other factors, according to some analysts, the 
common man gravitated back to the Taliban, who were there on the 
ground – unlike the Americans and other forces who were largely confined 
or restricted to their camps. The Taliban were not the Mujahideen of 1979; 
they were better trained in guerrilla warfare and better motivated to oust 
‘occupation forces’. Indeed, the Taliban seemed to the people to be a 
winning side because of their presence on the ground, unlike the American 
and allied forces. 
The fact that most of the former Mujahideen or the Taliban had been 
living in Pakistan as refugees for decades made it a lot easier for them to 
move in and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They knew and understood 
the system as well as how to circumvent or bypass it without being caught. 
For decades, the Mujahideen and later the Taliban used Pakistan’s tribal 
region straddling along the Afghan border as a base from which to 
organise and launch attacks, recruit soldiers to their cause, find finances 
and return to as a fallback position. A careful study and analysis of the 
Mujahideen incursions into Afghanistan during the Soviet era would show 
that the Taliban continued to use more or less the same bases and routes to 
hit out at places in Afghanistan.  
Interestingly though, while Afghanistan blames Pakistan for all its 
troubles, many Pakistanis believe that extremism in Pakistan is fuelled 
from Afghanistan and not vice versa. The success of the Taliban in 
challenging the American-backed government in Kabul and the 
international forces has encouraged Pakistan’s own tribal militants (who 
had hitherto been subservient to Pakistani laws) to challenge the writ of the 
Pakistani government. The Pakistani tribal militants are beholden to the 
Taliban for finance and direction and look to them for leadership rather 
than the other way around, although the Taliban do obtain many of their 
recruits from Pakistan.  
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A case in point is the situation in North and South Waziristan and the 
Bajaur tribal regions along with the Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu 
districts of the North-West Frontier Province, which are affected by what is 
generally called ‘Talibanisation’. Pakistani militants draw their strength 
and inspiration from the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Pakistani militants 
have wanted to emulate the sort of system the Taliban introduced in 
Afghanistan and some analysts hold that this has stemmed from their own 
weariness of the colonial system that Pakistan has followed since the British 
ruled the Indian subcontinent. For them, the Taliban system was based on 
locally accepted norms and values on both sides of the border. Therefore, it 
has been the inability of Pakistan, the US, NATO and the Afghan 
government to give them an efficient system of governance that has moved 
them to the Taliban camp. 
The tribes on both sides of the Pakistani–Afghan border have always 
obeyed the mandate of the strongest force – in this case, the Taliban and the 
militants – which in turn has raised the spectre of vigilantism. They are 
doing what the government should have been doing for them, providing 
security and dispensing justice. 
Pakistan’s tribal conundrum 
Pakistan sent thousands of soldiers, for the first time since its inception in 
1947, to its tribal borders with Afghanistan in order to stop the al-Qaeda 
operatives fleeing American bombings in Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan 
from entering Pakistan.  
Although Islamabad had been able to control its borders in the 
Khyber and Kurram tribal regions effectively and as a result managed to 
round up over a 150 al-Qaeda operatives in a single haul, it is not clear why 
similar action was not taken in the restive North and South Waziristan 
tribal region. At the time, the regional military commander (now the 
Governor of the North-West Frontier Province), Lieut. General (retired) Ali 
Muhammad Jan Aurakzai denied that there were foreign militants in the 
tribal region, an argument vehemently rebutted by Pakistan’s premier 
intelligence bureau, Inter-Services Intelligence. Initially reluctant, when the 
army finally did move to act on good sound intelligence in June 2002 in 
Azam Warsak in South Waziristan, the bloody gun battle that left ten 
soldiers including two officers dead made abundantly clear the challenges 
that lay ahead.  
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More troops were rushed in and in March 2004, an operation was 
launched to flush out foreign militants in Kaloosha, South Waziristan. The 
security forces suffered massive casualties. The operation led to a series of 
attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes and 
rocket attacks on government and security installations.  
The situation was pretty grim, with security forces almost confined to 
their military barracks and garrison. The government entered into an 
agreement with tribal militant commanders known to have been 
harbouring foreign militants. The military commander at that time, Lieut. 
General Safdar Hussain, flew into Shakai in South Waziristan in April 2004 
to sign the controversial agreement with top militant commander Nek 
Mohammad and four others.  
Predictably, the agreement soon collapsed after the militants refused 
to agree to the registration of foreign militants with the government, a key 
element of the agreement. The collapse led to more attacks and Nek 
Mohammad was killed in a precision missile attack a few months later.  
Violence escalated and spread to the more difficult tribal region of 
South Waziristan, dominated by the Mehsud tribe, where military convoys 
came under ambush and IED attacks. A tribal militant and a former 
Guantanamo Bay prisoner, Abdullah Mehsud, plotted and kidnapped two 
Chinese engineers working on an irrigation project. One of the engineers 
was killed in a rescue operation. 
The attacks continued throughout 2004–05 and 160 pro-government 
tribal elders were eliminated by militants in targeting killing. Journalists 
also came under fire: two were killed, one was kidnapped and others were 
forced to flee the region.  
The government once again reached out to militants, this time 
signing a peace agreement with top militant commander Baitullah Mehsud 
in February 2005. The agreement has brought relative peace although in the 
process the government writ in South Waziristan has been utterly lost. 
Militants, both local and foreign, hold complete sway over the entire tribal 
region, operating a virtually parallel administration. The government writ 
is confined to the front walls of the Scouts Camp in Wana, the regional 
headquarters of South Waziristan.  
By 2006, the situation had also begun to deteriorate in neighbouring 
North Waziristan, where militants had started challenging the writ of the 
government by attacking government and security installations. The 
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government soon entered into another peace agreement, this time with the 
militants in Miramshah in North Waziristan. The 5 September 2006 peace 
agreement with the militants stipulated that the government would not 
carry out air or ground offensives, and in return, the militants agreed not to 
attack government or security installations. The agreement was seen by 
critics as a major concession to the militants, having failed to address two 
key demands: a) cross-border infiltration and b) the presence of foreign 
militants.  
At the same time, the government was also striving to strike a similar 
peace deal with the militants in the Bajaur tribal region. The American air 
strike in Damadola, apparently targeting al-Qaeda’s ‘no. 2’, also killed 
women and children, prompting public uproar. The air strike was followed 
by another in the same area; this time Pakistan owned up to the strike 
much against local belief that it was carried out by the Americans, 
effectively sealing the fate of any government–militants’ deal in Bajaur.  
The two attacks in Bajaur and the January 2006 attack on a cluster of 
compounds in South Waziristan led to a spate of suicide bombings aimed 
at military and police officials, leaving more than 50 dead. These incidents 
were demonstrative of how the government swung like a pendulum from 
one extreme to the other, from using force to what appeared total 
appeasement and capitulation to the militants and in so doing effectively 
ceding the writ of the state to the militants.  
Arguably, the Waziristan tribal region is now more difficult to 
administer than it was say, three years ago. As is evident, the agreements 
have failed to address key issues of cross-border infiltration and the 
presence of foreign militants in Pakistan’s tribal region, where militants 
continue to operate and recruit more freely than ever.  
Islamabad, which has continued to scoff at international criticism that 
Pakistan is not doing enough to stop cross-border infiltration, has pointed 
to the deployment of around 80,000 troops and 187 border posts. But at a 
press conference in Islamabad on 2 February, President Pervez Musharraf 
candidly admitted that there had been incidents in which some border 
guards had turned a blind eye to cross-border infiltration: “So similarly I 
imagine that others may be doing the same”, he said.  
Pakistan, as it appears, is facing its own dilemmas. It has been finding 
it hard to explain and persuade its own tribespeople of what has largely 
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been seen at home as a policy U-turn by Islamabad, in rejecting the Taliban 
and allying itself with the US in the post-9/11 war on terror.  
The tribespeople, predominantly illiterate, poor and conservative, are 
finding it hard to understand the difference between the Soviet ‘occupying 
forces’ and the US ‘liberating forces’ and just how the Mujahideen, who 
had earlier been hailed by the West as heroes, turned into villains 
overnight. This seemingly quick shift in policy and transition is too 
complicated a business for the tribespeople, who are now flocking to the 
Taliban to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from ‘foreign invaders’. So while 
President Musharraf has taken the stance of allying himself with the US, 
there are many in Pakistan’s tribal regions who do not share his view.  
Pakistan’s other predicament is that if it tries to control and rein in 
tribal militants from crossing the border to fight in Afghanistan, the 
militants level their guns at Pakistani forces and target government and 
security installations through ambushes, IED and suicide attacks.  
Thus, the situation in the tribal regions has a direct bearing on 
internal security. There are also political implications. Military operations 
and air strikes have resulted in a political backlash and outcry, particularly 
from the religious–political alliance that is ruling Pakistan’s North-West 
Frontier Province and sharing power with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan 
Muslim League in the province of Balochistan. While there have been some 
discussions and debates in the Pakistani parliament about the situation in 
the tribal regions as well as the violence and subsequent military 
operations, the government has not been able to formulate a consensus or 
achieve across-the-board political or public support for its policies there. 
With national elections only a few months away it also remains to be 
seen whether General Musharraf, so close to his bid to seek re-election as 
President, will want to take the political risk of launching yet another 
military operation in Waziristan to wrestle control from the militants. Such 
a move is especially questionable given the absence of broader political 
support for his pro-US policies and his reluctance to reach out to more 
secular political parties, such as the Pakistan Peoples’ Party of former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Pashtun nationalist parties like the 
Awami National Party.  
After exercising different options, from the use of military force to 
deal with militancy to engaging the militants directly, the government does 
not appear to be in the mood to go for a massive military operation. If 
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statements by President Musharraf are any indication, the government 
intends to give the political process a chance, with the military approach 
taking a backseat. 
The political process means engaging tribespeople as well as tribal 
militants in an effort to restore peace in the region, buy time to carry out 
development, foster tribal stakes in the system and extend the state’s 
authority and writ. It is a long and time-consuming process and it is not 
clear whether Afghanistan and its international backers, chiefly the US, will 
have the patience to let Pakistan try out the option amid growing violence 
across the border. 
This proposition is a difficult one and something that has crumbled in 
the past after air attacks by either the US or Pakistan under pressure from 
Washington, reigniting the flames of violence in the restive tribal region. 
But government officials are hopeful that if allowed, with patience and 
perseverance, they can turn the tide against militancy in the region. They 
argue that by cutting deals with tribespeople and militants, the government 
could buy enough time to carry out massive development and create job 
opportunities to wean unemployed, poor youth away from militancy.  
Peace is essential for development and requires concerted effort by 
Pakistan and the international community to inject funds to build up what 
are clearly the most underdeveloped regions in the country. There are 
already some signs that the tribespeople who had wholeheartedly 
welcomed their foreign ‘guests’ are growing weary of them in the face of 
the rising killings, kidnappings and robberies that have hit the region, 
leading to a stand-off between foreign and local militants. It is another 
matter that a much weaker administration there could not exploit such 
public sentiments and turn the tide against the foreign militants. 
A strategy to deal with the situation  
What then could work in the tribal region? The answer may lie somewhere 
half-way between a military and a political process: an intelligent 
combination of the two could create an atmosphere of peace and 
development, which in turn requires a well thought-out strategy to deal 
with the situation.  
What is needed therefore is a good and efficient system that brings 
development, security and job opportunities to a population with the 
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lowest socio-economic indicators in the entire region. It is a protracted 
process but a recipe for lasting peace devoid of any militancy.  
There is also a need to change the overall strategy from a colonial 
approach to a neo-colonial one, which entails the necessary development 
along with more cash and better security. Again, the solution is not going 
to be further militarisation of the conflict but a considered combination of 
the political as well as the military approaches. 
The government, in consultation with local tribes and taking into 
account their sensitivities needs to re-establish the network of checkpoints 
that it abandoned after the peace agreements with the militants, as well as 
disperse the militants and deny them territory in which to operate and 
train.  
Some analysts believe that tribespeople on both sides of the border 
can settle political matters among themselves and with the Taliban and 
militants, if allowed to do so freely without attaching any pre-conditions or 
strings. The worst of them, the former Mujahideen commanders who have 
always had their daggers drawn, would also continue to negotiate with 
each other through intermediaries. There is a sense in some circles in 
Pakistan that this could still be achieved. And in so doing, while the 
Taliban would not be immediately removed from the political scene, they 
could become important power brokers who could later be neutralised over 
a period of time.  
In addition, the forces would have to go and occupy the area, 
spreading out and preventing the Taliban the freedom to move. They 
would have to operate or initiate massive development and reconstruction 
projects involving the local tribespeople, buying-off the influential tribal 
elders by awarding them contracts for road construction, hospitals, schools, 
irrigation systems, etc., and thus enabling the tribes to have a stake in the 
new order. 
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